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ABSTRACTS

Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History

By ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN

The revolutionary events of 1989 in Eastern Europe took a special shape in the German Democratic Republic: large-scale flights of citizens to the Federal Republic of Germany combined with increasingly powerful mass demonstrations in the major cities to bring down the communist regime. This conjunction of private emigration and public protest contrasts with the way these distinct responses to discontent had been previously experienced, primarily as alternatives. The forty-year history of the German Democratic Republic thus represents a particularly rich theater of operation for the concepts of "exit" and "voice," which the author had introduced in his book *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970). The events of 1989 are scrutinized in some detail as they trace a more complex pattern of interaction than had been found to prevail in most previous studies.

The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec

By HUDSON MEADWELL

The central argument of this article is straightforward. (1) The contemporary Quebec nationalist movement has moved through phases of mobilization, demobilization, and remobilization. (2) Interpretations of Quebec nationalism do not successfully explain all three phases. (3) A new model of mobilization can provide a more satisfactory account. The goal is to construct a model that is useful for all three phases and that can say something about nationalism and political mobilization more generally.

Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europe

By WAYNE SANDHOLTZ

The member states of the European community are not just liberalizing telecommunications but are cooperating extensively in the sector. Breaking with a past dominated by rigid national monopolies (the PTTs), EC states in the 1980s undertook collective action in research and development, planning future networks, setting standards, and opening markets. This article seeks to explain telecoms liberalization and cooperation in Europe. Two conditions are necessary for international collective action to emerge. The first is policy adaptation at the national level, such that governments are willing to consider alternatives to pure unilateralism. In telecommunications, technological changes induced widespread policy adaptation in EC states. This adaptation was a necessary prerequisite for European cooperation. The second necessary condition is international leadership to organize the collective action. This paper extends the analysis of international leadership by outlining the conditions under which international organizations can exercise leadership to organize collective action. The case study, focusing on three dimensions of EC telecoms reform, shows how the Commission of the EC led in organizing collective action.

Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution

By JEFF CHECKEL

This article explores the influence of cognitive and institutional factors in shaping state behavior. In particular, the author examines their role in the Gorbachev foreign policy revolution, developing an analytic framework that integrates domestic and international sources of state behavior. While it is clear that a new ideology of international affairs—one developed and conveyed by Soviet specialists—played a critical role in shaping Gorbachev's "new thinking," its ability to influence policy was at different times constrained or magnified by insti-

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tutional and political variables. Moreover, the relevance of this new ideology to policy debates, particularly during the early years of the Gorbachev era, depended crucially upon the efforts of individual "policy entrepreneurs" and open policy windows. How wide these windows opened was, in turn, partly a function of the USSR's international environment.

Divergent Learning and the Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform

By JAMES CLAY MOLTZ

Attempts at economic reform in the late Gorbachev years suffered from a critical lack of consensus among top leaders on the desired direction of change. As the crisis worsened, top leaders did not band together but instead fell back upon their underlying organizational interests, adopting new economic programs largely to promote their own political constituencies. This article critiques the "collective learning" literature that has been applied widely to explain the Gorbachev reforms, and it suggests a typology to account for its strengths and weaknesses in both foreign and domestic policy settings.

In examining the politics of the late Soviet economic crisis, it proposes a model of divergent (rather than collective) learning and suggests the new concept of "borrowing" to explain the instrumental use of foreign economic models by rival Soviet politicians.

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EXIT, VOICE, AND THE FATE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

An Essay in Conceptual History

By ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN*

> Es gibt wenig Menschen, die sich mit dem Nächstvergangenen zu beschäftigen wissen. Entweder das Gegenwärtige hält uns mit Gewalt an sich, oder wir verlieren uns in die Vergangenheit und suchen das völlig Verlorene . . . wieder hervorzurufen.
>
> [The immediate past is but rarely the object of our interest. Either the present takes hold of us forcefully or we lose ourselves in the remote past and attempt . . . to re-create what has been wholly lost.]
>
> —*Goethe*
> *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*
> [The Elective Affinities]

Introduction

THE year 1989 was greeted with something of a yawn. Its first half would be marked by the elaborate, far-flung, and infinitely wordy bicentenary commemoration of the French Revolution. Everything was laid out well in advance, and the schedule of events was strictly followed up to the appointed climax, the celebrations of the Fourteenth of July in Paris. Thereafter, with the bulk of festivities, conferences, and speeches over, people would return to their usual pursuits. But then, as though the spirits of revolution, once invoked, assumed a life of their own, came the surprise, the "divine surprise" of that year: a series of totally unexpected political and popular movements broke out in rapid succession in Eastern Europe—from Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia to Bulgaria and Romania—overturning the hitherto uncontested power of the Communist parties and thereby altering fundamentally the seemingly stable bipolar world "order" of the preceding forty-five years.

The most radical of these changes took place in the German Democratic Republic, where the internal convulsion led in short order to the

* For useful comments on an early draft of this essay, I am much indebted to Albrecht Funk, Arthur J. McAdams, Bernhard Peters, and Rebecca Scott. See also fn. 18 for further acknowledgments.

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extinction of the political entity in which it occurred. The East German state was unable to survive the collapse of communist power and was absorbed (*geschluckt*, or "swallowed," is the expressive term often used) by its outsize twin, the Federal Republic of Germany, within a year of the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.

In spite of a considerable outpouring of articles and books—including some autobiographical accounts by key actors—a great deal about these events remains poorly understood. The very fact that they came as a total surprise to both spectators and actors suggests that our capacity to comprehend large-scale political and social change remains utterly underdeveloped. Under the circumstances, any conceptual tool that holds out the promise of providing a handle on the enigmatic events is likely to be eagerly seized upon. This is what happened in Germany to the concepts of "exit" and "voice," which I had proposed in my book *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*.[1]

The German translation of that book was published in 1974 under the title *Abwanderung und Widerspruch*,[2] literally "outmigration and contradicting." This was a daringly free, though apt, translation of the terms exit and voice, and it may have been chosen by the translator because even then migration and would-be migration were characteristic alternatives to actual resistance in the German Democratic Republic. So the title, with its accent on migration as a primary form of exit, may have contributed to making the book appear particularly relevant to the commotion of 1989. In any event, only six days after the spectacular opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Germany's most respected daily newspaper, published an article by Henning Ritter, director of the social science and humanities section, with the title "Abwandern, Widersprechen: Zur aktuellen Bedeutung einer Theorie von A. O. Hirschman" (To exit, to voice: On the current relevance of a theory of A. O. Hirschman). According to Ritter, my 1970 thesis was being tested "experimentally on a large scale" by the upheaval in East Germany. Since then, several political scientists and sociologists have made extensive, if on occasion conflicting, uses of the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty in interpreting the events of 1989, now generally called *die Wende* (the turn).[3] Eventually the topic even received a degree

[1] Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[2] Hirschman, *Abwanderung und Widerspruch*, trans. Leonhard Walentik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1974).

[3] For me the most stimulating contributions were several articles by Detlef Pollack, a sociologist of religion at the University of Leipzig. See in particular Pollack, "Das Ende einer Organisationsgesellschaft," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 19 (August 1990). Pollack gives an in-

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of official sanction as the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Association), an agency of the Federal Republic, listed the exit-voice approach to the analysis of the *Wende* among the research projects eligible for its grants.[4]

I became aware of this interest in my twenty-year-old book as I spent the academic year 1990–91 at the Wissenschaftskolleg (Institute for Advanced Study) in Berlin. At that time, I was also able, through reading and interviewing, to become more closely acquainted with the history of the GDR and, in particular, with the remarkable story of its demise. Perhaps not surprisingly, I came to feel that the exit-voice perspective could indeed be of help in seeing some of the events in a new light and that it could itself be enriched by its encounter with a complex historical testing ground. Moreover, to conclude this introduction on a personal note, the topic provided me with a point of reentry into German politics and history after an absence of over half a century from the country where I had spent my first eighteen years.

The Interplay of Exit and Voice: A Reformulation

To set the stage for my inquiry it is useful to present and reformulate as briefly as possible the concepts of exit and voice as they will be used here. Exit and voice were defined in my book as two contrasting responses of consumers or members of organizations to what they sense as deterioration in the quality of the goods they buy or the services and benefits they receive. Exit is the act of simply leaving, generally because a better good or service or benefit is believed to be provided by another firm or

sightful account of the events in Leipzig during the fall of 1989; he had obviously witnessed them at very close range. He points out that the events contradict my model to the extent it asserts a predominantly rival, rather than complementary, relation between exit and voice in social processes. He returns to this theme in several subsequent articles: Pollack, "Religion und gesellschaftlicher Wandel" (Religion and social change), *Übergänge* (June 1990); and idem, "Aussenseiter oder Repräsentanten?" (Outsiders or representatives?), *Deutschland-Archiv* 23 (1990), 1217–23. See also Pollack and Christiane Heinze, "Zur Funktion der politisch alternativen Gruppen im Prozess des gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs in der DDR" (About the function of politically alienated groups in the social upheaval in the GDR), in Wolf-Jürgen Grabner et al., *Leipzig im Oktober* (Berlin: Wichern, 1990). Other uses of the exit-voice distinction are found in Claus Offe, "Wohlstand, Nation, Republik: Aspekte des deutschen Sonderweges von Sozialismus zum Kapitalismus" (Welfare, nation, republic: Aspects of the unique German path from socialism to capitalism) (Manuscript, September 1990); and Wolfgang Zapf, "Der Zusammenbruch einer Sozialstruktur" (The collapse of a social structure) (Manuscript, February 1991). Visiting graduate students from the United States also contributed to the discussion. See Rogers Brubaker, "Frontier Theses: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in East Germany," *Migration World* 18, no. 3–4 (1990), 12–17; and John Torpey, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in the 'Peaceful Revolution' in the GDR" (Paper for the 17th Symposium on the German Democratic Republic, University of New Hampshire, June 1991).

[4] Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, press release no. 3, January 29, 1991.

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organization. Indirectly and unintentionally exit can cause the deteriorating organization to improve its performance. Voice is the act of complaining or of organizing to complain or to protest, with the intent of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has been impaired. Much of my book and of my subsequent writings on this subject dealt with the conditions under which exit or voice or both are activated.

A recurring theme of my 1970 book was the assertion that there is no preestablished harmony between exit and voice, that, to the contrary, they often work at cross-purposes and tend to undermine each other, in particular with exit undermining voice. Easy availability of exit was shown to be inimical to voice, for in comparison with exit, voice is costly in terms of effort and time. Moreover, to be effective voice often requires group action and is thus subject to all the well-known difficulties of organization, representation, and free riding. By contrast, exit, when available, does not require any coordination with others. Hence one of my principal points: "The presence of the exit alternative can . . . *atrophy the development of the art of voice*."[5]

This inverse relationship between exit and voice was confirmed by numerous examples from economic and social life. Thus, the fact that shares can be readily sold in the stock market makes it difficult for shareholders to have any real influence on management through voice; when exit from a marriage by divorce is easy, less effort will be made at repairing the relationship through "voice," that is, through communication and efforts at reconciliation; and, as was affirmed by the influential "Turner thesis," the absence of a strong workers' movement in the United States can be explained in part by the possibility, real or imagined, of "going West"—in the United States mobility was greater, or was widely believed to be greater, than in Europe during the period of rapid industrialization.

In many situations, exit thus tends to undermine voice, particularly, so I argued, when exit deprives the potential carriers of voice of their most articulate and influential members, as is often the case. In a recent essay I came to speak of the "basic seesaw pattern" of exit and voice.[6] This pattern could also be characterized as a simple "hydraulic" model: deterioration generates the pressure of discontent, which will be channeled into voice or exit; the more pressure escapes through exit, the less is available to foment voice.

It is remarkable that so primitive a model was able to account for as

[5] Hirschman (fn. 1), 43; emphasis in original.

[6] Hirschman, "Exit and Voice: An Expanding Sphere of Influence," in Hirschman, *Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays* (New York: Viking, 1986), 91.

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many diverse situations and experiences as have been marshaled by myself and others. But it could not be expected to be universally valid, and indeed the events of 1989 in the GDR traced out a very different relationship. As was pointed out by an East German sociologist,[7] here exit (out-migration) and voice (protest demonstrations against the regime) worked in tandem and reinforced each other, achieving jointly the collapse of the regime.

Even before this spectacular case of collaboration of exit and voice, I had become aware of some complications affecting the seesaw or hydraulic model. For example, I noted that since exit and voice are "two basic, complementary ingredients of democratic freedom, [they] have on the whole been enlarged or restricted jointly."[8] Also, in reconsidering the question of school vouchers, I speculated that the opening up of previously unavailable opportunities of choice or exit may generate feelings of empowerment in parents, who as a result may be more ready than before to participate in school affairs and to speak out.[9] Such a positive relationship between increased availability of exit and increased willingness to voice rests on a structure that is more complex than the one underlying the seesaw pattern. What happens here is that the newly won right to exit actually *changes* the human agents involved. Being allowed more choice they become more aware of and more desirous to explore the whole range of choices at their disposal. Once men and women have won the right to move about as they please, they may well start behaving in general as adult and hence as *vocal* members of their community.

Here, then, is a quite general rationale for thinking that enlarging the opportunity for exit can on occasion make for *more* rather than less participation and voice. This is indeed close to how things worked out in the German Democratic Republic in 1989. But the course of events over the forty-year-long life of that state comprised a large variety of exit-voice relationships. Some correspond faithfully to my original script; others depart from it more or less in the way that has just been sketched but

[7] See the articles by Pollack cited in fn. 3.

[8] Hirschman (fn. 6), 79.

[9] Ibid., 89. In describing the process of slave emancipation in Cuba in the late 19th century, Rebecca Scott has shown how slaves at times adopted a mixed, exit cum voice strategy; she calls it "voice in pursuit of exit." After 1880, when a new statute had imposed certain obligations on slave owners with regard to treatment and payment of slave labor, a substantial number of slaves, in alliance with abolitionists, took advantage of this statute to bring charges against their masters for violations. They obtained their freedom in this manner rather than by simply "running away." See Scott, "Dismantling Repressive Systems: The Abolition of Slavery in Cuba as a Case Study," in Alejandro Foxley et al., eds., *Development, Democracy, and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert O. Hirschman* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 274.

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will invite yet new interpretations. Time has come to plunge into "the facts."

Exit as Antagonist of Voice: 1949–88

From the very day of its founding, the stability of the German Democratic Republic was undermined by its coexistence with the Federal Republic. The possibility of improving one's lot by just getting out—by moving to the other, bigger, freer, and soon to be more prosperous Germany—fundamentally distinguished the East German postwar experience from that of the Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Hungarians, who had no such alternatives or prospects and who by and large were confined to their countries.

This basic existential difference between the German Democratic Republic and the other three comparatively advanced Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe explains much about their divergent political history. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary epic battles were fought against communist domination, from the 1956 Revolution in Budapest to the Prague Spring of 1968 and the emergence of Solidarity in Poland in 1980. After these movements were forcibly suppressed, new forms of resistance or dissidence promptly reemerged and created new spaces for "civil society," or, as Václav Havel called it, the "independent life of society."[10] In the German Democratic Republic, by contrast, the only important manifestation of discontent was the early and promptly crushed workers' uprising of Berlin on June 16–17, 1953. Thereafter, resistance (other than attempts to exit) and dissidence were minimal—until the powerful movement of autumn 1989, of course.

One may put in a claim right here, then, for a resounding confirmation of the simple hydraulic exit-voice model: the presence, real or imagined, of the exit option did undermine the development of the art of voice in the German Democratic Republic. For many years the GDR was the most reliably tranquil as well as the most supine of the Soviet satellites. In Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia resistance and dissidence were also up against enormous odds, but at least these movements did not have to contend with the sabotage and lure of exit.

Once stated, this very general first finding must be qualified by a more detailed look at exit and voice as they operated in the German Democratic Republic. For the purpose of the history of exit, Table 1 shows yearly data on East-West emigration from 1949 to 1989. Migration was

[10] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," trans. P. Wilson, in Havel, *Living in Truth*, ed. Jan Vladislav (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 85ff.

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TABLE 1
MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES FROM THE GDR
(INCLUDING EAST BERLIN) TO THE FRG
(INCLUDING WEST BERLIN)

Year	*Refugees*	*Authorized Migrants*	*Including Ransomed Political Prisoners*	*Total*
1949	129,245	—	—	129,245
1950	197,788	—	—	197,788
1951	165,648	—	—	165,648
1952	182,393	—	—	182,393
1953	331,396	—	—	331,396
1954	184,198	—	—	184,198
1955	252,870	—	—	252,870
1956	279,189	—	—	279,189
1957	261,622	—	—	261,622
1958	204,092	—	—	204,092
1959	143,917	—	—	143,917
1960	199,188	—	—	199,188
1961	207,026	—	—	207,026
1962	16,741	4,624	—	21,365
1963	12,967	29,665	(8)	42,632
1964	11,864	30,012	(880)	41,876
1965	11,886	17,666	(1,160)	29,552
1966	8,456	15,675	(400)	24,131
1967	6,385	13,188	(550)	19,573
1968	4,902	11,134	(700)	16,036
1969	5,273	11,702	(850)	16,975
1970	5,047	12,472	(900)	17,519
1971	5,843	11,565	(1,400)	17,408
1972	5,537	11,627	(730)	17,164
1973	6,522	8,667	(630)	15,189
1974	5,324	7,928	(1,100)	13,252
1975	6,011	10,274	(1,150)	16,285
1976	5,110	10,058	(1,490)	15,168
1977	4,037	8,041	(1,470)	12,078
1978	3,846	8,271	(1,480)	12,117
1979	3,512	9,003	(900)	12,515
1980	3,988	8,775	(1,010)	12,763
1981	4,340	11,093	(1,584)	15,433
1982	4,095	9,113	(1,491)	13,208
1983	3,614	7,729	(1,105)	11,343
1984	3,651	37,323	(2,236)	40,974
1985	3,484	21,428	(2,676)	24,912
1986	4,660	21,518	(1,536)	26,178
1987	6,252	12,706	(1,247)	18,958
1988	9,718	27,939	(1,083)	37,657
1989	—	—	—	343,854

SOURCES: Thomas Ammer, "Stichwort: Flucht aus der DDR," *Deutschland-Archiv* 22 (November 1989), 1207; and Hartmut Wendt, "Die deutsch-deutschen Wanderungen," *Deutschland-Archiv* 24 (April 1991), 390.

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substantial throughout the first twelve years of existence of the new state. Significantly, it reached its high point, close to the record of 1989, in 1953, year of the brief and ill-fated June 17 uprising in Berlin. It is not difficult to understand how the failure of this attempt at voice should have led to an exceptionally large exit. But even during the other years of that early period, emigration was substantial in relation to the total population of about seventeen million.

The existence side-by-side of the two German states was a remarkable historical experiment in migration. Here were contiguous territories inhabited by people speaking the same language and sharing a common history and culture. The ease and attraction of moving from East to West were further increased by the Grundgesetz (basic law or constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany, which stipulated that GDR citizens settling in the West would be automatically eligible to become FRG citizens. As such, they would then be eligible for the considerable range and substantial level of social welfare benefits available in the Federal Republic.

These structural characteristics would normally make for a considerable flow of emigration in response to even small differences in economic and political conditions. In fact, of course, such differences were large, as the two countries were organized according to wholly opposite economic and political principles. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s West Germany achieved a rapid and remarkably steady economic expansion, known as the *Wirtchaftswunder* (economic miracle), whereas the East German economy, burdened by reparations to the Soviet Union (rather than benefiting, like West Germany, from the Marshall Plan) and subjected to central planning on the Stalinist model, experienced only a modest recovery from the large-scale destructions of World War II.

The flow of people from the East was large enough to cause concern in the German Democratic Republic. Initially the East German authorities may have shrugged off the "voting with their feet" of many of their citizens and may even have welcomed it. As Fidel Castro felt later with respect to Cubans leaving for Miami, the GDR powerholders probably thought it advantageous to be rid of disgruntled and irreconcilable "class enemies": expropriated landowners, shopkeepers, and other "bourgeois" elements. But soon such complacency would give way to concern and then to alarm: it became clear that in this instance mass emigration was not a "safety valve," a metaphor that had often been rather aptly used to describe earlier emigration experiences. Rather, as it continued, the exodus of East Germans to the West—among them many highly skilled members of the labor force—came to be likened to a life-threatening

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"hemorrhage" that had to be stopped. The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was intended to achieve this objective.

The Wall did succeed in substantially reducing the outflow. After 1961 the statistics distinguish between two flows: first, emigrants who moved to West Germany with the permission of the East German authorities (*Übersiedler*)—often older people allowed to rejoin younger family members who had preceded them; second, there were those, less numerous but still in the thousands, who managed to flee to the West in spite of the Wall and other strict border controls.

Table 1 documents the precipitous drop in the number of total emigrants, from around 200,000 per year to an average of 32,000 during the first five years following the building of the Wall. Thereafter total emigration declined further, reaching its lowest level in the 1970s, when the yearly average was 15,000. In the 1980s the flow swelled again, particularly in 1984, when large numbers of long-time applicants suddenly received permission to leave. Thereafter, the door was shut once again.

The pressure to leave clearly increased in 1988 and forced the authorities to be less restrictive while the number of unauthorized departures also rose ominously. Then, in 1989 the gates were simply forced wide open and the outflow of people soon exceeded the "exodus" or "hemorrhage" levels of the pre-Wall period, until, eventually, the Wall came down.

What is actually surprising about the statistics from 1961 up to 1988–89 is the extent to which the Berlin Wall and the assorted draconian border controls were *unable* to stop the emigration. Though much reduced, out-migration remained throughout in the five-digit range—small in relation to total population, but definitely more than a trickle. As a result, the hope for escape to the West was kept alive year after year by the *actual life experiences* of thousands of exiting people. Both the real emigration of large numbers in the early postwar years and the continuing hope for exit (including the illusion about its possibility) in later years help explain the comparatively low levels of voice.

Moreover, in addition to the actual exits to the West, modern communications technology made possible a vicarious, if temporary, mass escape—via West German television. The East German writer Christoph Hein makes this point in a 1990 interview precisely in order to explain the weakness of the dissident movement in the GDR:

> [In the GDR we had a difficult task because] the whole people could leave the country and move to the West as a man [*geschlossen*] every day at 8 P.M.—via television. That lifted the pressure. Here is the difference with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. There the pressure contin-

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> ued to bear down *and generated counter-pressure* . . . that's why I always envied the Russians and the Poles. . . . In general, the helpful proximity of the Federal Republic was not helpful to our own development. . . . Here we had no samizdat, as long as we had access to the publishing houses of West Germany.[11]

So much for an exit-centered account of the considerable differences in resistance to the communist regime in the GDR and its neighbors in the Soviet bloc. But I do not wish to claim that differences in the ease of exit are the whole explanation. In looking backward, we hardly ever escape the presence of multiple (hence inconclusive) causation. It is certainly true in the present case that exit was infinitely more available, promising, and beckoning in Eastern Germany than elsewhere in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. At the same time, however, the chances for the emergence of voice in some shape or form were also much smaller there, for three principal reasons.

First, unlike the Poles, Czechs, or Hungarians, the citizens of the East German rump state could not look back on a sheltering history or national tradition of their own, nor did they have any established, more or less independent institutions (like the Catholic church of Poland) that would sustain them in a struggle for some autonomy from the all-powerful Communist Party and state. Only at a fairly late stage did the Protestant church in East Germany take on that function to some extent.[12]

Second, it is likely that many East Germans initially embraced the ideology of the new state for reasons intimately connected with the catastrophic historical episode they had just lived through. In addition to the Communist Party cadres and militants who had survived the Nazi regime and the war, there were those who, having been first seduced and later disenchanted and perhaps appalled by national socialism, eagerly embraced the ersatz ideology or *Weltanschauung* that was now tendered to them in the guise of antifascism and "true" socialism.[13] To accept this new creed meant that they could almost providentially forget the past or

[11] Christoph Hein, *Texte, Daten, Bilder*, ed. Lothar Baier (Frankfurt: Luchterhand, 1990), 42.

[12] Full documentation is found in Gerhard Rein, *Die protestantische Revolution, 1982–1990* (Berlin: Wichern, 1990); see also Ehrhart Neubert, "Eine protestantische Revolution," *Deutschland-Archiv* 23 (May 1990).

[13] Christa Wolf, who was sixteen years old when the Nazi regime collapsed in 1945, speaks of this experience in an interview in 1987–88: "My generation has early on exchanged one ideology for another." See Wolf, *Christa Wolf im Dialog* (Frankfurt: Luchterhand, 1990), 26. In another interview she amplifies this theme: "Today we see—some of us, anyway—that we were in danger of exchanging one salvation doctrine for another; for it is much more difficult to develop new forms of feeling and thinking than to exchange simply (though that was not so 'simple' either) old articles of faith for new ones" (p. 74). This experience is also re-created in two of her finest novels, *Nachdenken über Christa T.* and *Kindheitsmuster*.

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even atone for it. During the early postwar period this reaction fulfilled a cleansing function in East Germany that was the equivalent of the unremitting pursuit of work and prosperity in the West. In the other countries of Eastern Europe, with their very different histories, the newly installed communist regimes never held that sort of initial ideological advantage.

Third, and probably most important, East Germany was different from the other communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe in that it was the front line of the extended Soviet empire in its contest with the West. It was in East Germany that the highest concentration of Russian troops and tanks was to be found, and it was there that the Soviet short- and medium-range atomic missiles were later located. It therefore seemed unthinkable that the Soviets would ever permit any loosening of the leash that tied the East German regime to their own. "The more the day of reunification approached, the greater became the agreement among the theorists [of politics] about the impossibility, the dangers, and the uselessness of reunification."[14] No one in his or her wildest dreams ever imagined that the Soviet empire would disintegrate from within, the way it did in 1989 (and then again in 1991). Hence, the only conceivable scenario for East Germany recovering some freedom of movement was the defeat of the Soviet Union after a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers—a prospect too awful to behold and generally excluded from one's field of vision or discourse. The chances for successful voice were accordingly seen as being extremely low in East Germany, far more so than in less strategically situated areas where some relaxation of imperial controls was conceivable.

In sum, the direct obstacles to voice, that is, to any political movements of resistance or dissidence, were enormous. They must be added to the indirect undermining of voice by the real or imagined availability of exit to the West. Jointly these direct and indirect restraints on voice produced an exit-voice balance that was tilted far more against voice and in favor of exit than that prevailing in other Soviet-controlled East European territories, with the already noted result of substantially divergent political behavior in East Germany.

Moreover, throughout the forty-year existence of the GDR, authorities there showed every sign of being fully aware of the basic seesaw pattern of exit and voice. This is apparent from their frequent attempts to manipulate and exploit it. Particularly after they had substantially reduced exit by building the Wall, they realized that they could weaken internal

[14] Günter de Bruyn, *Jubelschreie, Trauergesänge* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1991), 29.

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opposition by a selective policy of either permitting certain people to exit or outright expelling critical voices considered to be dangerous or obnoxious. The best-known instance of such conscious manipulation of the exit-voice seesaw was the withdrawal of citizenship from the satirical poet and chansonnier Wolf Biermann while he was on tour in West Germany. This act, done on November 16, 1976, left Biermann unable to return home. Thus, a critical, ironic voice that was gathering a growing group of enthusiastic admirers was in effect expelled. The banning of Biermann gave rise to a rare voice event: twelve of the GDR's most prominent writers, artists, and intellectuals signed a declaration protesting the official action and asking for reconsideration, and in the following days the document was endorsed by another hundred signatories.

The episode marked the end of any hope that Erich Honecker, who had succeeded the hard-line regime of Walter Ulbricht in 1971, would be more tolerant of criticism and dissent. In the following years the authorities systematically used forced exit to reduce voice. The special term *abschieben* (pushing out or pushing over the border) came into use to denote the decision to get rid of certain critics by allowing, encouraging, or obliging them to leave for the Federal Republic. In the caustic formulation of Günter de Bruyn:

> The most creative, most critical or simply most adventurous people moved, often at the risk of their lives, across the German-German border and thereby contributed to the consolidation of stagnation and mediocrity [in the East]. Only when groups of dissidents started to advocate change in the GDR instead of simply leaving it, did the leaders of the country, who had long been aware of the damaging impact of the exodus on the economy, understand that it did contribute to political stability, with the result that they now resorted to Abschiebung as a sedative. In this way they also revealed that the mediocrity of the country matched their own to a fault.[15]

Among the prominent people who were thus pushed out were many well-known writers (for example, Jurek Becker, Erich Loest, Sarah Kirsch, and Monika Maron), as well as actors (Manfred Krug) and composers (Thilo Medek).[16]

In this manner the GDR authorities continuously beheaded oppositional groups in their early stages and eliminated dissenting voices *without* having to resort to overt acts of heightened domestic repression at a

[15] Ibid., 36–37.

[16] Hermann Weber, *DDR: Grundriss der Geschichte, 1945–1990* (Hannover: Fackelträger, 1991), 170. This is a good general guide to the history of the GDR; other principal sources of information are the journal *Deutschland-Archiv* and Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*; Christoph Links and Hannes Bahrmann, *Wir sind das Volk: Die DDR im Aufbruch* (We are the people: The GDR is breaking up) (Berlin: Aufbau, 1990).

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time of increasing international monitoring of human rights violations. They also found a way to get rid of many political opponents who did land in prison: soon after the Wall was built, the GDR systematically "sold" such people to the Federal Republic, which was willing to pay good ransom money for them. With the price per head often said to be as much as DM 40,000, this conversion of voice into exit became a valuable source of hard currency for the GDR. As Table 1 shows, this unsavory trade peaked in the mid-1980s.

These various forms of manipulating the exit-voice seesaw were attractive to the GDR for yet another reason. The people who were ransomed, expelled, "let go," or cajoled into leaving did not constitute compact, plotting, and therefore threatening exile communities on the model of nineteenth-century Italian or Russian exiles in Paris or London. Those writers and intellectuals who left settled easily in a variety of locations in the Federal Republic; they tended to blend into their new environments and did not maintain much cohesion as an émigré group. In the short term, the East German powerholders could justifiably feel that their policy of selective pushing out was both riskless and effective in reducing unwanted voice.

In the longer run, of course, the policy was to prove disastrous for the survival of the GDR. The comparison with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—where there was no exit alternative to speak of—is again instructive. Here dissenters stayed put. Even when, as was often the case, they started out as "deviationists" (that is, as communists unhappy with the party line), they eventually came to occupy a wide spectrum of points of view, from nationalism to liberalism to various social democratic tendencies. Hence, a pluralistic political discourse could evolve in these countries after the breakup of the communist regimes in 1989. Not so in the GDR; here most vocal opponents of the regime had been pushed out to the Federal Republic, where they had joined the existing political groups and had little interest in returning to the GDR. What dissident voices were to be heard in the GDR in 1988–89 came largely from a narrow band of reform-minded communists that had remained inside the party (SED) and criticized the "really existing socialism" exclusively in the name of some "true" Marxism or socialism. As the well-known dissident Bärbel Bohley said as late as mid-1989, in comparing the GDR and Czech situations: "Here change from below is out of the question. . . . Too many of those who would be in a position to take on political responsibility have left."[17] The resulting exit-induced vacuum of leader-

[17] Bärbel Bohley in an interview with Katja Havemann, in Bohley et al., *40 Jahre DDR* (Frankfurt: Büchergilde Gutenberg, 1989), 184.

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ship and of political life explains a good deal about the eventual collapse of the GDR as an independent entity and its easy absorption by the Federal Republic.

Exit and Voice as Confederates: The Collapse of the Communist Regime in 1989

The exit-voice seesaw was a sturdy reality with multiple aspects and extensive consequences throughout the first thirty-nine years of the short life of the GDR. So what happened in the final climactic year of 1989 when the seesaw of exit and voice suddenly turned into a joint grave-digging act?

Before addressing this critical question, I first go back to a remaining puzzle of the previous period. I have argued that, in contrast to the situation in the three neighboring Soviet-controlled countries, exit in the GDR remained a live option throughout the postwar years, whether such exit was a realistic project, a matter of hope and fantasy or a crude stratagem for the authorities. From the point of view of the citizens, nevertheless, the building of the Wall in 1961 represented a considerable shift from exit as a feasible project to exit as hope and fantasy. Would one not expect such a shift to reinforce voice in line with the seesaw or hydraulic exit-voice model?

Some such response can actually be noted. A few critical voices arose, particularly in the late 1960s and the 1970s. As already mentioned, the best-known case was that of chansonnier Wolf Biermann and the ensuing protest of leading GDR intellectuals following his banishment in 1976. But viewed against the sustained oppositional movements in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the absence of a crescendo in criticism or dissent in the years following 1961 was striking. It rather looks as though the brutal repression of exit signaled by the erection of the Wall was also understood as a further repression of voice. Formulated in these terms, the absence of the seesaw in this instance has a certain plausibility. The decision to tear the city of Berlin asunder with a 165-kilometer-long Wall, turning it into two noncommunicating halves, was an extraordinary affirmation of state power that signaled the GDR's general readiness to be more aggressive against "state enemies." In other words, not only did the building of the Wall restrain exit, but it also projected an enhanced willingness to rein in voice. Under the conditions, the increase in voice that might normally be expected when exit alone is curtailed did not and could not occur.

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The simultaneous repression of exit and voice in 1961 was to have its counterpart twenty-eight years later, when exit and voice exploded jointly and brought down the whole edifice of the GDR. In a first cut, the events of 1989 look like the exact inverse of what happened, or failed to happen, after August 1961. The inability of the GDR, starting in the spring 1989, to prevent a large-scale flight of its citizens to West Germany, via Hungary, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, signaled a novel, serious, and *general* decline in state authority. It was thus taken to imply a similar decline in the ability and readiness to repress voice—with the result that citizens started to demonstrate against the regime for the first time since June 1953. Precisely because the East German regime had made the repression of exit into the touchstone of its authority, its sudden incapacity to enforce its writ in this area meant a huge loss of face that emboldened people to other kinds of transgression.

This account of the collaboration of voice and exit in 1989 follows the lines of reasoning that have already been laid out in the introductory section. There I suggested that when previously unavailable opportunities to exit are forced open, people may experience new feelings of empowerment. They might then consider or reconsider other options, including that of reacting to an odious state of affairs by a direct attempt at change—through voice—instead of by moving away from it. This sort of *conjunction* of exit and voice turned out to be exceptionally powerful in the German case and took some striking forms. It will now be traced in some detail.[18]

Initially, exit played the lead part in the drama. Already in 1988 the pressure to leave the GDR is clearly on the increase, as a record thirty-nine thousand people manage to leave as compared with an average twenty-two thousand for the three preceding years (see Table 1). As is shown in the monthly figures of Table 2, the coming of spring heightens exit activity in 1989, particularly after Hungary decides on May 2 to take down the barbed wire fence on its frontier with Austria. This means that East Germans coming to Hungary as "tourists" can now slip into Austria and then reach West Germany with a much smaller risk of being stopped than before. Numerous GDR citizens soon take advantage of this opening, and on August 19, on the occasion of a meeting of the Pan-

[18] The following account is based in part on the sources cited in fn. 16, in part on other publications cited here. See in particular Gerhard Rein, ed., *Die Opposition in der DDR* (Berlin: Wichern, 1989); and the *Chronik der Ereignisse in der DDR* (August 1989–May 1990), *Edition Deutschland Archiv* (1990). Interviews with Gerhard and Gudrun Rein and with Detlef Pollack in Berlin in early 1991 were most helpful. In May 1992 I spent several days in Leipzig and Dresden and talked with a number of participants in the 1989 events. I am greatly indebted to all of them and in particular to Hagen Findeis in Leipzig.

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TABLE 2
MIGRANTS FROM EAST TO WEST GERMANY, 1989

January	4,627
February	5,008
March	5,671
April	5,887
May	10,642
June	12,428
July	11,707
August	20,955
September	33,255
October	57,024
November	133,429
December	43,221
Total	343,854

SOURCES: Harmut Wendt, "Die deutsch-deutschen Wanderungen," *Deutschland-Archiv* 24 (April 1991), 390.

European Union in Hungary, over six hundred East Germans make it to Austria. At the same time, the West German embassies in Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, and East Berlin are filling up with hundreds of East Germans looking for asylum and hoping somehow to be allowed to move to the West.

International and media attention is focused on the human drama and mass flight that is shaping up just as the East German regime is preparing for a Gorbachev visit and the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of its founding. On September 10 the Hungarian government further facilitates exit by officially authorizing all East Germans on its territory to pass into Austria. By the end of September over twenty-five thousand *Ausreiser* (outward-bound travelers) will have taken advantage of this escape route. In the meantime the situation in the embassies becomes increasingly unmanageable, as thousands of refugees keep crowding into them. As a result of high-level talks between the foreign ministers of the two German states, an agreement is reached to transport them by train to West Germany. The one face-saving "concession" obtained by the East Germans is that the trains are routed through its territory, so that the East German state is seen to let go officially and expel its alienated citizens—an insistence that, as will be noted shortly, was to have remarkable unintended consequences. Special sealed trains thus bring some fourteen thousand Ausreiser from Poland and Czechoslovakia to West Germany on October 1, 4, and 5, giving a grotesque cast to the fortieth anniversary celebrations on October 6 and 7. In one more month,

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marked now primarily by ever more massive demonstrations, the Berlin Wall would come down.

Such, in briefest outline, is the chronicle of exit from the GDR in 1989. Let me now try a similarly concise review of the course of voice. As in the case of exit, premonitory signs of future explosions of voice stand out in retrospect. From the early 1980s on, the Nikolaikirche, a church in the center of Leipzig, served on Monday afternoons as a meeting point for "peace prayers."[19] In 1988 these occasions become a rallying point for Ausreiser or *Ausreisewillige*—people who wish to leave and are waiting for the official permit. On January 15, 1989, an unauthorized silent march (*Schweigemarsch*) takes place in Leipzig on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg (who had become something of a hero to the counterculture largely because of her saying "Freedom always means freedom for those who think differently"); 150 participants are taken into custody by the police. On May 7 municipal elections are held; when a 98 percent victory for the ruling party is announced, unprecedented, widely scattered protests break out against irregularities and forgeries, and 120 arrests are made in East Berlin alone. In May–June the regular Monday meetings at the Nikolaikirche in Leipzig increasingly turn into protest meetings, with ever larger groups of Ausreiser participating. Even in the presence of a considerable police force they often chant their slogan: "Wir wollen raus" (we want out).

In June, after the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, the Honecker government vows not to give an inch, by declaring its unconditional solidarity with the Chinese communist regime. But at the same time, the mass exodus via Hungary becomes widely known. This leads to a loss of authority for the GDR, which comes to be referred to derisively as *D*er *D*umme *R*est (= DDR), or "the dumb remainder."

After a brief summer recess the Monday church meetings resume in Leipzig, and on September 4 a single shout of "Ich bleibe hier" (I'm staying here) is heard for the first time, in response to the chant ("we want out") of the Ausreiser.[20] This turns into the collective "Wir bleiben hier" (we're staying here) on September 11 *and becomes a rival rallying cry*. According to participant observers, there were a number of meanings implied: "We're staying so as to make sure that things will not stay as they are"; or "We're staying even though we don't like things here";

[19] For the events in Leipzig, see in particular Grabner (fn. 3); Neues Forum Leipzig, *Jetzt oder nie: Demokratie* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1990).

[20] Albrecht Dönert and Paulus Rummel, "Die Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen," in Grabner (fn. 3), 149.

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or "You won't be able to get rid of *us*."[21] Despite the pervasive tension and fear, the back and forth of the two slogans—"we want out" and "we're staying here"—introduces an element of entertaining street theater into the demonstration, which now emerges from the church and spills over into the adjoining streets. There it is met and dissolved by massed police forces, which use force and make numerous arrests.

For a while the Ausreiser, the partisans of exit, and the *Bleiber*, the partisans of voice, form separate, even somewhat antagonistic, groups.[22] Eventually they merge under the slogan "*Wir* sind das Volk" (*we* are the people), which, particularly when the first word is accented, trenchantly denies the basic tenet of the communist state structure and ideology: that there is a complete identity of views and interests between the ruling Communist Party and the population. This arresting slogan also seems to echo Bertolt Brecht's poem on the insurrection of June 17, 1953, with its final caustic suggestion that the government may wish to dissolve the people and elect another.[23]

Another important pole of voice is the city of Dresden,[24] where the number of would-be Ausreiser is especially large. According to one (paradoxical) explanation this is so *because* West German television did *not* reach the low-lying Dresden area, which was therefore referred to as the *Tal der Ahnungslosen* (valley of those who are out of it). The local people are thus unaware of some of the unpleasant realities of life in the West—unemployment, hard work, and so forth—while they routinely *dis*believe the propaganda emanating from the radio and television programs of the GDR! But another aspect of Dresden's geographical position is more important in explaining the presence of many would-be emigrants. The city was the GDR's major rail and road gateway to Czechoslovakia, and from there to Hungary and the West. In September it fills up with many people from points west and north in the GDR—people who are plan-

[21] The first meaning is noted in Peter Schütt, "Bleiben, damit es nicht so bleibt, wie es ist," *Deutschland-Archiv* 22 (1989), 1209–13. The other interpretations ("Wir bleiben, obwohl's uns nicht gefällt" and "*Uns* werdet Ihr nicht los") were reported by activists in interviews held in May 1992 in Leipzig.

[22] Petra Bornhöft, "Ausreiser und Bleiber marschieren getrennt: Auf der Demonstration in Leipzig trennten sich die Wege: abwandern oder reformieren?" (Ausreiser and Bleiber march separately: During the demonstration in Leipzig the roads parted—to exit or to reform?), Berlin *Tageszeitung*. September 9, 1989, reprinted in the *Tageszeitung* brochure, *DDR: Journal zur November-Revolution* (Berlin: S.d.), 8.

[23] At the end of his poem "Die Lösung" (The solution), Brecht asks: "Would it in that case / Not be simpler if the Government / Dissolved the People / And elected another?" [Wäre es da / Nicht doch einfacher, die Regierung / Löste das Volk auf und / Wählte ein anderes?] See Bertolt Brecht, *Werke*, *Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe*, ed. Werner Hecht et al. (Berlin: Aufbau, 1988; and Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 12:310.

[24] The events in Dresden are chronicled in Eckhard Bahr, *Sieben Tage im Oktober: Aufbruch in Dresden* (Seven days in October: Upheaval in Dresden) (Leipzig: Forum, 1990).

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ning to leave the country. Then, two major events occur in rapid succession. On October 3, the official East German news agency announces that the frontier with Czechoslovakia is being closed "temporarily," except to GDR citizens with passports and valid visas. (Up to then, GDR citizens could travel freely to Czechoslovakia, which, with its hard-line regime, was considered to be the most "fraternal" of all socialist countries.) As a result, many people are blocked in Dresden as well as intensely frustrated over being shut in (*eingesperrt*). The next day, October 4, the news circulates that sealed trains with East German Ausreiser from the Federal Republic embassies in Prague and Warsaw are about to pass through the city on their way to West Germany. As a result, large groups of would-be Ausreiser congregate in and around the main railroad station in hopes of somehow boarding these trains. The police are alerted and brutally clear the station area. This, in turn, leads to resistance, rioting, considerable damage to the station, and further demonstrations during which, once again, shouts of both "Wir wollen raus" and "Wir bleiben hier" are heard.

There is also a second story about the origin of the rallying cry "Wir bleiben hier" during those days. Before the police intervened, a railway official—a woman—apparently attempted to get the crowd of Ausreiser to leave the Dresden station by telling them: "Citizens, go home—we promise you that all of you will be permitted to emigrate [*ausreisen*]." Whereupon a good many in the crowd, disbelieving such promises and unwilling to vacate the station, shouted back: "Wir bleiben hier"—we're staying right here![25] Only later, according to this account, did the meaning of the slogan change to the more sophisticated concept "we want to change things by staying." Hence, voice may have arisen out of intended exit not as a result of opposition to exit as such, but through linguistic ambiguity and slippage.[26]

Whatever the case, the riots at the Dresden station are followed by daily protest demonstrations that draw up to ten thousand people. They take place in the midst of the fortieth anniversary celebrations of October

[25] Kurt Nowak, *Jenseits des mehrheitlichen Schweigens: Texte vom Juni bis Dezember des Jahres 1989* (Beyond majoritorian silence: Texts from June to December 1989) (Berlin: Union, 1990), 20–21.

[26] A correspondingly literal use of the opposite slogan "Wir wollen raus" was reported to me during my visit to Leipzig in 1992. In October 1989, when groups of demonstrators found themselves cut off on all sides by mobile police forces, they would shout "Wir wollen raus" simply to indicate their demand to break out of the police trap. But in this case the wider meaning (we want to be free to leave the GDR) certainly antedated the narrower one. Well known by then, the wider meaning probably inspired the demonstrators to use the slogan in the narrow sense. By contrast, in the case of "we're staying here," it is possible that, at least in Dresden, the narrow meaning preceded the wider one.

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7; perhaps not to mar that occasion too badly, police violence remains sporadic. Then, on October 8 a large group of protesters stages a sit-down in a square in the vicinity of the station, and a young priest manages to obtain approval from a police official for the crowd to appoint representatives who will negotiate its demands with the authorities. Delegates are somehow selected, and as they stand up, they are applauded by the seated crowd by way of investiture. Thus is born the Dresden "group of twenty," which actually convenes with the mayor of Dresden the next day and works out concessions that lead to a relaxation of tensions. In the short span of five days, the Dresden crowd will have traveled all the way from a desperate push for exit to organized voice, complete with representation and delegation.

At this stage, Berlin's voice is lagging behind those of Dresden and Leipzig, but on October 7, after the official celebrations, several hundred young people gather on Alexanderplatz and, for the first time there, the slogan "Wir bleiben hier" is heard in response to the initial "Wir wollen raus" of those who simply want to leave. The whole group then marches in the direction of the nearby Palace of the Republic, where Gorbachev and other high-ranking special guests from the "fraternal" communist countries are being entertained. Another widely heard, significant cry is "Gorbi hilf uns" (Gorbi help us) as well as, more simply, "Gorbi, Gorbi."

The watershed event is the next Monday demonstration in Leipzig, on October 9, frequently referred to since as *Schicksalstag*—the fateful day. During the preceding days there are ominous rumors—no doubt officially inspired—of an imminent "Chinese solution." The most widely read daily newspaper, the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, publishes a virulent declaration by a group of militant communists; the group attacks the "counterrevolutionary actions," which must be "stopped once and for all, if need be with weapons in hand."[27] Stories circulate about hospital floors being emptied of their occupants, in anticipation of a flood of new arrivals, and about supplies of frozen blood being readied. So great is the apprehension that six prominent citizens, including three high functionaries of the SED and the symphony director Kurt Masur issue an urgent appeal for moderation and dialogue among all parties.[28] Then, issuing not only, as on previous Mondays, from the Nikolaikirche, but converging by advance arrangement from three other inner-city churches as well, the biggest demonstration ever takes place on the afternoon of October 9. Some seventy thousand participate in a peaceful march, with the principal shouts being "Wir sind das Volk" and "Keine Gewalt" (no violence). Another slogan expressing the hope for avoidance of violence

[27] Links and Bahrmann (fn. 16), 16.
[28] Neues Forum Leipzig (fn. 19), 82.

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is "Widerrede ist nicht Widerstand," which can be translated as "to voice does not mean to resist." For all the tension of the situation on that Monday afternoon, the police do not intervene, no blood is shed—and the authority of the GDR is shattered forever. As one eyewitness put it later: "In the late evening of October 9, the GDR had become something different. This was obvious to all participants."[29]

Thereafter, while thousands continue to flee to the West (the prohibition of exit via Czechoslovakia that was imposed in early October is lifted in the middle of the month), events accelerate and the center of the stage moves to East Berlin. By October 18, the Central Committee of the SED has become sufficiently concerned about the future of the regime and the immobility of the party leadership to force Erich Honecker to resign as secretary and all-powerful government leader. On November 4 the largest voice event on record, a huge protest demonstration with over half a million people, takes place in East Berlin. It is followed in short order by the most spectacular exit event: with the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, millions of Easterners cross into West Berlin to enjoy their newly won *Freizügigkeit* (freedom to move).

As in many other demonstrations throughout East Germany, the two principal demands of the November demonstration in Berlin were free elections (more voice) and freedom to travel (free exit). The latter is achieved directly with the opening of the Wall and the subsequent abolition of other border controls. It takes a little longer to organize free elections; they are held on March 18, 1990, with shattering results for the SED.

In the year following the opening of the Wall, the state structure of the GDR disintegrates rapidly. As one East German commentator wryly noted, the famous "final stage of communism" in which the state is supposed to "wither away" is virtually reached in those months during which the GDR, along with its once formidable police, slowly expires.[30] The GDR ceases to exist on October 3, 1990, when its territory is incorporated as five new provinces (*Länder*) into the Federal Republic.

Interpretation

The foregoing account, with its close intertwining and mutual stimulation of exit and voice, may not strike the reader as particularly problematic. It becomes more so, however, when the year 1989 is contrasted with

[29] Christoph Wielepp, "Montags abends in Leipzig," in Thomas Blanke and Rainer Erd, eds., *DDR: Ein Staat vergeht* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1990), 72.

[30] Friedrich Dieckmann, *Glockenläuten und offene Fragen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 205.

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the previous thirty-nine-year period. During those years, as shown earlier, exit took place by and large at the expense of voice and was often engineered "from above" for that very purpose. That classical hydraulic pattern still put in a fleeting, if influential, appearance during the 1989 events, when the closing of the Czech border on October 3—the *prohibition* of exit—contributed a great deal to the powerful development of voice in and about the Dresden railway station. But on the whole it was the confluence of the two forces that characterized their interaction in 1989. To appreciate the peculiarity of this situation it is helpful, first of all, to recall a few distinguishing conceptual properties of exit and voice.

Exit—be it the decision to look for and go over to a more satisfactory supplier of goods and services or the decision to emigrate, to leave for a more satisfactory country—is essentially a *private* and also typically a silent decision and activity. One can do it alone: there is no need to talk it over with anyone. Exit is therefore a minimalist way of expressing dissent—one does not act in concert with others and leaves without noise, "under the cover of night." Nobody can exit for you, however: the fact that others exit may influence one's decision to do likewise, but it can never substitute for that decision. Thus exit is not only a private decision; it is also a private good in that it cannot be had through the exertions of others, as a result of some sort of free ride.

The characteristics of voice could not be more different. Voice is typically a *public* activity. Though it does not indispensably require organization, action in concert with others, delegation, and all the other features of collective action, it thrives on it. Voice activities such as petitions and demonstrations are therefore subject to the well-known liabilities of free riding—even though, as I have amply argued elsewhere, these liabilities can on occasion turn into assets.

According to this brief recapitulation, exit and voice have very different impulses and are likely to arise in very different circumstances—they would seem to inhabit quite different worlds. How then did the two come to be so intimately bound up together during the events of 1989?

Now it must be pointed out that exit—experienced in East Germany as departure for the West—initially ran true to the form just described. For example, during the exit wave of 1984, when an unusually large number of requests for emigration, mostly of young people, was granted by GDR authorities, Heinrich Rathke, the Protestant bishop for the province of Mecklenburg, declared: "Precisely in these weeks large numbers of people are leaving us *secretly, softly, and silently*" (*heimlich, still und leise*). At the same time, another pastor lamented the "loss of speech"

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of the young.[31] This loss of speech (*Verlust der Sprache*, or *Sprachlosigkeit*, "speechlessness") is also a much noted characteristic of those who left via Hungary or Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1989. Robert Darnton witnessed a silent exit scene near the West German embassy in Prague:

> I was especially struck by a young couple who arrived with a baby in a taxi. The mother stepped out. She lifted a pram from the taxi's trunk, unfolded it, and placed the baby inside. Then she pushed the pram ahead of her, while her husband carried two large suitcases, looking grimly at the embassy door. When they stopped in front of it, she suddenly burst into tears. I nearly did, too.[32]

Others were similarly shaken. Fearing, Cassandra-like, that events might take a disastrous turn, Christa Wolf, the prominent writer, managed to slip into West Berlin for a radio interview with Gerhard Rein on the eve of the October 9 demonstration in Leipzig. It was a last-minute attempt to help avert another Tiananmen Square. She began by speaking at length about the deep distress (*Erschütterung*) she and her friends had experienced during the preceding weeks over the images of so many young people leaving the GDR:

> These last days, in conversing with people, I have always come up against questions that are also my own: Do we really know these young people? Why do they leave so easily? Why are they in part so speechless [*sprachlos*]? Why do they find it so difficult to articulate what they dislike here and what they look for elsewhere? . . . During the last four or five weeks we in the GDR were all dominated by these images, couldn't sleep, were in despair.[33]

Later on in the interview, she lodged an impassioned protest against the official reaction of the SED leadership to the mass exodus:

> There should not be any mockery. No one has the right to come out with this sentence that has been tremendously upsetting for many people, including myself: "We do not shed a single tear over those who leave." [Wir weinen denjenigen, die weggehen, keine Träne nach]. That is awful [*schrecklich*]. It is absolutely awful to say such a thing while forty thousand young people leave our country.[34]

Christoph Hein, another major writer of the GDR, spoke in similar terms as early as mid-September. He too was indignant at the "not a single tear" statement and affirmed, to the contrary, that to live in a

[31] Wolfgang Büscher, "Warum bleibe ich eigentlich? Reaktionen der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR auf die Ausreisewelle" (Why do I stay? Reactions of the evangelical church in the GDR to the emigration wave), *Deutschland-Archiv* 17 (July 1984), 684–85.

[32] Darnton, *Berlin Journal, 1989–1990* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 73.

[33] Wolf (fn. 13), 77.

[34] Ibid., 83.

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country that is constantly being abandoned by its citizens made him "physically and emotionally sick."[35] Jens Reich, a principal founder of the citizens' movement "New Forum" in September 1989, put it this way: "This out-migration torments [*quält*] us already for many years . . . for various reasons we have lost many friends . . . that was so bitter, this feeling of sitting in the waiting room of a railroad station and everything around you is breaking loose. In the end it was unbearable."[36]

There was something particularly devastating about these *silent*, *private* exits—they drove some of the more conscientious remaining citizens, such as Christa Wolf, Jens Reich, and Christoph Hein, to a passionate voicing of their concern and despair. It is not too daring a conjecture that we touch here also on the backdrop to a major, still largely unexplained nondecision of these months. Why did the hardest and most rigid communist regime in the East not follow the Chinese example that it had hailed just a few weeks earlier? Why did it fail to defend itself "weapons in hand" (*mit der Waffe in der Hand*) as it had many times boasted it would? Among the explanations that have been offered, the most prominent has been the assumption of a deus ex machina—Gorbachev was thought to have discouraged any such course during his October visit. But I find it plausible that not only Christa Wolf and her friends were devastated by the mass exodus of the summer: the communist rulers themselves may well have suffered self-doubt and a loss of nerve and were in the end unable or unwilling to perpetrate yet another *Schrecklichkeit*.

In fact, Günter Schabowski, the member of the Politburo of the SED who was later to give the signal, perhaps unwittingly, for the breaching of the Berlin Wall on November 9, speaks in his recollections about the exodus in terms quite similar to those of Christa Wolf and Jens Reich: he calls the resulting situation "tormenting" (*quälend*) and "most deeply shaming" (*zutiefst beschämend*).[37] According to his account, moreover, the opposition to Honecker and the other hard-liners that arose within the Politburo in September–October and led to the ouster of Honecker on October 18 had really gotten under way when Krenz and Schabowski agreed to circulate a position paper criticizing the "not a single tear" statement. (The statement had appeared in the party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* of October 2 and was widely attributed to Honecker.) Their position paper stressed, to the contrary, that the exodus was a matter of

[35] Irene Charlotte Streul, "Die Kulturszene der DDR im Aufbruch," *Deutschland-Archiv* 22 (December 1989), 1404.
[36] Rein (fn. 18), 27.
[37] Schabowski, *Das Politbüro* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990), 62.

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great concern for the GDR and that every departure must be felt as a loss.[38]

This story provides a first way of understanding how public voice was stimulated by private exit in the fall of 1989, instead of being undermined by it, as had been the case previously. A closer look reveals the sequence of events to be a variant of the usual way exit is supposed to work in alerting "management" to its failings. The normal pattern is as follows: when customers take their business away from a firm or members desert a political party, the managers of these organizations soon become aware of declining sales or other evidence that something is wrong; they then search for the reasons and take steps to repair whatever lapses are responsible for the customers' or members' evident unhappiness.[39] In the case of the GDR, this straightforward feedback mechanism worked very poorly, because the managers of the GDR had inured themselves to it—note the "not a single tear" phrase—and were in general an insensitive and inflexible bunch. But the mass exodus did sufficiently impress, depress, and alert some of the more loyal citizens, those who had no thought of exiting, so that they finally decided to speak out. The mobilization and voice of these citizens can thus be seen as a substitute for the failed response of the GDR managers or as a second wake-up call for them. The normal sequence of events that is supposed to be set off by exit has simply become more roundabout.

The collaboration of exit and voice during the events of 1989 can also be explained by an appeal to the concept of loyalty, as discussed in my book.[40] Here, loyalty was shown to delay exit (as well as voice) when there is a decline in the performance of an organization to which one belongs. In counterpart, when that decline passes a certain threshold, the voice of the loyal members tends to become particularly vigorous. All along, however, I had made the simplifying assumption that at any one time, organizations (families, political parties, nations, and so forth) ordinarily evoke a specific degree of loyalty among their members (or that characteristics such as loyalty have some sort of normal distribution around a specific mean intensity). If we now complicate this assumption and imagine an organization with two very different kinds of members, those with a great deal of loyalty and those with little or none, reactions to deterioration will take two distinct forms: those who are unburdened by feelings of loyalty will be prone to exit, while the loyalists will resort to voice. The former are the Ausreiser, the latter the Bleiber. Although

[38] Ibid., 81.
[39] Hirschman (fn. 1), 21–25.
[40] Ibid., chap. 7.

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the concurrent emergence of these two distinct groups could thus have been predicted from an elementary complication of my loyalty model, in fact, the inventiveness of history was needed to suggest the complication and to reveal its importance.

It may look as though the conjunction of exit and voice during 1989 in the GDR has been adequately explained by the two considerations that have just been put forward. In the process, as expected, the theory has already been enriched by the historical events themselves. Nevertheless, the intimate fusion of exit and voice that was so characteristic of the protest movement in the GDR requires further comment.

The real mystery of the 1989 events is the transformation of what started and was intended as a purely *private* activity—the effort of scattered individuals to move from East to West—into a broad movement of *public* protest. How and when did public elements intrude upon the private sphere? How and when did they overwhelm the original intentions of the actors? The answer is contained in the historical account that has been presented. Originally the 1989 Ausreiser conceived their departure from the GDR as a totally private affair: as in 1984, they were intent on leaving *heimlich, still und leise*—in secret, silently, on tiptoe. But these intentions were frustrated by two circumstances: too many people had the same idea, and, as a result of external events such as the relaxation of frontier controls between Hungary and Austria, their moves were too successful to remain secret and private. Pictures of the exodus soon flooded the TV screens, with the result not just of causing established critics like Christa Wolf and Jens Reich to sharpen their criticism but also of making activists out of long-passive average citizens. As a Protestant pastor of Leipzig said in November 1989, looking back on the crucial September events in that city:

> [As] the others fled West, the folks here said: . . . We won't go along [*mitmachen*] any longer. People who are forty-five, fifty, fifty-five years old, who previously never raised a finger, who were totally indifferent, who have perhaps been cussing and saw clearly how everything went to the dogs—they now got worried about seeing their own children waving at them on TV the next day from Prague or Budapest. That's what motivated them.[41]

Exit also ignited voice in another, more direct way. As the Ausreiser themselves converged at key points (border crossings, railroad stations, embassies), they realized they were no longer alone, recognized each other as being of similar mind, and *rejoiced in the community they had*

[41] Rein (fn. 18), 180.

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unwittingly forged. The most remarkable episode of this sort was the massive occupation of the Dresden railroad station by would-be Ausreiser hoping to board the refugee-laden trains that would pass through. Upon looking at each other and particularly upon being told to clear the station, those erstwhile private Dresden Ausreiser *went public*. The very chant, "Wir wollen raus," turned them instantly from private to public citizens with a common cause. At this point those in the crowd who had no thought of leaving felt obliged to manifest their position in turn: their contrary chant, "Wir bleiben hier," became inevitable, irresistible, as one East German writer put it.[42] Thus private exit turned into public exit, which in turn generated public voice and even organized delegation and negotiation with the authorities—all within a matter of days.

At first the "Wir bleiben hier" chant may have been a mere reflex, a clever linguistic invention, an automatic reply, initially without much content, to the rallying cry of the Ausreiser. Whereas the latter knew exactly what they wanted, namely, "out," those who viscerally disagreed with that solution had no such certainties. Having asserted their will to stay they now had to come up with some good reasons for doing so. Their rallying cry rather slowly and haltingly took on reformist meanings and messages. Perhaps "Wir bleiben hier" was an effective slogan just because of its vagueness and ambiguity—everyone who intoned it could endow it with his or her own content.

This linguistic interpretation of the chant carries considerable conviction. It is actually intermediate between the two earlier interpretations: (1) that the chant had a definite reformist message from the start and (2) that it arose totally by happenstance, initially expressing nothing more than the refusal of demonstrators to obey an order to vacate the Dresden railroad station and was later misunderstood or reinterpreted to assume a broader political meaning.

Seeing "Wir bleiben hier" as a purely verbal reply-reflex to the "Wir wollen raus" of the Ausreiser gains plausibility from the slogan "*Wir* sind das Volk" (*we* are the people) that eventually supplanted the two warring pro-exit and pro-voice slogans. "*Wir* sind das Volk" inherited the ambiguity of "Wir bleiben hier" and was similarly enigmatic and vaguely threatening. So much ambiguity could not be sustained for long, however. In the end, as is well known, a slight variation in wording endowed the Volk motto with a quite concrete and down-to-earth meaning. Just as "Wir wollen raus" led to "Wir bleiben hier," so did "*Wir* sind das Volk" turn into "Wir sind *ein* Volk" (we are *one* people)—a slogan that

[42] Dieckmann (fn. 30), 64.

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asked for the merger of the two Germanys and, implicitly, for the obliteration of the GDR.

This outcome is yet another aspect of the 1989 events that must confront my original script and in particular its happy-end scenario. My book had been written with the "constructive" purpose of exploring how exit and voice could help restore or nurture a faltering organization back to tolerable performance and health. Both exit and voice were seen primarily as mechanisms that would "alert management to its failings" after a "repairable lapse." Yet the possibility that an organization might actually fail to recover and instead succumb to the blows inflicted on it by exit and voice (as well as by its own weaknesses) was not entirely ruled out. I had argued that exit and voice would yield the desired constructive results only if they came forth *with moderation*, thereby not only alerting "management" but also giving it the time needed to mend its ways.

For the survival and recuperation of both business firms and political organizations, a "mixture of alert and inert citizens" or customers would be far better, so I argued, "than either total, permanent activism or total apathy."[43] This consideration points to one of several reasons why the combination of massive exit and tumultuous voice in 1989 led to the death of the GDR rather than to its rebirth: that twofold "critique," so long repressed, was simply too devastating to allow for any "recuperation mechanism" to work. Attempts to stay the course were made, notably by the famous November 26 appeal, *Für unser Land* (for our country), which was drafted by Christa Wolf and signed by a group of GDR writers and professionals that included several well-known dissidents.[44] It argued for the maintenance of a reformed but socialist and "humanist" GDR as an autonomous entity—and it proved totally ineffectual. The headlong rush to reunification was not to be halted. Indeed, the extinction of the German Democratic Republic can be seen as the ultimate penalty for the long suppression of both exit and voice.

Conclusion

This is the end of my "essay in conceptual history." I have looked at the GDR and its demise through some special lenses, in hopes of discerning new patterns, significant connections, and improved interpretations. The details of the story are therefore its essence, but two general observations will provide a conclusion.

First, the 1989 upheaval in the GDR represents a reversal of a move-

[43] Hirschman (fn. 1), 24, 32.
[44] Wolf (fn. 13), 170–71.

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ment that has been held to be characteristic—disastrously characteristic—of German history. A great deal has been written about the propensity of Germans in various historical circumstances to retreat from the public domain to the strictly private—to the famous (or infamous) *Innerlichkeit.* This movement is supposed to have come all too easily to Germans, particularly when they were confronted with distasteful and repugnant events in the public domain. The idea, often traced to Luther, that the inner, private sphere is something infinitely precious, pristine, and inviolable may indeed have undercut the emergence of the public citizen who assumes responsibility for the political life of his or her community. From this point of view, the story that has been told here provides a welcome counterpoint: it essentially chronicles how many East Germans found the road back from exit and apathy to voice, from withdrawal and purely private reaction to public action. However unintended this movement was initially, it became nevertheless a powerful and successful citizen movement. Thus, it stands in contrast to the many "failed revolutions" as well as failures to resist tyranny that have marked German history since the Reformation. From this point of view it is perhaps to be regretted that language downgraded the movement from "peaceful revolution" to *Wende* (turn) soon after it was over. Strangely, once Germans had finally succeeded in toppling, at considerable risk but without major bloodshed, an oppressive and ruinous regime, they designated the event with a term that almost deliberately understated it. In this they resemble those persons who, on the basis of their past missteps, have a poor self-image and who, confronted by success in some new endeavor, will strain to reinterpret that unfamiliar experience as yet another failure or, at best, as "nothing to write home about." By contrast, Richard von Weizsäcker, Germany's Federal president, showed a better appreciation of the 1989 events, when he said in a recent speech: "With their nonviolent actions, the revolutionaries of the year 1989 have given all Germans a new awareness of liberty. The past is not extinguished in consequence. But a decisive new chapter has been added to our history."[45]

My second point reflects on method. I have attempted to give some shape to the story of the short-lived German Democratic Republic by retelling it in terms of the contrasting categories of private exit and public voice. Such an enterprise runs the risk of making too much of a theoretical construct. In 1909 the French anthropologist Robert Hertz published an article about the extravagant extrapolation of the right hand–

[45] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 18, 1991, p. 7. Speech on the occasion of the award to Weizsäcker of the Heine prize for 1991.

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left hand dichotomy by language and culture to encompass ever more basic contrasts, such as right-wrong, good-evil, divine-profane, and so forth.[46] For quite some time, then, we have known about the strange proclivity of the human (or Western?) mind to exaggerate differences, to blow up what Hertz called an "almost insignificant asymmetry" into unbridgeable binary oppositions—in short, to make socially constructed mountains out of natural molehills. I, too, may have engaged in this pastime as I collected conclusive evidence for the existence in many realms of a fundamental antagonism between private exit and public voice. Here the German story of 1989 should stand as a reminder of Sportin' Life's maxim, "It ain't necessarily so"—a principle in theoretical modesty that social scientists disregard at their peril. In some momentous constellations, so we have learned, exit can cooperate with voice, voice can emerge from exit, and exit can reinforce voice.

I noted a number of specific ways where the role of exit turned around in this fashion. The German language has a peculiar gift for compact verbs, such as *umschlagen* and the famous Hegelian *aufheben*, which endow such turnabouts with seeming reality. I deliberately avoided these terms, as they evoke the famous dialectic, the "negation of the negation," and similar mysterious, if preordained, processes that dissolve all contrasts and reconcile all opposites. The longing for such reconciliation is of course the exact counterpart of the inordinate fondness for building up dichotomies that was noted by Hertz.

The events of 1989 were not experienced as stemming from an enigmatic turnabout in the functioning of social processes. Those who lived through them were not troubled at all by the fact that exit and voice now worked hand in glove after having undermined each other for four decades. A problem arises only for the social scientist who seeks a deeper understanding and who, in the course of this attempt, fashions a conceptual framework that initially makes it easier, but subsequently can make it more complicated, to understand what is going on. In that case, of course, our analyst may still come out on top by showing how instructive it is that events should have diverged from the original scheme!

[46] Hertz, "La prééminence de la main droite: étude sur la polarité religieuse," in Hertz, *Mélanges de sociologie religieuse et folklore* (Paris: Alcan, 1928), 99–129. The expression cited in the next sentence occurs on p. 127. The article was originally published in *Revue Philosophique* 68 (December 1909). For an English translation, see Hertz, *Death and the Right Hand*, trans. Rodney and Claudia Needham (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

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THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC

By HUDSON MEADWELL*

Introduction

THE nationalist movement in Quebec is one of the most powerful national movements in the developed West. It has weathered more successfully the disappointing results of a referendum on the national question than either the Welsh or Scottish nationalist movements.[1] Its efforts to entrench the use of the French language in Quebec[2] have been more successful than the efforts of any other language movement in the developed West, with the possible exception of Catalonia since the transition to democracy in Spain. Nationalists have been able to use the provincial state to weaken the cultural division of labor, which worked in the past to segregate Francophones in lower-status and lower-paying occupations.[3]

Nationalism dominates Quebec politics. Indeed, since the formation of the Parti québécois (PQ) in 1968, one single question has increasingly defined political discussion and action: how much decentralization should govern relations between Quebec and Canada? Unlike most other cases in which movements have produced a single ethnoregional party (for example Scotland, Wales, and Brittany), both the provincial Liberals and the Parti québécois are nationalist parties that differ fun-

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[1] See Edward A. Tiryakian, "Quebec, Wales and Scotland: Three Nations in Search of a State," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 21, no. 1–2 (1980).

[2] See Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); William D. Coleman, *The Independence Movement in Quebec, 1945–1980* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1984); Marc Levine, *The Reconquest of Montreal* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); Michel Plourde, *La politique linguistique du Québec, 1977–1987* (Quebec's linguistic policy, 1977–1987) (Quebec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1988).

[3] See Yves Bélanger and Pierre Fournier, *L'entreprise québécoise* (The Québécois enterprise) (Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 1987); Jorge Niosi, *La bourgeoisie canadienne* (The Canadian bourgeoisie) (Montreal: Editions Boréal, 1980); François Vaillancourt, *Langue et disparités de statut économique au Québec 1970 et 1980* (Language and economic status disparities in Quebec, 1970–1980) (Quebec: Gouvernement du Québec, 1988).

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damentally on how much decentralization is desirable. This is a luxury that other movements do not often enjoy.

The case of Quebec is distinguished by the combination of popular support for territorial decentralization and the institutional capacity to translate this support into meaningful political pressure. By contrast, other cases, such as Scotland, have broad support for decentralization but institutional environments that make it difficult for nationalist leaders to use this support to produce political change. Conversely, cases such as the Swiss cantons are characterized by low levels of support for territorial change and relatively high institutional capacity. Finally, there are cases, like Brittany, in which nationalist leaders have neither the significant support nor access to local institutions to mobilize support: hence they must depend on nonnationalist parties to implement parts of their nationalist agendas.

In this article, I examine one central feature of the nationalist movement in Quebec: the ability of its leaders to mobilize popular support for substantial changes—up to and including political independence—to the constitutional status quo in Canada. I focus especially on the period since the Quiet Revolution of the late 1950s and early 1960s. More specifically, I provide an interpretation that accounts for the events following the formation of the Parti québécois in 1968, that is, the pattern of mobilization, demobilization, and subsequent remobilization of the nationalist movement in the late 1980s. Whereas most accounts of Quebec nationalism have proved useful for the initial phase of mobilization and the second phase of decline, the goal here is to construct an explanation that is useful for all three phases and that can also say something about nationalism and political mobilization more generally.

The article is divided into five sections. I first discuss the historical background and consider several influential interpretations of the contemporary Quebec nationalist movement. In the third section I introduce an alternative theoretical argument that focuses explicitly on processes of ethnic nationalist mobilization, and I assess relevant features of the Quebec case, using this model of mobilization as a framework for interpretation. In the final section, I extend this model further to examine the factional politics of nationalist parties and, once again, to assess features of the Quebec case. Finally I discuss the consequences of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the package of constitutional reforms designed to make the Constitution Act of 1982 acceptable to Quebec. The accord was adopted by the Canadian prime minister and provincial premiers on June 3, 1987, but was not ratified by all the provincial legislatures.

My central argument is straightforward. (1) The contemporary Que-

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bec nationalist movement has moved through phases of mobilization, demobilization, and remobilization. (2) A useful model of mobilization should account for all of these phases. (3) The interpretations of Quebec nationalism considered in this paper do not successfully explain all three phases. (4) A new model can provide a more satisfactory account.

I. Some Historical Background[4]

The institution that defined the character of French Canadian nationalism in Quebec from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century was the Roman Catholic church. The population was mobilized by the church around local symbols, with rural life and *la patrie* linked together and glorified as part of a natural community. The church attempted to insulate the flock from social changes perceived as dangerous to the maintenance of the faith and consequently to the power and the position of the church in Quebec. The high clergy had close ties to the European church and closely followed events overseas. Changes associated with the French Revolution—republicanism, anticlericalism—were viewed by the church with great concern. Not surprisingly the insurrection of 1837–38, which was led by an emerging middle class that argued for secular education and a liberal state, was viewed as a "small French revolution."

In fact, the failure of the insurrection marked the consolidation of the position of the church as the principal intermediary between the government and the French Canadian population. From then on, the fusion of faith and nationality preserved boundaries that insulated the church's flock from the influence of the English, Protestant, and industrial world.

Except for a short period following the Durham Report (1841), the Canadian state pursued an accommodationist rather than an assimilationist policy toward French Canadians. The political arrangement underlying confederation gave the church control of the regionally concentrated, French-speaking Catholic population. The federal structure of political authority in Canada was in part a direct consequence of both the French Canadian reality and the decision not to pursue assimilation—a strategy that would likely have been costly, in terms of social programs and of increased social unrest and disorder. Part of the negotiated accommodation was the relinquishment of certain limited powers to the province of Quebec. In return, English Canada retained its control of commerce in Quebec, a necessary feature of the accommodation for

[4] This section draws on Hudson Meadwell, "Forms of Cultural Mobilization: Quebec and Brittany, 1870–1914," *Comparative Politics* 17 (July 1983).

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the English Canadian commercial and financial elite, and the Canadian political elite avoided the costs of an assimilationist strategy.

Although it did not attack traditional authority in Quebec, accommodation by the Canadian state nevertheless left the traditional elites more dependent on the structure of local society. Provincial political elites were dependent on Quebec society since their positions were part of the provincial political system. The church's continued existence as an institution depended on its ability to maintain its flock. Since the French Canadian cultural group was concentrated in Quebec, the church's control over it became increasingly linked to the provincial boundaries of Quebec, especially after 1900.

The traditional elite in Quebec was effectively able to control cultural and political resources through the 1940s. The 1950s then brought the emergence of a new political class that contested the local power of the church and the traditional political elite, as well as the co-optive arrangement underlying confederation. The decline of traditional elite control brought with it an end to these co-optive institutions and practices and ushered in a new bargaining relationship between state and ethnic group. The changes in Quebec politics since this Quiet Revolution have been the subject of theoretical debate. In the next section, I discuss the most important interpretations of contemporary nationalist mobilization in Quebec.

II. Other Approaches to Nationalism in Quebec

Let me comment here on three different arguments: internal colonialism, the new middle class thesis, and the capitalist state thesis.

Internal Colonialism

The most powerful class-based interpretation of ethnic nationalism is the thesis of internal colonialism,[5] which locates the cause of nationalist mobilization in the inferior structural position of the ethnic group.[6] The mechanisms that account for nationalist preference are typically some combination of exploitation and injustice experienced by individuals who occupy similar economic positions and therefore share material interests. These structural conditions are linked to nationalist preferences

[5] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975).

[6] Internal colonialism is both too strong and too weak an explanation for ethnic mobilization. Too strong, because there are cases with significant nationalist movements that are not internal colonies, such as Catalonia. Too weak, because there are cases with weaker movements that are internal colonies, such as Brittany during the Third Republic.

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by an ideological trope of internal colonialism. These arguments typically predict that support for nationalism will be associated with a stable cultural division of labor and will be concentrated among those inferior positions in occupational structures.[7] Moreover, the political rhetoric of nationalism is expected to be couched in terms of "ethnic class."

This ideological trope has appeared in nationalist discourse,[8] and it had some influence among the 1960s generation of *indépendantistes*.[9] As in other cases, such as the Basque country in Spain[10] and the peripheries of France,[11] these activists found their model for political action in the movements for national liberation in the developing world.[12] This model is not important today among activists or the mass public, including the Quebec working class.

Related interpretations of Quebec nationalism, which turn on the presence of a cultural or segmented division of labor,[13] are flawed in other ways. National mobilization cut across class lines in the 1970s and 1980s and occurred, not when segmentation was stable, but as it was breaking down.[14] As a consequence of this change in the division of labor, Francophone Quebec is no longer dependent on Anglophones to manage key institutions in the private and public sectors. As the Francophone division of labor has become more complete, resembling a "pillar" rather than a segment,[15] independence has become a more plausible option, and popular support for it has increased. This development contradicts an important prediction of the internal colonial thesis, namely,

[7] Charles C. Ragin, "Ethnic Political Mobilization: The Welsh Case," *American Sociological Review* 44 (August 1979); Eric Leifer, "Competing Models of Political Mobilization: The Role of Ethnic Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 87 (January 1980).

[8] Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique* (White Niggers of America) (Montreal: Editions Parti Pris, 1968).

[9] Kenneth McRoberts and Dennis Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, 2d ed. (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1980), 144–54.

[10] Gurutz Jàurequin Bereciartu, *Ideologia y estrategia politica de* ETA, 2d ed. (ETA's ideology and political strategy) (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985), 238–63.

[11] Robert Lafont, *La révolution régionaliste* (The regionalist revolution) (Paris: Gallimard, 1967).

[12] As in some other cases, as well, this orientation was associated with the use of violence in the 1960s, which culminated in the kidnapping of a provincial cabinet minister and British diplomat in 1970.

[13] Jacques Dofny, "Ethnic Cleavages, Labor Aristocracy, and Nationalism in Quebec," in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

[14] Rudi Fenwick, "Social Change and Ethnic Nationalism: An Historical Analysis of the Separatist Movement in Quebec," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (1981); McRoberts and Posgate (fn.9).

[15] A "segmented" division of labor refers here to the concentration of an ethnic group in a narrow range of activities, while a "pillar" refers to a division of labor in which the group spans a broad range of activities. See Ronald Rogowski, *Rational Legitimacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); and Hudson Meadwell, "Ethnic Nationalism and Collective Choice Theory," *Comparative Political Studies* 22 (July 1989).

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that nationalist mobilization is caused by segmentation in a cultural division of labor.

The PQ does have a cross-class base of electoral support that includes substantial working-class support: the trade union movement, for example, has supported sovereignty. In its formative years, the PQ drew support from activists who combined a national project with social democratic goals. Despite the party's shift toward a more liberal economic program, the trade unions have continued to support sovereignty. Their leaders now distinguish between the national and social projects, which provides a rationale for group solidarity when sovereignty seems achievable. Survey research has also shown that individual perceptions of economic domination are related to nationalist support.[16]

Little is gained, however, from viewing these features of nationalist politics through the too narrow optic of internal colonialism. This approach to ethnic mobilization fails to account for two central features of nationalism: its *embourgeoisement* in the 1970s and its remobilization in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

The New Middle Class

Another approach emphasizes the linkage between an emerging new middle class and support for nationalist politics.[17] It thus explains *embourgeoisement* as follows: nationalism is a strategy that secures a niche in the provincial public sector for this class, which has found upward mobility blocked in the private sector (in large part because of the limited opportunities in the economic sectors controlled by the French Canadians and because of discrimination within the sectors controlled by English Canadians). In this argument, the strengthening of the provincial state must at least be a by-product, if not the central goal, of nationalism. Individuals in the new middle class thus support nationalism because it widens, maintains, and legitimates a niche in the occupational structure that provides them with otherwise unavailable opportunities. The boundaries of the niche, and therefore access to positions, are defined by one's language (and educational background). This tended de facto to restrict entry to French Canadians. All else being equal, the fewer the opportunities in the private sector, the greater the interest in nationalism;

[16] Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "Motivational Dimensions in the Quebec Independence Movement: A Test of a New Model," in *Research in Social Movements Conflicts and Change* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 1986).

[17] Hubert Guindon, *Quebec Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Mary Beth Montcalm, "Québécois Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," in Alain G. Gagnon, ed., *Quebec: State and Society* (Toronto: Methuen, 1984); Gilles Bourque and Anne Legaré, *Le Québec: la question nationale* (Quebec: The national question) (Paris: Maspero, 1979).

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and the larger the state sector, the lower the degree of distributive conflict over jobs within the educated subset of the group. This argument emphasizes the private benefits that flow to individuals from the capture of the state.[18]

The argument, however, is also statecentric and downplays the effects of the partisan composition of governments. Public sector expansion in Quebec is not associated with any particular administration or party but rather holds across governments in the post-Lesage period. If the public sector is expanding regardless of who is in office, however, individuals in the new middle class might be expected to be indifferent toward parties on this issue. The argument thus does not provide a consistent theoretical rationale for the prediction that these individuals will be supporters of separatism. Nor has it explained why some are federalist and others *indépendantistes*. (The argument that support for these options is associated with different fractions of the new middle class[19] is neither convincing nor substantiated.)[20]

Further, the argument about the new middle class does not provide a convincing explanation of the different levels and composition of support for independence in the various cases of ethnic nationalism, nor does it provide an account of the mobilization process of *indépendantiste* organizations. The argument does not distinguish between two different propositions: (1) that all or most of the new middle class supports separation and (2) that all or most separatist supporters are from the new

[18] André Breton, "Economics of Nationalism," *Journal of Political Economy* 72 (August 1964); Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as Group Solidarity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 10 (October 1987). Survey evidence suggests that the relationship between public sector employment and political preferences has varied over time in the Francophone population. Blais and Nadeau report a positive relationship between public sector employment and support for the 1980 referendum and for the Parti québécois in the 1981 election. Blais and Dion, using a 1985 survey, find no significant difference between public and private sector employees and support for sovereignty. A likely cause of this change was the conflict between the PQ and public sector employees over wage levels in 1981–82. More recently Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche present survey evidence that indicates a sectoral effect on support for independence in the immediate pre–Meech Lake period (spring 1990). This relationship disappears because after the failure of Meech Lake, independence gains more support among private sector employees than among public sector employees. See André Blais and Richard Nadeau, "La clientèle du Parti québécois: évolution de la clientèle de 1970 à 1981," and idem, "La clientèle du 'oui,' " both in Jean Crête, ed., *Comportement electoral au Québec* (Chicoutimi, Quebec: Gaëtan Morin, 1984); André Blais and Stéphane Dion, "Les employés du secteur public sont-ils différents?" *Revue Française de Science Politique* 37 (February 1987); Edouard Cloutier, Jean H. Guay, and Daniel Latouche, *Le virage: l'évolution de l'opinion publique au Québec depuis 1960* (Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 1992).

[19] Gilles Bourque and Nicole Laurin-Frenette, "La structure nationale québécoise" (The national structure of Quebec), *Socialisme québécois* 21–22 (April 1971).

[20] Richard Pelletier, "Nationalisme et étatisme au Québec dans les années 1960" (Nationalism and statism in Quebec during the 1960s), *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 7 (Autumn 1980), 346.

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middle class. These propositions are not equivalent. Most of the middle class may support separatism, but most separatists may still come from other strata. Conversely, few from the middle class may support separatism, but all supporters of separatism may be middle class. The proportion of new middle class supporters in an organization also can be higher than the proportion of this stratum in the broader group and still be only a small part of the organization's support. The most sensible reading of the argument, however, is that there is disproportionate support for separatism within the new middle class and that separatists are disproportionately drawn from the new middle class. If this argument is accurate, support would vary mainly with the size of the new middle class. Level of support across time in one case is thus assumed to depend on changes in the size of this stratum; and cross-sectional differences in support across different cases are assumed to vary with the sizes of their respective new middle classes. Neither of these assumptions is compelling.

Part of the problem is that this argument lacks a theory of the competitive process of political mobilization. Mobilization, for example, is not always precisely defined, and the argument may fail to distinguish between membership, on the one hand, and active participation and electoral support, on the other, in an *indépendantiste* organization.[21] The new middle class thesis assumes, moreover, that relevant cases are located in the developed West. The relevant organizations are nationalist parties that participate in the electoral process; and in several of these cases, nationalist issues have been addressed in referenda. In no case in the developed West is the new middle class of the ethnic group large enough to provide electoral victory, however. Nationalist parties that seek to mobilize broad support must invariably move outside the new middle class. Hence, the new middle class thesis provides no purchase on explaining these processes of mobilization. At best, the argument provides a partial theory for the emergence of activists.

These problems are confirmed in the case of Quebec. The relationship between occupation and different measures of electoral support in the 1970s and the 1980s are summarized in Table 1. The evidence is consistent across different measures, including support for independence and the Parti québécois. Most supporters are not drawn from the middle class, old or new, but come instead from the working class. While the PQ and the independence option do well among intellectuals and other professionals, this support is only a small fraction of overall support. Fur-

[21] The work of Pinard and Hamilton is an important exception. See, e.g., Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Class Bases of the Quebec Independence Movement: Conjectures and Evidence," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7 (January 1984).

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TABLE 1

CLASS BASIS OF SUPPORT FOR THE PQ AND INDEPENDENCE

	Intellectuals	*Other Professionals and Technicians*	*Managers and Proprietors*	*Clerical and Sales*	*Workers*	*Farmers*
A. PQ supporters within classes (1973): Francophones	58%[a]	—	23%	38%	38%	0%
PQ supporters by classes[b]	17%[a]	—	9%	11%	63%	0%
B. Support for independence within classes (May 1980): Francophones	46%	31%	21%	32%	26%	21%
Support for independence by classes[b]	13%	9%	17%	14%	44%	4%
	Professionals and High Managers	*Semiprofessionals and Middle Managers*	*White Collar and Functionaries*	*Semiskilled Workers and Technicians*	*Skilled Workers*	
C. Support for independence within type of employment (April 1990): Francophones (Montreal only)	23%	40%	35%	32%	24%	
D. Support for independence (April 1991)	31%	32%	25%	31%	34%	

SOURCES: Panels A and B: Pinard and Hamilton (fn. 16), Table 2, Panels 3d. and 2a. Panels C and D: Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche (fn. 18), Table 21.

[a] Includes Other Professionals and Technicians.

[b] Calculated by author from data in Pinard and Hamilton (fn. 16), Table 2. Row percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

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ther, support was already coming from all strata very early in the development of the nationalist movement, with the class differentials remaining roughly the same over time. The movement has constantly and gradually gained supporters from all classes.[22]

Furthermore, Pinard and Hamilton show that activists in the movement are not drawn from the new middle class or the state middle class overall but rather are drawn from a specific segment of these classes—the intellectuals. Intellectuals proper make up only 5–10 percent of the Quebec labor force but constitute 50 percent of PQ deputies and 33 percent of the party executive.[23] The party combines an activist base centered around intellectuals with additional electoral support that is located outside of the intelligentsia and, indeed, outside the new middle class altogether. The party must thus be able to recruit in the broader group without alienating its activist base.

The language issue has been so potent a vehicle for mobilization precisely because it can elicit support without alienating activists. Language use combines expressive and instrumental concerns, since language symbolizes elements of collective identity and at the same time is cultural capital[24] that determines access to positions in the public and private sectors. The issue of language provides a basis for broader support without alienating activists. However, the party has been subject to internal factionalism whenever the leadership has sought to increase or maintain its level of support by weakening its commitment to independence.

The Capitalist State Thesis

Another argument emphasizes how the Quebec state has served the interests of Francophone capital.[25] This perspective illuminates issues neglected by the new middle class thesis. It points out that the expansion of the parapublic sector has provided not only employment for the middle class but also the infrastructure for private sector growth. The strengthened Francophone business community, however, has only a limited commitment to nationalism.[26] Paradoxically, then, the conse-

[22] Ibid., 44.

[23] This pattern distinguishes the PQ from the provincial Liberal Party, which had much lower proportions of intellectuals as candidates and deputies in the 1970s. See Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Leadership of Intellectuals in Traditional Parties: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives," in Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds., *Canadian Parties in Transition* (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1989), 294.

[24] Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire: l'économie des échanges linguistiques* (What speaking means: The economy of linguistic exchanges) (Paris: Fayard, 1982).

[25] Alain G. Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm, *Quebec beyond the Quiet Revolution* (Toronto: Nelson, 1989); Bélanger and Fournier (fn. 3).

[26] Gagnon and Montcalm (fn. 25); Stephen Brooks and Alain G. Gagnon, *Social Scientists and Politics in Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 69.

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quence of public and parapublic expansion has been to provide an effective counterweight to any *indépendantiste* coalition. The implication of this line of argument is that the national movement had been demobilized and deradicalized in the 1980s.

This picture is consistent with the broad outline of provincial politics in the early and mid-1980s, when the PQ appeared to have come around to the business point of view in two ways. Their approach to economic management moved away from modest initial attempts at *concertation* to a neoliberal development strategy,[27] punctuated by a series of confrontations with public sector unions in the early 1980s. By the 1985 election the party, led by Pierre-Marc Johnson, also had shelved sovereignty-association. Further, the 1985 election brought to power a Liberal Party even more moderate than the PQ on the national issue and more committed to neoliberalism. Thus, it appeared that neoliberalism and a moderate nationalism went hand in hand. As the PQ softened its stance on sovereignty-association, it changed its economic strategy. And the most moderate party on nationalism was also the most committed to neoliberalism.

Yet the relationship between national and class questions is not this smoothly linear. First, it holds only up to a threshold. There are limits to this neoliberalism. Not surprisingly, the Liberal commitment to deregulation and privatization, expressed early on in the 1985 government, went unfulfilled. Further, while both the PQ and the Liberals now support free trade in the international economy and the lowering of interprovincial trade barriers, they are also committed to the state regulation of economy and culture. In response to international openness and a low birth rate among Francophones, Quebec governments have supported and encouraged immigration into Quebec. They have also sought to devolve as much political responsibility for immigration as possible from the federal to the provincial level. Further, the most important practical justification for the provincial regulation of public language use, especially Bills 178 and 101, has been the importance of presenting a "French face" to immigrants. Thus, the political regulation of culture has been joined to support for deregulation (free trade) at the international level. The industrial strategy of governments has also been statist, and for this reason both PQ and Liberals, as well as segments of business and trade unions, challenged the constitutional proposals of the federal government tabled in September 1991. They argued that the economic project

[27] Richard D. French, "Governing without Business: The Parti Québécois in Power" in Vera V. Murray, ed., *Theories of Business-Government Relations* (Toronto: Trans-Canada Press, 1985).

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of the proposals not only sought the deregulation of interprovincial trade but also threatened a more general deregulation of the Quebec economy.

Second, the position of the PQ has changed in ways that contradict this apparent relationship between the national and class questions. In 1987 the *indépendantistes* recaptured the party. The PQ also supported free trade under the leadership of Jacques Parizeau, despite coordinated trade union opposition and some dissension among party activists.[28] Thus, the option of sovereignty-association has become linked to a form of neoliberalism. Further, resistance to sovereignty-association in business has decreased, as will be discussed below. This weakens the capitalist state thesis and is difficult to reconcile with the internal colonial argument, which sees nationalism as the territorial expression of class liberation. More fundamentally, the capitalist state thesis does not account for nationalist remobilization in the late 1980s and 1990s.

Moreover, the mobilizing rhetoric of *indépendantistes*, especially since the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, has been primarily political. Parizeau and Lucien Bouchard, who is the leader of the Bloc québécois in the House of Commons, have emphasized that the Québécois are second-class citizens of Canada and that the constitutional framework of Canada does not allow them to be a part of Canada as Québécois. The symbolism of this politics draws on the collective identity of Francophone Quebeckers and downplays the significance of economic class as a source of grievance. Instead of discussion of "ethnic class" (the argument that Francophones were both culturally and economically exploited), which was part of political debate in the late sixties and early seventies, political rhetoric has now focused on the relationships among political community, citizenship, and collective identity. The constitutional debate in Canada lends itself naturally to this rhetoric; indeed, this language is an integral part of the debate. It focuses attention on shared attributes and concerns among Francophones in Quebec. As a consequence, the nationalist movement is less likely to be fragmented by the kinds of division that would be produced by a rhetorical strategy tied to class. This kind of political rhetoric is a more potent call for solidarity than the rhetoric of internal colonialism in societies such as contemporary Quebec, which have a significant degree of economic stratification, especially when the terms of the broader political debate are not cast in class terms.

[28] For an analysis of the politics of free trade in Quebec, see Pierre Martin, "Free Trade and Party Politics in Quebec," in Charles F. Doran and Gregory P. Marchildon, eds., *Trade and Party: Essays in the Politics of Trade in North America* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

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III. The Politics of Nationalism

There are a number of problems associated with the internal colonial, new middle class, and capitalist state theses. Each is relevant for only a specific phase of mobilization in Quebec since the formation of the Parti québécois, with none adequately covering the politics of the entire period from 1968 to the present. Indeed, each of these arguments was developed to account for changes in the movement. As a consequence, the relevance of each argument is limited. Nor do the arguments, taken together, converge toward an overarching theoretical logic. In this section I introduce a more appropriate model of nationalist mobilization. This model identifies and incorporates the effects of conditions that both enable and constrain mobilization.

Enabling Condition: Counterhegemony

The enabling condition is counterhegemony. Several authors have suggested that ethnic mobilization is easier to accomplish to the extent that leaders can fashion interpretations of the situation of the group that build on structures of meaning embodied in collective identities.[29] Preference formation and identity are closely tied together in theories of counterhegemony. To overcome hegemony, activists may have to resocialize others to form identities and to recognize their "real" interests.[30] Counterhegemony also has an institutional dimension that involves the development of a countersociety and a set of institutions that are an alternative to those of the central state, thus contributing to the political self-sufficiency of the group.

Identity and organization are analytically separate dimensions of counterhegemony and have a reciprocal relationship. Identity formation is easier to the extent that "organizational encapsulation"[31] is present; in that case individuals are less exposed to cross-pressures and alternative identities. Identity formation legitimates and justifies group-specific organization. Encapsulation and identity formation together create "communities of fate," which shape the perception of grievances and facilitate collective action.

[29] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Books, 1983); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); Patricia Mayo, *The Roots of Identity* (London: Allen Lane, 1974).

[30] Walter L. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980).

[31] Spencer Wellhofer, "Strategies for Party Organization and Voter Mobilization: Britain, Norway and Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (July 1979).

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Constraining Condition: The Transition to Independence

The constraining condition is the problem of the transition to independence and the economic viability of the group, if it were to become politically independent. If we distinguish short- and long-term effects on opinion formation, these problems have stable, long-term negative effects on support for independence. These problems set limits on the level of support that is possible, although they are not insurmountable, unchanging, or the same across cases. Finally, the effects of the problems of transition and viability can vary within the group, depending not only on patterns of counterhegemony but also on where individuals are located in economic structures.

This theoretical logic will be summarized in a simple model of mobilization. This model states the consequences of the problems of transition and viability. In this section I emphasize the direct consequences for the mobilization of popular support; in a subsequent section I examine the more indirect consequences for the internal dynamics of nationalist organizations. While this model is not directly estimated, I use it as a framework for the interpretation of empirical evidence. The model also summarizes the theoretical logic independently of the details of this particular case. This helps to make clear that the model is not case specific and in fact can be used for other movements.

The model of mobilization implicit in identity theory is

$$Y = sX \tag{1}$$

where Y is the level of support, X is the number of self-identified collectivists in the group, and s is the efficiency of mobilization. According to these theories, s should be extremely high, approaching unity. Levels of support can be increased essentially through processes of socialization that increase the size of X. Identity theorists have great faith in the likelihood of preference and motivational change in the processes of social interaction and identity formation, which together constitute the socialization process in organizational networks.

This is a robust interpretation of the consequences of collective identity. It may need to be qualified, however. Because of the problems of transition and economic viability, even those individuals whose primary identity is tied to the ethnic group may not support independence. One way to incorporate the constraining effects of risk aversion is to divide X from equation (1) into two subsets. In the first subset the relationship between identity and support is assumed to hold. The size of this subset, however, depends on the extent of risk aversion in the group. In the

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second subset the relationship between identity and support does not hold because of the effects of the extent of risk aversion in the group.

One representation of this constraint on mobilization is:

$$Y^* = qX \tag{2}$$

where q measures the average level of risk aversion on the unit interval [0, 1] and Y* represents the size of the second subset defined by risk aversion. Where $q = 0$, there is no risk aversion and Y* is empty. When $q = 1$, individuals are absolutely risk averse and there is no support for independence. Where $0 < q < 1$, the form of equation (2) is:

$$Y = s(X - qX) \tag{3}$$

Theorists of identity would suggest otherwise, that individuals accept the risks associated with a transition to independence. Collective identity provides the motivational set for social action. These theorists expect that support for independence is increased by working to increase the number of self-identified collectivists and by creating the organizational networks that can recruit an increased proportion of this group. It is assumed by theorists of identity that this process of mobilization is in itself a solution to the problem of viability. The internalization of collective identity leads individuals to accept the risks of independence because to do otherwise would violate one's identity. This interpretation is consistent with the common argument that secession is supported despite the economic costs,[32] and with the proposition in work on new social movements that individuals bear risks when their identities commit them to a course of action.[33]

[32] Horowitz (fn. 29), 132. For a more detailed discussion that takes into account the different strategic structures of secessionist movements in the developing world and in the developed West, see Hudson Meadwell, "Transitions to Independence and Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization," in William James Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, eds., *Politics and Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[33] Craig Calhoun, "The Problem of Identity in Collective Action," in Joan Huber, ed., *Macro-Micro Linkages in Sociology* (Newbury Park and London: Sage Publications, 1991), 51ff. As I hope is clear, I am reluctant to accept this interpretation of the consequences of identity. I have suggested elsewhere that this argument is quasi-functionalist: identity is needed when the barriers to change are so high that they cannot be surmounted without it. See Meadwell (fn. 32). I think the reasoning here is dubious. There is a further conceptual problem. I have suggested that institutions and identity are dual moments of counterhegemony. Much of the discussion about identity proceeds as if collective identity can be identified independently of the institutional infrastructure of the group. I prefer to think of identity as simply a restatement at a different conceptual level of patterns of group organization and structuration. Identity then becomes a principle of representation in a symbolic field, rather than an independent cause of, or reason for, action. Perhaps we need two-place predicates that include just institutions and practices, rather than three-place predicates extended to include identity.

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Enabling Condition: Identity Formation

There is some support for this argument in the bivariate relationship in several cases between national identity and support for independence. The relationship suggests that the higher the degree of identification with the group, the greater the degree of decentralization that is supported.[34] A recent survey in Quebec indicated that 62 percent of Francophones identified themselves as "Québécois."[35] The political consequences of this new identity have been noted in several studies:[36] self-identified Québécois are more likely to support the PQ and less likely to support renewed federalism.

At the same time, however, self-identified Québécois, even when they are strongly attached to Quebec, may still retain a sense of attachment to and identification with Canada. When they do, their support for sovereignty is lower.[37] The effects of Canadian federalism thus run in two directions. Federalism has provided considerable institutional capacity, which has reinforced a distinctive collective identity. At the same time two hundred odd years of shared history and economies have also had an impact.[38] The Québécois do not have the visceral memory of conquest and occupation that motivates Estonians and Lithuanians. Nor is the history of Quebec in Canada marked by a lengthy period of repression in the twentieth century,[39] like that experienced by the Basques or Catalans in Spain. The result seems to be that the consequences of Québécois identity for support for sovereignty are weakened.

These mixed effects of federalism also can be understood historically

[34] Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, *Spain after Franco* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 360; Thomas D. Lancaster, "Comparative Nationalism: The Basques in Spain and France," *European Journal of Political Research* 15, no. 5 (1987).

[35] *Le Devoir*, April 9, 1991, p. A3.

[36] Harold D. Clarke, "The Parti Québécois and Sources of Partisan Realignment in Contemporary Quebec," *Journal of Politics* 45 (February 1983); Jon Pammett et al., "Political Support and Voting Behavior in the Quebec Referendum," in Alan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, eds., *Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983).

[37] André Blais and Richard Nadeau, "To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers' Perennial Dilemma," *Canadian Public Policy* 18 (March 1992).

[38] Richard Johnston and André Blais, "Meech Lake and Mass Politics: The 'Distinct Society' Clause," *Canadian Public Policy* 14 (Supplement, 1989); Sylvia Bashevkin, "Solitudes in Collision: Pan-Canadian and Quebec Nationalist Attitudes in the Late 1970s," *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (April 1990).

[39] This relative absence of repression has meant that one source of grievance, rooted in the reaction to repression, is less relevant in Quebec. In other cases, authoritarian regimes provide a common focus and target that foster a basis for solidarity among diverse kinds of dissent. At the same time, the democratic regime in Canada opens up space for the expression of group identity and nationalist demands. In this pattern, political mobilization in the public sphere is easier, but there is likely greater division within the group over the degree of decentralization to demand.

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as a result of the form of political incorporation of French Canadians. There are three central elements of this pattern of political incorporation. (1) The Canadian state was built on the earlier military conquest of the French. (2) The accommodation between English and French was federalist. (3) Canadian confederation also established a tacit and informal concordat between the state and the French Canadian Catholic church.[40]

The first element provides the group with a genealogy that harks back to the original settlement of 1608 and to the Conquest of 1760. It marks a golden age for the group and points to the interrupted development of an emergent nation caused by defeat and occupation. The combination of (2) accommodation and (3) the tacit concordat devolved some informal public authority to the church, which preserved its organizational structure and its place in French Canadian society and became a key institutional support for conservative governments in Quebec. Because the religious and national projects were coextensive, the church became an institutional support for French Canadian nationalism.

Since this informal devolution of authority to the church was embedded in a federal state, political power located in the provincial state became in the 1950s the locus of activity for a modernizing coalition of intellectuals, trade unionists, lower clergy, and white-collar professionals. As a consequence, political and economic modernization in Quebec has been built on a nationalist project that has sought to complete the Quebec state by devolving powers to it from the central state.[41] This is a distinctive feature of nationalism in Quebec. In other cases, by contrast, modernization was controlled and managed by the central state. Very simply, political debate in contemporary Quebec has been about the form and direction of modernization, but very little discourse in this debate has not been nationalist in some fashion or has not occurred against a nationalist backdrop.

This fusion of nationalism and modernity has produced a familiar

[40] The mixed effects of federalism can also be seen in the Québécois reaction to the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. The symbolic politics of this issue engaged different elements of collective identity. On the one hand, the failure represented an unwillingness on the part of many Canadians to recognize the distinctiveness of Quebec within Canada. On the other hand, it represented to Québécois the rejection of Quebec's contribution to Canada. See Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," in Ronald Watts and David Brown, eds., *Options for a New Canada* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

[41] Gérard Bergeron and Réjean Pelletier, *L'État du Québec en devenir* (The evolving Quebec state) (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1980). There are several interesting similarities between the project of modernization associated with the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and economic modernization in postwar France. Both projects were tied to industrial strategies that were basically statist, growth-oriented, and characterized by increasing sectoral concentration and support for superfirms ("national champions"). Both were dependent on policy networks that linked bureaucrats and business. And both projects have involved important changes in foreign economic policy as economic openness came to be accepted in each case.

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pattern of state-led economic modernization. Hydro-Quebec is a perfect illustration of this fusion. Originally established as a Crown corporation in 1944, Hydro-Quebec broadened its scope by nationalizing private hydroelectric companies in 1963, an initiative led by René Lévesque, then a minister in the provincial Liberal cabinet. In the early 1970s the corporation embarked on a huge hydroelectric project in northern Quebec. This project simultaneously expressed a commitment to industrial growth, greatly strengthened the Francophone engineering and construction sectors, and complemented the theme in French Canadian history and culture of the colonization of the North.

Hydro-Quebec is now politically contested in ways that reveal the tensions within the national project in late modernity. First, ecological concerns are set against the commitment to industrialism expressed in the intention, apparently shared by both Liberal and Parti québécois leaders, to extend hydroelectric development. Second, the rights to self-government of aboriginal communities (Cree, Naskapi, Inuit) of northern Quebec, the populations most directly affected by dam and road construction, are pitted against the provincial Quebec state.[42] It seems clear that the core idea of the national project, which might be expressed as "Québec, un et indivisible," is going to be increasingly difficult to sustain in the 1990s, whether Quebec remains in Canada or becomes independent. The political recognition of difference and diversity will require some modification of this core idea. But the power of the commitment to a unitary identity in the national project is demonstrated by the difficulty some Québécois have had in accepting a nonnationalist vision of an independent Quebec.[43]

[42] The interest in establishing provincial jurisdiction in the North was expressed by a provincial cabinet minister prior to the signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. "The Agreement has enabled us to accomplish two great tasks to which the government committed itself. It enables us to fulfill our obligations to the native peoples who inhabit our North and to affirm finally Quebec's presence through its entire territory." John Ciaccia, *Opening Remarks to the Standing Parliamentary Committee of the National Assembly of Quebec convened to examine the Agreement with the James Bay Crees and the Inuit of Quebec prior to its signature, November, 1975*, in *The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement* (Quebec: Editeur Officiel du Québec, 1976).

[43] Martin Masse, "Identités collectives et civilisation: pour une vision non-nationaliste d'un Québec indépendant" (Collective identity and civilization: For a non-nationalist vision of an independent Quebec) (Book manuscript, Montreal, 1991); Jacques Larose, "Crise de glu de la spécificité Québécoise" (Quebec specificity in a trap), in Larose, ed., *La petite noirceur* (The little darkness) (Montreal: Boréal, 1987), 85–91. Quebec is undergoing some of the changes associated with the transition from "old" to "new" politics—to use the stylized language of work on new social movements. The politics of difference plays itself out in interesting ways in Quebec because of the nationalist context. On this transition, see, e.g., Hans Peter Kriesi, "New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (March 1989); Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research* 52 (Winter 1985).

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Viewed from a comparative perspective, Quebec has very high institutional capacity as a result of its pattern of incorporation. For example, neither the Statutes of Autonomy of 1979 for the Basque country and Catalonia nor the "federalization" of Belgium has created a territorial unit with the powers of the province of Quebec. The decentralization and deconcentration of territorial authority in more unitary states such as France or Italy[44] are only minor changes in comparison with the situation in Quebec. Of course, many of these provincial powers have been won since 1867, over the course of more than a century of bargaining with the federal state and in the courts. Moreover, the territorial status quo that was built into confederation from the outset privileged Quebec. Canadian federalism is by far the most important component of this institutional capacity.

It is well known that federalism implemented for the purposes of accommodation or control can be quickly turned to more radical ends when a co-opted elite is replaced or changes its preferences. The Quebec case combines replacement and change associated with the Quiet Revolution. This transition is usually marked by the election of the Lesage government and the creation of provincial departments of health, education and welfare, but this only ended a long period of resistance within the Duplessis regime. The Asbestos Strike of 1949[45] was especially important in politicizing young intellectuals, who constituted an important element of the emerging political class. There was, however, no inevitable relationship between provincial political reform and independence. Reform was also compatible with some form of federalism, and the activists of the 1950s were neither all *indépendantistes* nor all federalists when they entered political life.[46]

[44] Yves Mény, "Decentralization in Socialist France," *West European Politics* 7 (January 1984); Robert Leonardi, Rafaella Y. Nanetti, and Robert O. Putnam, "Devolution as a Political Process: The Case of Italy," *Publius* 11 (Winter 1981).

[45] Hélène David, "La grève et le bon Dieu" (The strike and the good lord), in Fernand Harvey, ed., *Le mouvement ouvrier au Québec* (The worker's movement in Quebec) (Montreal: Boréal, 1980).

[46] In 1949 there was a wildcat strike that lasted five months in the asbestos mines at Asbestos and Thetford. It engaged the attention and support of a group of intellectuals and trade union activists who would later become key players in the French Canadian political class. They included André Laurendeau, an editor at *Le Devoir* in the late 1940s, Gérard Pelletier, the reporter for *Le Devoir* who covered the strike, Jean Marchand, secretary-general of Conféderation des travailleurs catholiques du Canada, and Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, who had recently returned from doing graduate work at the London School of Economics and Ecole des sciences politiques in Paris. The strike was a major impetus for the founding of *Cité Libre* in 1950, the forum for a liberal critique of traditional French Canadian nationalism. Another line of criticism, expressed for example by Laurendeau, sought to disengage nationalism from the control of the Catholic church (at least from the conservative elements within the church) and from Premier Duplessis. See Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).

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Federalism has provided the political levers by which the political elite in Quebec has entrenched French language use and changed the cultural division of labor. Governments since Lesage have been unabashedly statist in these areas. The availability of these levers also provided incentives for the formation of a single province-oriented separatist party out of several smaller parties and associations.[47] More generally, it seems clear from other cases that nationalist parties which elect candidates to legislatures in unitary states face a much more difficult task of implementing territorial change. They must be able to take advantage of short-term strategic opportunities to force governments to formulate changes (for example, Scottish and Welsh nationalists in the aftermath of the 1974 election of the Labour government). And they can be weakened when national parties take on board some of their nationalist programs, as British Labour has done with the Scottish National Party.[48]

Federalism also has had a fundamental effect on the self-understanding of Francophones in Quebec. The nationalist movement in Quebec today is "Québécois"; it is not French Canadian. This redefinition of the boundaries of the group now parallels provincial boundaries and is rooted in the geographic distribution of Francophones in Canada and the federal structure of the Canadian state. Thus, political institutional capacity has contributed to collective identity.

Federalism has provided institutional capacity for mobilization within the group and for bargaining with the central state. However, the effects of federalism do not all run in one direction. Another genealogy of the group points to the importance of Quebec as a founding nation of Canada, harking back to 1867 and not to the Conquest of 1760 and emphasizing the protection for the French Canadian nation provided by the British Empire and within confederation. Further, federalism may have provided a set of semiautonomous political institutions, but it does not solve the problem of viability.

Counterhegemony has been an enabling condition for Quebec nationalism. Institution building has also underpinned collective identity in Quebec. However, nationalist mobilization in this case has repeatedly been constrained by the problem of economic viability, and it is to this constraint that I now turn.

[47] The federal Bloc québécois, composed primarily of former Conservative members of Parliament from Quebec, may well be a temporary, unstable phenomenon created by the failure of Meech Lake. The party is unlikely to be able to create an activist base of support where local politics are centered in the province, and it may draw support only as a protest vote. This does not mean, however, that it could not have leverage in a hung parliament after the next federal election.

[48] Jack Geekie and Roger Levy, "Devolution and the Tartanisation of the Labour Party," *Parliamentary Affairs* 42 (July 1989).

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Constraining Condition: The Problem of Economic Viability

The historical solution to this problem in nationalist politics has been mercantilism. Economic viability has been closely associated with self-sufficiency, but self-sufficiency has become a less necessary and less attractive economic strategy as economic interdependence has stabilized in the postwar period. Small regional economies can now base economic viability on participation in an open regional or international economy. These changing opportunity structures have influenced the politics of nationalist movements in the developed West, including Quebec.

Jacques Parizeau has argued that increased openness in the international economy would allow Quebec to be politically independent and economically viable. If there were a free-trade area in North America, Quebec could substitute trade with the United States for commercial relations with Canada. Withdrawal from confederation would then more likely be perceived as economically viable, and voters in a future referendum would likely be less sensitive to the costs of independence.[49] Parizeau's argument is the culmination of an evolving position. In 1978, in the context of debate about the meaning of sovereignty-association, he argued that only a customs union with Canada (especially Ontario) was necessary for an independent Quebec. A monetary union was not as essential. By 1981 Parizeau was arguing that the necessity of a customs union with Canada could be rethought and he cited as reason for the reevaluation the lowering of tariffs under GATT.[50] In the aftermath of Meech Lake, however, Parizeau has proposed that Quebec use the Canadian dollar as its currency.

Parizeau's early position was the extension of an argument present in the nationalist movement since the early 1970s, when Tremblay[51] explicitly introduced the idea of a Quebec-American common market into the nationalist debate. There has been interest as well in the experience of Norway and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA).[52] Parizeau's argument certainly opens up Quebec nationalism to the rest of the world in ways that would have been unfamiliar to earlier generations of nation-

[49] Jacques Parizeau, "Interview," in Austin R. Riggs and Tom Velk, eds., *Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical, Political and Economic Dimensions* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987).

[50] *Le Devoir*, July 15, 1978; *La Presse*, January 12, 1981.

[51] Réjean Tremblay, *Indépendance et marché commun Québec–Etats-Unis* (Independence and a Quebec-United States common market) (Quebec: Editions du Jour, 1970); idem, "Souveraineté, marché commun, libre-échange" (Sovereignty, common market, free trade), *L'Action Nationale* 81 (January 1991).

[52] Michel Boisvert, *Les implications économiques de la souveraineté-association* (The economic implications of sovereignty-association) (Montreal: Les presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1980).

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alists. For them the maintenance of cultural distinctiveness acted as a restriction on the movement of factors of production.[53]

The earlier mercantilist ("conservative") nationalism[54] had specific implications for behavior: individuals should be willing to pay more for services and products that were supplied by other members of the cultural group. The preservation of cultural distinctiveness sometimes demanded the subsidization of existing price differentials in the name of investment in the group. Parizeau's position, however, is much closer to the arguments of those French Canadians who opposed "achat chez les notres" (buy at home) in the 1920s.[55]

More recently Parizeau has emphasized the importance of maintaining economic association with Canada after political separation. First, the polls show strong support for sovereignty-association. Second and more important, the necessity of economic ties with Canada was stressed or acknowledged in many of the depositions to the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, including those in support of independence (for example, those made by trade unions). In response, Parizeau emphasized the economic costs to Canada if the federal government were to sever economic ties, and therefore he has discounted the vulnerability of Quebec to federal threats that might arise because of its dependence on Canadian markets.

But not all supporters of independence are free traders. The Quebec labor movement has long been a supporter of independence. It also opposed the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and its support for a parallel Quebec-American agreement under independence would likely be qualified. The trade unions are willing for the moment to bracket the class question in order to achieve independence. The presentation of the FTQ (Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec) at the Bélanger-Campeau hearings was most clear on that point: "We must avoid confusing the constitutional statute and the social project. When sovereignty is achieved, Quebec will in effect be an open political field."[56] The CEQ (Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec) made a similar

[53] Meadwell (fn. 4); Yves Roby, *Les Québécois et les investissements américains, 1918–1929* (The Québécois and American investments, 1918–1929) (Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1976).

[54] Susan M. Trofimenkoff, *The Dream of Nation* (Toronto: Gage, 1983).

[55] Edouard Montpetit, *La Conquête économique* (The economic conquest) (Montreal: Editions Bernard Valiquette, 1938), 1:63–65; Joseph Levitt, *Henri Bourassa and the Golden Calf: The Social Program of the Nationalists of Québec, 1900–1914* (Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1969), 41.

[56] Assemblée Nationale, Journal des débats, *Commission sur l'Avenir Politique et Constitutionnel du Québec* (Commission on the political and constitutional future of Quebec) (Bélanger-Campeau Commission), November 1990, 3:140.

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distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions for economic and social development. Independence provides the political levers, but development depends on the priorities to which these levers are joined.[57] Debates about the social project can be left until full control of local political institutions is achieved.

Nor are all free traders also *indépendantistes*. Francophone businesspersons who wanted access to larger markets have now had this supplied by the federal government through the North American Free Trade Agreement. They need not support an independent Quebec state to gain freer trade, especially since the gains won by Canada in the Free Trade Agreement may not be extended to an independent Quebec. What is interesting about the PQ position is that its support for free trade is in part a strategy of mobilization. It assumes that there is a pool of soft supporters of independence who are averse to the economic risks of transition and statehood.[58] Individuals in this subgroup are predisposed to support independence. If they can be assured that independence is viable, their support will harden.

Some indication of the dual orientations of organized interests (ten business associations and one financial institution [Mouvement Desjardins]) that appeared before the Bélanger-Campeau Commission is provided in Table 2. Five of these associations supported some form of renewed federalism, and four rejected the constitutional status quo but made no specific recommendations. These latter associations tended not to be concerned about the overall structure of the new constitutional regime as long as their corporate interests could be satisfied within it. Their interest in decentralization is a response to federal economic and monetary policies, especially the federal debt, interest rates set by the central government, and the duplication of services. Two others (Union des producteurs agricoles, Mouvement Desjardins) supported sovereignty. Moreover, all associations emphasized the importance of economic ties with Canada. (In the case of Mouvement Desjardins, the economic relationship was acknowledged but not stressed.) In the cases of nonspecific demands for constitutional change, representatives before the commission implied that sovereignty without an economic entente would be unacceptable (for example, "Independence without an eco-

[57] Ibid., December 11, 1990, 18:1261.

[58] This is implied in the way Parizeau places the issue of free trade in the context of a referendum: "Once a free trade area in North America has been set up, no premier of other provinces could come to Québec in the midst of a referendum campaign and say, 'If you vote this way, no commercial deal with us.' I suppose we'd say, 'It really doesn't matter, old boy.' " Parizeau (fn. 49).

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TABLE 2
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITIONS AND TRADE POLICY

	Federalist	*Reject Status Quo*	*Sovereignty*
Support for free trade	Conseil du patronat du Québec	Chambre de commerce du Québec	Mouvement Desjardins
	Association Minière du Québec	Association des manufacturiers du Québec	
	Montreal Board of Trade		
No support	Institute des manufacturiers de vêtements du Québec	Coopérative fédérée du Québec	Union des producteurs agricoles
	Association des fabricants de meubles du Québec	Association provinciale de l'industrie ouvré du Québec	

SOURCE: Constructed by author from depositions and hearings of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec.

nomic link is not recognized by anyone,"[59] and "The reality of the Canadian geographic space must be maintained").[60] These positions imply that either sovereignty with economic union or renewed federalism would be preferable to sovereignty without economic union.

The available evidence that individual businesspersons in Quebec have become more favorably disposed toward sovereignty-association also needs to be qualified. In a survey in early 1991 of "business leaders" in Canada (N = 1,711), 72 percent of the Quebec respondents preferred sovereignty-association to independence, the status quo, or new constitutional negotiations. Only 7 percent wanted full independence without economic ties with Canada.[61] Although the report of the results was sketchy, the commentary suggests that the government's poor perfor-

[59] Deposition from the Coopérative fédérée du Québec (Federal cooperative of Quebec), *Commission sur l'Avenir Politique et Constitutionnel du Québec*, December 11, 1990, 18:1287.

[60] Ibid., December 11, 1990, 18:1297. Deposition from the Association provinciale de l'industrie du bois ouvré du Québec (Provincial association of the woodworking industry of Quebec).

[61] *The Globe and Mail Report on Business*, April 1991. There is some reason for caution because the support for sovereignty-association is likely inflated. The survey polls subscribers to *Affaires Plus*, a business magazine. Not all subscribers are businesspersons, and many may have owned small businesses.

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TABLE 3
DESTINATION OF SHIPMENTS OF GOODS MANUFACTURED IN QUEBEC
(PERCENTAGE)

	1974	*1979*	*1980*	*1983*
Quebec	53.1	53.7	54.2	52.9
Canada	31.1	27.4	26.6	27.5
Outside Canada	15.8	18.8	19.2	19.5

SOURCE: *Les échanges de produits manufacturiers entre le Québec et les provinces Canadiennes.*

TABLE 4
QUEBEC EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES
(PERCENTAGE OF ALL EXPORTS OUTSIDE OF CANADA)

1974	*1976*	*1979*	*1980*	*1983*	*1984*	*1989*	*1990*
52.5	52.3	56.4	50.6	56.7	63.0	72.2	74.1

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, *Export by Countries*, various years.

mance in economic management contributed to a desire for greater political autonomy. Yet despite this evaluation of the economic program of the federal government, respondents overwhelmingly preferred a customs and monetary union with Canada. The level of support for sovereignty-association also was higher than levels reported for surveys of the Francophone mass public, but the gap between this option and support for independence was much larger for the business sample. (In popular polls, the gap is typically 10–20 percent.) But in another poll conducted in November 1991 of 205 "decision makers" (7 percent women), 38 percent supported political sovereignty with economic association with the rest of Canada, 48 percent supported federalism with greater autonomy for Quebec, 5 percent supported independence, and 3 percent supported the status quo. (Of this sample 83 percent had annual incomes of $75,000 or more.)[62] Business is sensitive to the economic implications of independence. These attitudes are an accurate reflection of the continuing importance of the Canadian market for Quebec (see Tables 3 and 4). Although the evidence in Table 2 is limited,[63] it does suggest that organized business is hedging its bets on sovereignty.

[62] *La Presse*, November 24, 1991, p. A9; *La Presse*, November 23, 1991, p. A2.

[63] Most importantly, this evidence probably does not pick up the full effects of production for the American market. However, four of the associations are large and diversified enough for many of their members to have American markets. A more detailed analysis would take into account the fact that some of these associations are sectoral, while others are multisectoral.

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The federalists seem to be in a better position than *indépendantistes*. They can offer business guaranteed access to Canadian markets. This is, of course, an assurance that *indépendantistes* cannot provide. Instead Parizeau (and the representatives of the Union des producteurs agricoles) have argued that economic interdependence between Canada and Quebec precludes the use of the threat of Canadian economic withdrawal from Quebec in any attempts by the federal government to weaken support for sovereignty.

There are, as well, issues other than access to Canadian markets that shape the attitudes of business. Monetary policy (especially the question of a Quebec currency and the possibility and implications of a shared currency with Canada) and the consequences of these arrangements for international borrowing by Quebec governments are also factors. Uncertainty about the transition extends also to the issue of the division of the national debt. Indeed, since the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in June 1990 and especially after the tabling of constitutional proposals by the Canadian government in September 1991, the issue of the transition and the final institutional arrangements between Canada and Quebec, should Quebec separate, have become increasingly politicized. The federal government and supporters of renewed federalism have an interest in taking a hard line, whereas *indépendantistes* have an interest in downplaying the economic costs of transition.[64]

Finally, the current constitutional debate has occurred during an economic recession, which has worsened since June 1990. The unemployment rate is over 10 percent in Quebec province, and it approaches 20 percent in Montreal. Several prominent businesses (including Lavalin, the flagship of the Francophone engineering sector) have declared bankruptcy. Indeed, one trade union leader and *indépendantiste* (Gérald Larose) accused the federal government of fomenting recession to keep Quebec in confederation.

It seems fair to say that the issue of the economic viability of a politically independent Quebec and the possible costs of transition to independence are a constraint on the mobilization of support at the popular level and among organized business. It is a problem recognized by the leadership of the Parti québécois. In the next section, I consider some of the consequences of these economic constraints on mobilization for some of the strategic choices of organizational leaders.

[64] John McCallum and Christopher Greene, *Parting as Friends: The Economic Consequences for Quebec* (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1991).

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IV. Independence, Decentralization, and Viability

Equation (3) shows when the problem of viability establishes an upper limit to support for independence. Taking into account the effect of risk aversion is then the only way for a nationalist organization to increase its support in the cultural group. In seeking to mobilize support among risk-averse individuals, however, the organization may lose support among collectivists who are not risk averse. Thus, there is a trade-off between gains and losses in the two subsets when the organization changes its political goal from independence to decentralization. Regionalism will mobilize more supporters than will independence when this trade-off is relatively low. Under these circumstances, there should be recurrent conflicts within nationalist parties over the kinds of concessions to be made in exchange for electoral success.

Consider the case when the group is divided into two subsets: those who support the organization and those who do not. By construction, those who are supporters accept the risks of independence. By hypothesis, the reason for this is that to do otherwise would violate their identity. Those who do not support independence do not accept the risks of independence. Suppose, further, that the actual level of support is lower than the support preferred by the organizational leadership. For my purposes, the reasons for the gap between actual and preferred levels of support are less important than the gap itself. When there is a gap, however, leaders can recruit support in the second subset. In other words, the organization has a core base of support (Y) and may build on this base by recruiting outside Y. Its level of support in these circumstances can be represented as

$$\bar{Y} = \hat{Y} + aY^* \tag{4}$$

where a is the relative efficiency of mobilization in Y*, $\bar{Y}$ is simply the level of combined support from the two subsets, and $\hat{Y}$ is the level of support in Y after recruitment in Y*.

Two features of the model and of equation (4) remain to be demonstrated. The first is the effect of recruitment in Y* on the level of support in Y. The second is the extent of recruitment in Y*. Both come down to specifying linear equations for $\hat{Y}$ and Y* that are consistent with (4).

Support in Y* under a program of independence is impossible, because individuals in Y* are averse to the risks of independence. The organization must modify its program in order to recruit in Y*. As it modifies its program, however, the organization may lose support

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among the individuals in Y. Therefore, any gains in Y* must be discounted by a parameter d.

$$\hat{Y} = sY - dY^* \tag{5}$$

According to equation (5), the only costs to a strategy of recruitment in Y* are the supporters lost in Y. As it stands, however, this model represents recruitment when support is all of one kind—whether, say, votes, membership, turnout for street demonstrations, or financial contributions. It must be modified for organizations such as political parties that can be constrained by their internal structure in ways that are not picked up in equation (5). This equation represents the recruitment function for an office-seeking leadership that will accept as many votes in Y* as are needed for electoral success. But in some circumstances leaders will pay a price if they seek to increase their support in this way. When activists prefer some constraint on mobilization in Y*, the result of office seeking in the electoral arena is intraorganizational conflict that weakens the activist base and the mobilizational capacity of the party.

When leaders do not enjoy autonomy from party activists and leaders and activists have different preferences over recruitment in Y*, external (electoral) and internal (organizational) strategies are interdependent. Leaders may not pursue their opportunity in Y* because of the cost of this move within the party.[65] When we consider the mobilization of support in Y*, a parameter, k, takes this set of issues into account and represents how deep into Y* the leadership is able to go.[66] We can consider k as a parameter set by internal party debate between purists and pragmatists. Purists prefer not to recruit support outside of Y. Pragmatists are willing to recruit in Y*. These preferences can be treated as preferences over the proportions of total support drawn from these two subsets. The parameter represents the result of bargaining within the party over the appropriate mix of supporters. When $k = {}^{Y^*}/_{Y}$, leaders are relatively unconstrained in their move to Y* when $k \geq 1$. As k approaches zero,

[65] George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

[66] I have not discussed the consequences of varying levels of difference between Y and some preferred level of support. So I would argue that the model can hold at different levels of difference. The recruitment history of the organization and the history of the stability of political preferences in the group may be more important than the size of the difference. Even when the gap between Y and some target level of support is large, purists may resist ideological change (and carry the day within the organization) when the history of the group is punctuated by periods of preference volatility and dealignment. When the gap is small, even purists may tolerate some recruitment based on the modification of the political program, when the organization has had a relatively constant level of support for some time and the group has demonstrated relatively stable political preferences.

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leaders are increasingly constrained. It follows from the definition of this parameter that the level of support in Y* is

$$Y^* = kY \tag{6}$$

Support in Y* varies also with the efficiency of mobilization, so

$$Y^* = a(kY) \tag{7}$$

Equations (5) and (7) can be used to determine the levels of support[67] in $\hat{Y}$, Y* and the total level $\bar{Y}$.

The factionalism within the Parti québécois is consistent with this model of mobilization. Tactically, there were early differences over the timing of separation from Canada: whether all at once or in stages.[68] There have been recurrent conflicts within the party over the kinds of concessions to be made in exchange for electoral success. These are very common issues in nationalist movements once nationalists decide to contest elections.

Sovereignty-association is the strategy that the Parti québécois devised in anticipation of its electoral dilemma. It is certain that support for sovereignty-association is higher than for independence.[69] The commitment to sovereignty-association in the early 1970s was a recognition of electoral reality. Activists in the PQ have supported a greater degree of decentralization than has the rank and file, and this created electoral incentives to modify the program of the party in order to increase support. Survey research indicates that there has been a gap between the preferences of activists and the average individual in the group. In 1962 support for independence was 8 percent among adult French Canadians. By the election of 1976 it had grown to 20 percent, and by prereferendum 1980 to about 25 percent.[70] Support for sovereignty-association, moreover, is higher than for independence, and support for sovereignty declines when the economic association is in doubt. This holds even in the post–Meech Lake period.

Moreover the most important change in the platform of the PQ occurred when its leader, René Lévesque, overruled the resolution of a party congress in June 1984 that a vote for the PQ in the next provincial

[67] This result assumes no protest vote for the party in Y*. This could be taken into account with no loss in generality.

[68] Vera Murray, *Le Parti québécois: de la formation à la prise du pouvoir* (The Parti québécois: From formation to the seizure of power) (Montreal: Hurtubise: HMH, 1976).

[69] Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard, "The Quebec Independence Movement," in Colin H. Williams, ed., *National Separatism* (Vancouver and London: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 219. See also the comprehensive review of polls and survey results in Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche (fn.18).

[70] Hamilton and Pinard (fn. 69), 211, Table I.

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election was a vote for independence. Seven provincial cabinet ministers and many activists resigned. When Pierre-Marc Johnson and the moderates took over the party in late summer 1985, the PQ moved away from sovereignty-association and toward "national affirmation," a program that was deliberately ambiguous so as not to imply a commitment to political independence. "National affirmation" implicitly represented a decision to change the relative proportion of supporters drawn from outside the core, *indépendantiste* constituency of the party.

As was seen with such other parties as the Scottish National Party in the 1980s[71] or the Parti Autonomiste Breton in the 1930s,[72] factional conflicts of this kind usually worsen after perceived popular defeat on significant issues. Purists will consider the decision to participate as premature and will want to retreat from a moderate position. Pragmatists will blame the platform of the party as still too extreme, and they may want to move to an even more moderate position. In the case of the Parti québécois, the referendum failure and electoral defeat in 1985 lowered morale and increased mutual blame among both hard-liners and soft-liners, pushed the leadership to table sovereignty-association, and thus alienated more fundamentalist activists and leaders. They left the party and only returned to help oust Pierre-Marc Johnson in 1987.

V. The Meech Lake/Langevin Accord

The current state of constitutional debate in Quebec and Canada is a result of the failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord. This agreement was signed by the first ministers (the Canadian prime minister and provincial premiers) in June 1987. Ratification required legislative approval by all provincial legislatures and by the federal parliament within three years. The provincial legislature of Manitoba did not ratify the accord by June 1990 (and ratification by the legislature of Newfoundland was rescinded when Clyde Wells became premier), and the agreement became null and void. This failure had momentous consequences for Quebec: it strengthened the political position of *indépendantistes* and weakened the position of Quebec federalists.

The origins of the Meech Lake Accord, however, lie in the constitutional negotiations that led to the Constitution Act of 1982. This act, in turn, has at least its proximate roots in the period leading up to the Que-

[71] Roger Levy, *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1990).

[72] Hudson Meadwell, "Nationalism and Rationality" (Manuscript, McGill University, 1993).

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bec referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980. The referendum asked voters to give the provincial government "the mandate to negotiate" a proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada that

> would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, administer its taxes, and establish relations abroad—in other words, sovereignty—and, at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency. Any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be submitted to the people through a referendum.

While there has been considerable rhetorical maneuvering around the meaning of this arrangement, it has two core components. The first is the political independence of Quebec. This has meant minimally that no directly elected national parliament would have powers to tax and regulate.[73] The second component is a continued economic relationship between Quebec and Canada. Exactly what this relationship would be and how it might be negotiated are key issues in Quebec-Ottawa gamesmanship.

Speaking four days before the referendum in Montreal, Pierre Trudeau promised "renewed federalism" if the referendum was defeated.[74] This promise was made against the backdrop of constitutional negotiations in the late 1970s in which the federal agenda for constitutional change emphasized patriation (according to which the formal power of constitutional amendment still resided in the British parliament) and procedures for constitutional amendment. The division of powers in social policy, communication, and immigration was to be settled later through federal-provincial agreements rather than through formal constitutional reform.[75] The Parti québécois, in power in Quebec in 1976, opposed this sequential approach because it hoped to trade support for patriation for concessions on division of powers. It would not accept any agreement to patriation on the promise of later concessions. The decision to hold a referendum was designed to demonstrate popular support in Quebec for fundamental constitutional change, a demonstration that could be used in later negotiations.[76] A referendum, though a calculated gamble, was considered a less risky way to mobilize support than an

[73] Patrick Monahan, *Meech Lake: The Inside Story* (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 267.

[74] Ibid., 20; Pierre Fournier, *A Meech Lake Post-Mortem*, trans. Sheila Fischman (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 4; Thomas J. Courchene, "Forever Amber," in David E. Smith, Peter MacKinnon, and James C. Courtney, eds., *After Meech Lake: Lessons for the Future* (Saskatoon, Sask.: Fifth House Publishers, 1991), 33.

[75] Gagnon and Montcalm (fn. 25), 158.

[76] Alan C. Cairns, "The Charter, Interest Groups, Executive Federalism and Constitutional Reform," in Smith, MacKinnon, and Courtney (fn. 74), 16.

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election.[77] The referendum was defeated: 60 percent voted against, and it did not receive majority support even among Francophones.

After the referendum Trudeau began the "patriation round" of constitutional talks. He initially threatened unilateral repatriation after discussion with provincial premiers ended without agreement in September 1980. This initiative was challenged in the courts by Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland. In September 1981 the Supreme Court held that there was a constitutional convention requiring "a substantial degree of provincial consent" in the patriation of the constitution but that observance of the convention was not "legally required."[78] This mixed decision created incentives for both the federal and provincial governments to reopen discussion. Debate developed around two proposals. The proposal of the central government (also supported by Ontario and New Brunswick), described by one observer as a "nation-building offensive,"[79] sought to include a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the patriated constitution. The principle of the charter is antifederal and nonterritorial.[80] Its language recognizes individual rights and social pluralism, a discourse that runs counter to the Canadian federal tradition of provincial governments representing territorial identities. The other proposal supported by the remaining provinces (the "Gang of Eight") sought to maintain provincial power by eliminating the charter and by instituting an amending formula that provided for provincial withdrawal, with financial compensation, from transfers of power to the federal government.[81]

Since Lévesque came to the bargaining table already weakened by the referendum, the common front he formed with the other provinces cost him several concessions.[82] He consented to patriation with an amending formula without a concomitant agreement on division of powers. He also dropped his demand for a Quebec veto on constitutional amendments. Quebec, however, had a distinctive preference with regard to constitu-

[77] Gagnon and Montcalm (fn. 25), 159.

[78] Peter H. Russell, Rainer Knopff, and Ted Morton, *Federalism and the Charter* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 708.

[79] Guy Laforest, "Interpreting the Political Heritage of André Laurendeau," in Smith, MacKinnon, and Courtney (fn. 74), 104.

[80] Cairns (fn.76).

[81] The 1982 Constitution Act allowed withdrawal with compensation only with respect to eduation and "other cultural matters." The Meech Lake Accord would have extended this possibility to all jurisdictional transfers from the provinces to the federal government. Louis Imbeau, "Voting Games and Constitutional Decision: The 1981 Constitutional Negotiation in Canada," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 28 (March 1990), 93.

[82] For Quebec's point of view on the November 1981 constitutional talks, see Claude Morin, *Lendemains piégés: du referendum à la nuit des longs couteaux* (Ambushed future: From the referendum to the night of the long knives) (Montreal: Boréal, 1988).

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tional change. If both proposals failed, Lévesque could return to Quebec and claim that no agreement with the federal government or the other provinces was possible.[83] But the other provinces in the Gang of Eight preferred patriation to the status quo. Their sticking point was the charter, although they were under a great deal of pressure to accept one. Trudeau had managed to present the federal proposal as the "people's package," which left the premiers in an awkward political position. Their rejection of the charter could have been taken as a rejection of popular principles. There was also the possibility that Trudeau might proceed unilaterally, despite the political cost, leaving them with no influence in the patriation package. When they were offered a "notwithstanding clause" (legislative review of judicial review), which provided a legislative override with respect to certain provisions of the charter, the common front fell apart. As a result, the Constitution Act of 1982 was not signed by Quebec, although it was legally binding within the province. This set the stage for the Quebec round to "bring Quebec back in."

Two features of the Act profoundly affected the ability to include Quebec. The first was the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This institutionalized a nonterritorial principle in constitutional politics, although the political consequences of entrenching this principle were largely unanticipated at the time of signing. The second was the amending formula. Depending on the amendment, it required the consent of seven or ten provinces and ratification by provincial and federal legislatures. It also established a three-year time limit for ratification of certain amendments.

The Quebec round really began after changes in government at the federal level and in Quebec. The Liberals and Trudeau were replaced by the Conservatives and Mulroney in 1984; the Parti québécois was defeated by the provincial Liberal Party and Bourassa in 1985. Bourassa's room for maneuver, however, was very limited. No Quebec government could sign the Constitution Act as it stood and maintain popular support. Yet a constitution without Quebec's consent was also unacceptable, in

[83] This point needs more discussion than can be provided here. One interpretation suggests that the Gang of Eight broke apart because Quebec had no sincere interest in an agreement. When the other provinces in this group had an opportunity to make a deal that would produce an agreement, they took it because they preferred a deal to no agreement at all. Another interpretation suggests that Quebec had a sincere interest in the proposal of the Gang of Eight but was unable to convince the others of their sincerity; Imbeau (fn. 81). The argument for insincerity on the part of Quebec in the first interpretation is the argument for uncertainty among the other provinces in the second interpretation. Both depend on the fact that the Quebec government supported sovereignty-association. This can account for both why they were insincere, preferring no agreement at all, and why it was difficult to convince others that they were sincere.

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part because amendments to it, especially with regard to aboriginal issues, were close to impossible without Quebec's participation. At the same time, Liberal participation in negotiations was risky. If negotiations failed because the demands of Quebec were not accepted by Ottawa or the provinces, the arguments of *indépendantistes*—that no agreement was possible—would be reinforced. If negotiations succeeded because of concessions by the Quebec Liberal government, the provincial Liberals would have great difficulty selling an agreement in Quebec. The Liberals opened in 1986 by presenting a list of minimum conditions, which were consistently described by Liberal leaders as a final, rather than a negotiating, position.[84]

The Meech Lake Accord of 1987 extended to Quebec constitutional recognition as a "distinct society," control over candidates for the Supreme Court and Senate, the right to opt out of national shared-cost programs, constitutional recognition of bilateral Quebec-Ottawa agreements on immigration, and a limited veto over constitutional amendments.[85] However, the accord, which was not ratified within the three-year time limit,[86] foundered on three kinds of opposition in Canada, all of which "had developed a political allergy to activity organized around French-English lines":[87] supporters of provincial equality, interests institutionalized in the charter since 1982, and aboriginal peoples.[88]

The failure of Meech Lake has had dramatic consequences in Quebec, and any discussion of nationalist politics and mobilization must take them into account. With regard to the PQ, the changes in public opinion since Meech Lake have had the important consequence of decoupling the party's internal and external strategies. The party has not had to confront internal dissent because of its programmatic position, nor has it had to change its program to increase support. Polls and surveys since the failure of the accord have shown both an increase in support for

[84] Monahan (fn. 73), 26.

[85] Since this limited veto arose in a section expanding the number of items requiring unanimous consent, it meant that the other provinces would have had the same veto as Quebec.

[86] The likelihood of ratification declined sharply in December 1988, when Bourassa used the notwithstanding clause to override a Supreme Court decision that held that provincial legislation on public language use violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[87] Monahan (fn. 73), 27.

[88] The aboriginal peoples are now key participants in Canadian constitutional politics. Generally, they opposed both the "distinct society" definition of Quebec in the absence of similar recognition for their communities and the language of the accord that referred to French- and English-speaking Canadians as "a fundamental characteristic of Canada." They have also exploited the use by Quebec of the right to self-determination as a legitimating convention by broadening the extension of this right to their communities. Aboriginal politics played a very direct role in the failure of Meech Lake. In the process of ratification in Manitoba, the government needed unanimous consent in the legislature to hold a series of public hearings. A native member of the provincial legislature voted against the motion to send the issue to a committee for public hearings.

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independence and sovereignty-association and a continuing gap between the two. In June 1990, 57 percent of Quebec residents (63 percent of Francophones) were somewhat or very favorable to Quebec sovereignty; 40 percent were somewhat/very favorable to Quebec separation.[89] In mid-November of the same year 66 percent had similar attitudes toward sovereignty; 58 percent supported Quebec independence.[90] A more recent survey indicated that 52 percent of Quebec residents (61 percent of Francophones) support sovereignty even without a political association; 64 percent (71 percent of Francophones) support sovereignty-association.[91]

These results, however, overstated the support for some form of sovereignty because of the way the question was posed. When respondents were asked, not whether they did or did not support a single option, but to choose between options, support for sovereignty-association dropped to 37 percent of Quebec residents, for outright independence to 10 percent, for the status quo to 16 percent, and to 36 percent for a federal structure with strengthened provinces.[92] Nevertheless, these results were consequential, and the change left the provincial Liberals scrambling to find some room for political maneuver. At the time federalism was electorally less viable than before Meech Lake, and the Parti québécois already occupied the more extreme position on the issue of territorial change.

Much of the jostling for position by the PQ and the provincial Liberals, however, seems to have been premised on the fear or hope that the changes were temporary. The goal of the Parti québécois and the Bloc québécois was to transform this conjunctural change into an enduring advantage. They argued for an early referendum on independence.[93] Lucien Bouchard, for example, had at one point threatened to force the government's hand by mobilizing protest demonstrations in the early spring and summer of 1990 in support of a 1991 referendum. Bourassa attempted to buy time and to delay the referendum, expecting that public support for independence would decline to a level that made some form of renewed federalism a politically feasible Liberal policy.[94]

[89] *La Presse*, June 21, 1990, pp. A1–A2.
[90] Ibid., November 26, 1990, pp. A1–A2.
[91] *Le Devoir*, April 6, 1991.
[92] *Globe and Mail*, April 22, 1991, pp. A1–A5.
[93] Bourassa is required to hold a referendum by October 26, 1992, and must table a question in the National Assembly by September 9, 1992, either on Quebec sovereignty or constitutional offers from the rest of Canada. A postponement would require debate and a vote in the National Assembly. It is clear that Bourassa would prefer a referendum on constitutional proposals from Canada.
[94] However, as the recession deepened since the failure of Meech Lake, Parizeau acknowledged in an interview in the late spring of 1992 that he would prefer a referendum "in a year or two," because he expected the Quebec economy to be in an upturn by that time. He was

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The failure of the Meech Lake Accord has affected two central parameters of the model of mobilization I outlined earlier. First, the constant (sY) in equation (5) is larger after Meech Lake. And Y* in (6) is larger because Y* is directly dependent on the value of Y. This is illustrated in Figure 1. This suggests that the PQ, as the core *indépendantiste* organization, has mobilized new support among supporters of independence who were not politically active or sympathizers who were previously held back by risk-averse attitudes and also among federalists who took a more radical position after Meech Lake.

The changes in attitude that moved public opinion toward the position of the PQ obviously have left the party in a much stronger position. It has gained support without having to modify its program of sovereignty-association. As a result, the party has maintained support among those who might have abstained if it had changed its program. And at the same time the party has maintained its organizational capacity and activist base because it is less dependent on recruitment outside its constituency of sovereignists and thus can avoid the organizational costs (factionalism, resignations) associated with such recruitment. Instead, it has been the Liberal Party that has experienced factionalism.

Attitudinal changes have weakened the position of the provincial Liberal Party and have provided the party with incentives to move away from a federalist position. These incentives have in turn created factions. Divisions on the national question are not new among provincial Liberals: Paul Gouin formed Action liberale nationale in 1934; Lévesque left the party in 1967. Bourassa tried to placate activists dissatisfied with federalism by providing them with a party forum—the Allaire Committee and the report it subsequently produced. He also tried to satisfy federalists in the party by delaying the referendum on sovereignty. At the same time there is a narrow range of maneuverability available to Bourassa; if he can exploit it, he may actually be able to strengthen his local position. He can use the presence of a powerful *indépendantiste* network in Quebec to exact concessions from the federal government. Any concessions will also have to be accepted in the rest of Canada, however, or his position in Quebec will be greatly weakened.[95] Concessions have to

confident enough, however, to have supported the circulation of a provincewide petition demanding a referendum as scheduled for the fall of 1992, as a means of continuing to pressure Bourassa. There is therefore an interesting dilemma built into the time horizons of federalists and *indépendantistes* as they consider the joint effects of the failure of Meech Lake and the economic recession: each of these factors pushes them in different directions. For the federalists, an ideal time for a referendum would be long enough after Meech Lake for its symbolic effects to be weakened, but not so late that the referendum is held in a period of economic expansion.

[95] If a referendum on sovereignty is held and sovererignty is supported, Bourassa may have a fallback. He may be able to accept this statement of the attitudes of Québécois and

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

FIGURE 1

be substantial enough to appeal to Quebeckers but not so substantial that the package cannot be sold in Canada. That current constitutional discussions have been broadened to include issues other than Quebec is not simply a result of political pressure from groups in civil society; the federal government fears that the Quebec problem cannot be resolved as a single issue and is attempting to provide the basis for logrolling among groups across issues.[96]

argue that the provincial Liberal Party is simply the best choice of party to lead Quebec (part of the way) out of confederation and also the most suitable party of government in a politically independent Quebec.

[96] As of August 3, 1992, it appears that the federal government will present a constitutional package designed to satisfy a wide range of territorial and nonterritorial interests in the early fall of 1992, and there is a strong possibility that a national referendum on these constitutional reforms will follow. Aside from the question of Quebec's status, the constitutional proposals

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The factionalism in the provincial Liberal Party is generational as well as issue-driven. The key base of support for sovereignty is the youth wing of the party. Federalists are drawn from an older cohort whose commitments and identifications were formed in the heyday of Canadian federalism.[97] The divisions also do not fall exactly along leader/activist lines. Not all elected leaders (for example, Claude Ryan) are electoral pragmatists, and neither are all activists driven to maintain the party program. Liberal youth, which control one-third of the votes at the party convention, have pushed especially hard for a tougher line. They have been supported by some Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) or riding associations that face strong PQ candidates and constituency organizations.[98] Others in the parliamentary wing of the party saw a declaration of sovereignty as a useful negotiation strategy for bargaining with the Canadian state.[99] Others, both elected MNAs and activists, have remained basically federalist and hence unwilling to use sovereignty as a bargaining position.

The state of public opinion in Canada has further constrained the provincial Liberals because it signals an unwillingness in Canada to accept a distinct constitutional status for Quebec.[100] At the same time, the process of constitutional negotiation in Canada has become more open and more complex: the Quebec question is only one of several issues and constituencies that are now a part of constitutional change. Elites are much less insulated from their publics and have less freedom to make deals.[101] Hence attitudes in Canada and the declining degree of elite autonomy thus have contributed to the local dilemma of the Liberals in Quebec and strengthened the position of the PQ.

Conclusion

The process of nationalist mobilization in Quebec cannot be determined simply from the size or the interests of the new middle class. Nor does

include a reformed Senate (designed to placate the Western provinces), a commitment to aboriginal self-government, and a social charter.

[97] *Le Devoir*, July 17, 1990, p. 2; *Le Devoir*, February 2, 1991, p. 1.

[98] Interview with Liberal youth activist, March 1991.

[99] *Le Devoir*, June 30, 1990, p. A1; *Le Devoir*, November 17, 1990, p. A3.

[100] In an April 1991 poll commissioned by the Toronto *Globe and Mail* and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 76 percent of the sample of respondents from the rest of Canada said "no" to the question, "Should the rest of Canada agree to give Quebec some powers that the other provinces would not have if that's what it takes to keep Quebec within Canada?"

[101] Alan C. Cairns, "The Charter, Interest Groups, Executive Federalism and Constitutional Reform," in Smith, MacKinnon, and Courtney (fn. 74); and idem, "Political Science, Ethnicity, and the Constitution," in David P. Shugarman and Reg Whitaker, eds., *Federalism and Political Community* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1989).

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the capitalist state thesis provide a useful theoretical framework for explaining mobilization. However, a model of mobilization that emphasizes the interplay of counterhegemony and the problem of economic viability provides a compelling interpretation that systematically incorporates macro- and micro-level evidence. The model also has the advantage of being applicable to other cases, thus allowing the Quebec case to be situated in a broader comparative context.[102]

By considering counterhegemony as a strategy of activists, this model can account for the origins of nationalist organizations. The life cycle of organizations can be explained by the interaction over time of institution building and identity formation, on the one hand, and by the transition to independence and future economic viability, on the other. These two moments of counterhegemony—institutions and identity—are not determined exclusively by their mutual effects. The success of identity formation will vary with preexisting patterns of political alignments and subsequent changes in these patterns. Organizational encapsulation will vary with both the institutional infrastructure of the group and the territorial distribution of power. The effects of transition should vary with both structural features of the local economy's interaction with the world economy and with cyclical trends in particular conjunctures.

Two types of ethnic mobilization are usually distinguished in the literature on ethnic nationalism. The first develops when the position of the nationalist organization is more extreme than that of the average individual. This relationship—the classic model of political mobilization in the developed West—creates incentives for the organization to moderate its position. The second type of mobilization develops when the position of the average individual is more extreme than the program of the organization. Moderation can then be costly in terms of support for the party position. Group leaders have less incentive to engage in accommodation when there are rival leaders in their group and when leaders do not enjoy autonomy vis-à-vis their followers. Intergroup agreement on moderate positions is difficult to achieve and enforce because of the incentives for leaders within groups to defect to more extreme positions. The nationalist movement in Quebec historically has resembled the first model, but the changes since the failure of Meech Lake have introduced some of the dynamics of the second model. Quebec and Canadian societies will likely experience important changes in the next few years. This article provides a model to make sense of some of them.[103]

[102] Meadwell (fn. 32).

[103] The final draft of this article was completed on August 3, 1992.

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INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

The New Telecommunications in Western Europe

By WAYNE SANDHOLTZ*

TECHNOLOGY has transformed telecommunications in ways that were the stuff of science fiction twenty-five years ago. New technologies and services have triggered changes in markets, government regulation, and international regimes. One of the most striking phenomena in this era of change is the emergence in Western Europe of extensive collaboration in telecoms. This paper addresses the puzzle of why European governments began in the 1980s to move from strongly autarkic policies toward collective action in telecommunications. So far, studies of telecoms reform have analyzed the trend away from monopolies and toward free-market principles (liberalization).[1] The West European case adds another dimension: the Europeans have liberalized *and* collaborated extensively.

I will argue that the Commission of the European Communities (hereafter the Commission) played the leading role in promoting collective action. The Commission launched the RACE program (R and D in Advanced Communications-Technologies in Europe), initiated preparations for a Europe-wide next-generation infrastructure, pushed for open markets in equipment and services, and led the way in the creation of new institutional arrangements for the joint management of standardization and planning. Though the reform process is not yet concluded, the changes are already substantial enough to declare them a major political achievement by the Commission. The analytical point is that in-

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[1] Peter F. Cowhey, "The International Telecommunications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990); Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43 (April 1991).

World Politics 45 (January 1993), 242–70

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ternational institutions can, and in this case did, exercise leadership and promote international collective action.

Three factors confer economic and policy importance on the telecommunications sector. First, it is large and growing rapidly. The Commission estimates that by the year 2000 telecoms will generate 7 percent of GDP in the Community, as compared with 2 percent in 1984. EC states will invest 500 billion ECU[2] in telecommunications by the end of the century, at which time the sector will be responsible for some sixty million jobs.[3] Second, telecommunications constitutes an essential part of the infrastructure for modern economies. For the European Community, telecommunications will be vital to the functioning of the internal market, which is to be barrier-free by 1993. Virtually every economic activity from the Mediterranean to the Baltic will require compatible advanced services and equipment.

Third, and related to the infrastructure issue, advanced telecommunications has become a source of competitive advantage for firms. As the OECD-BRIE Telecommunications User Group Project concludes, new telecommunications

> can permit more rapid response to market changes, greater production flexibility, more cost-effective tailoring of products to customers, speedier and better integrated management and work processes. Even in more stable market environments, the intensive use of telecommunications networks can produce a broad range of benefits, from cost-savings and productivity improvements to better market monitoring and customer service.[4]

Firms that do not have access to technologically up-to-date and low-cost telecoms services will be at a competitive disadvantage.

The emergence of new telecommunications policies and institutions at the European level is a political event that demands explanation. Prior to the reform initiatives of the Commission, telecommunications was the exclusive domain of fiercely autonomous national monopolies. Today, significant policy powers have been transferred to the European level, and liberalization has pruned the traditional monopolies. The analytical framework employed to explain these outcomes posits that two conditions are necessary to initiate international collective action. First, adap-

[2] At June 1992 exchange rates, that would amount to U.S. $645 billion.

[3] Commission of the European Communities (CEC), *Establishing Advanced Communications in Europe: IBC Strategic Audit 1988* (Brussels: CEC, February 1989), 1.

[4] François Bar and Michael Borrus, "Information Networks and Competitive Advantage," in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (OECD-BRIE), *Information Networks and Business Strategies* (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, October 1989), 3.

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tation at the national level must take place, such that governments are willing to consider collective action as an alternative to unilateral approaches. In other words, analyses of international collective action must examine the domestic political and policy changes that redefine for national governments the feasible set of international outcomes. Second, there must be international leadership to organize collective action. This study thus extends recent work on international leadership by suggesting that international organizations can provide it. Even in combination, however, the two conditions are not always sufficient to produce a cooperative outcome. Specifying necessary conditions is nevertheless worthwhile because it provides a framework for explaining instances in which collective action emerges and also points to key variables that ought to be examined when accounting for the absence of collective action.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section analyzes the process of adaptation in national governments and argues that technological and market changes led to policy adaptation and the redefinition of national interests. The second section discusses international leadership and the conditions under which international institutions can be the source of it. The third section analyzes the case of collective action for telecommunications reform in Western Europe.

Technological Change and Policy Adaptation

The telecommunications sector has undergone a technological revolution since the mid-1970s. New technologies altered markets by making possible a vast array of new services and equipment, but the old national monopolies were too rigid to respond adequately. Market change affects domestic groups, which in turn make demands on government and have an impact on policy-making. The organization of intermediate associations and the institutional structure of the polity shape the political influence of domestic groups.[5] I will first examine telecommunications reform from the perspective of domestic institutions and groups, explaining the policy adaptation that occurred in the various states.

Telecommunications worldwide is in a state of dramatic technological and regulatory flux.[6] The trend has been for liberalization—or the open-

[5] For examples of this approach, see John Zysman, *Governments, Markets and Growth* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Peter J. Katzenstein *Corporatism and Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[6] See Cowhey (fn. 1).

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ing of competition—in the provision of networks, equipment, and services. The United States deregulated the sector with the breakup of AT&T, allowing competition in every aspect of it. Japan has substantially reregulated and has planned a unified, technically advanced network for the future.[7] Liberalization in Europe has been much more complex than in the U.S. and Japan for two reasons. First, telecommunications in Europe has been fragmented into autonomous national systems. They are technically incompatible, offer distinct services and equipment, and utilize differing tariff (rate) principles. The regime for coordinating European telecoms, based on the Conférence européenne des postes et télécommunications (CEPT), has operated on the principle of pure national autonomy. CEPT is an association of the national ministries of post, telegraphs, and telephones (PTTs) that in the past did little more than arrange for interfaces at national borders and rules for revenue sharing on cross-national traffic.

The second factor complicating telecoms reform in Europe is that each national system has historically been the monopoly preserve of an entrenched PTT. Telecommunications had always been regarded as both a natural monopoly and a public utility, justifying the extensive and exclusive powers of the state PTTs. Those powers included ownership, management, and regulation of the telecommunications network; private networks (common in the U.S.) were severely restricted. Typically, the PTT bought network equipment (for switching and transmission) from one or at most two national suppliers. In contrast to the U.S., where a host of private companies provided a variety of enhanced services, the PTT was the sole supplier of all telecoms services. In Europe even terminal equipment (what a subscriber could attach to the network) could be bought or leased only through the PTT. These monopolies on network and customer equipment were enforced through national standards and the requirement that any piece of equipment had to receive "type approval" from the PTT. Table 1 depicts the status of PTT monopolies as of 1984; note that the United Kingdom was the only European country with a major degree of liberalization.

By 1980 this patchwork of heavily regulated national fiefdoms faced mounting pressure to change, a result of technological changes and liberalization abroad.[8] A torrent of technological innovations, deriving

[7] See Michael Borrus et al., *Telecommunications Development in Comparative Perspective: The New Telecommunications in Europe, Japan and the U.S.*, Working Paper no. 14 (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1985).

[8] Numerous sources discuss the technological and regulatory changes in telecommunications during the 1980s. See, e.g., Borrus et al. (fn. 7); Peter F. Cowhey, "Telecommunications," in Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ed., *Europe 1992: An American Perspective* (Washington,

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TABLE 1
PTT POWERS, 1984[a]

Countries	*Networks*	*Services*	*Terminals*	*Standards*	*Tariffs*
Belgium	M	M	M	M	M
Denmark	M	M	M	M	M
France	M	M	S	M	M
Germany	M	M	M	M	M
Greece	M	M	M	M	M
Ireland	M	M	S	M	M
Italy	M	M	M	M	M
Luxembourg	M	M	S	M	M
Netherlands	M	M	M	M	M
United Kingdom	S	S	O	S	M
United States	O	O	O	O	O

[a] M = monopoly; S = semiopen; O = open.

from the revolutions in microelectronics and data processing, made possible entirely new ("enhanced") kinds of telecommunications services, which advanced customers wanted and which the PTTs were frequently slow to provide. One major innovation was the digital switch. Other key developments were the widespread connection of computers to the telecoms network and new transmission media (microwaves, satellites, and fiber optics). Taken together, these innovations increased the capacity, versatility, and reliability of telecoms networks and made possible entirely new, rapidly expanding services. Some are already commonplace: data communications, data processing services, specialized electronic data bases and information services, electronic mail, teleconferencing. Future broadband networks will be capable of simultaneously carrying voice, data, and high-quality video pictures (high-definition TV).

Two domestic groups in European countries felt the impact of the technological and market changes: major producers of telecoms equipment and users and providers of advanced telecoms services. Both groups became strong supporters of reform. Manufacturers came to favor European cooperation for two reasons. First, they needed Community-scale

D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); Jeffrey A. Hart, "The Politics of Global Competition in the Telecommunications Industry," *Information Society* 5 (1988); Jill Hills, *Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan and Britain* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986); Godefroy Dang Nguyen, "Telecommunications: A Challenge to the Old Order," in Margaret Sharp, ed., *Europe and the New Technologies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); OECD, *Telecommunications: Pressures and Policies for Change* (Paris: OECD, 1983); Office of Technology Assessment, *International Competition in Services*, OTA-ITE-328 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1987); Hubert Ungerer, with Nicholas P. Costello, *Telecommunications in Europe*, European Perspectives Series (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1988).

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markets in order to remain competitive with U.S. and Japanese rivals; the national PTTs, in preserving their home markets for their national champion suppliers, precluded such a market. Second, manufacturers, knowing that they would have to rely on a regional market, recognized the need for regional technical standards. If their equipment was to be salable in each national market, the telecoms systems would have to conform to common standards for future networks. Under the fragmented PTT system, each country clung to its own standard. Thus major manufacturers became supporters of Community-level cooperation.

Nor were the possibilities presented by the new technology lost on major users of telecommunications or on companies interested in offering innovative services. The problem was that the PTTs (with the exception of Britain) maintained a tight grip on every aspect of telecommunications. Some PTTs introduced new networks and services, like the packet-switched data network (TRANSPAC) and the public videotex services (Teletel/Minitel) in France. Nonetheless, the pace of change in Europe was inadequate, especially by comparison with the deregulation occurring in the United States and the reregulation in Japan.[9]

By the mid-1980s telecommunications users in the United States had the greatest freedom in the world to adopt the latest equipment and services. As a result of deregulation, American users (especially the large corporations) had virtually unlimited flexibility in customizing their telecommunications networks. Since private companies were free to offer new value-added services, the number of such services available to American users far outstripped the number of offerings in Europe. In short, U.S. businesses benefited from more advanced telecoms facilities at lower prices than were available to their European counterparts.

Even when European PTTs incorporated the new technologies, they did so without cross-national coordination. This was a source of immense frustration for users in need of advanced telecoms capacities linking sites in more than one country. To establish a private line between Italy and the Netherlands in the early 1980s, a user had to deal with every PTT in between, frequently making it a nightmare to trace and correct breakdowns. Equipment and software were incompatible across borders. This meant that many services could not operate properly: packet-switched data networks nominally using the X.25 standard could operate at only 4.8 kilobits per second for transborder traffic, compared with 48 kilobits per second domestically. French videotex was incompatible with German, British, and Dutch systems. Tariff differentials were striking.

[9] See Borrus et al. (fn. 7).

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A 500–kilometer leased line could cost 840 ECU per month in Britain and 2,230 ECU per month in France. Different regulations in each country meant widely varying cost structures: in 1988 a telephone set was seven times more expensive in Italy than in Belgium; installation was seven times more costly in Denmark than in Germany; rates on local calls were nine times higher in Britain than in Portugal; and long-distance calls cost over seven times more in Greece than in Denmark.[10] European businesses reported tremendous difficulties in establishing reliable, modern, efficient telecommunications links across Europe. Not surprisingly, major users of telecoms began to pressure for a coordinated European approach to modernization and liberalization.

The combination of technological innovation and foreign liberalization put pressure on the traditional European telecoms systems. The pro-reform camp included major users and suppliers of telecoms equipment and services. Both groups were frustrated by the slow introduction of new services and by the lack of EC-wide compatibility. They began to urge change on the national telecoms authorities. The domestic level thus explains an important part of the reform movement, namely, why national telecoms arrangements were in a process of adaptation by the mid-1980s. The adaptive process led to a reconsideration of past policies and a search for new ones, which was necessary but not sufficient for collective action to arise. Equally important, Commission plans emerged before the national governments could complete the adaptive process and define new national interests. In fact, developments at the EC level helped to shape the reform process in member states. With national policies changing, political leadership at the international level was necessary to organize diverse agendas into collective action.

Institutions and Collective Action

A well-established body of theory posits that institutions matter for international cooperation.[11] Ernst Haas has argued that international re-

[10] Roundtable of European Industrialists, *Clearing the Lines: A User's View on Business Communications in Europe* (Paris: European Roundtable, 1986), 9–12; William Dawkins, "High EC Telephone Charges Attacked," *Financial Times*, July 5, 1988, p. 2.

[11] By "cooperation" I mean something more than a class of outcomes in strategic games. When actors' independent choices produce Pareto-optimal outcomes, the result is cooperation only in the sense in which game theorists use the term. For my purposes, cooperation in international politics requires policy adjustment by each player; it implies that each participant follows a course different from what it would have pursued in the absence of a joint effort. In this essay, I use the terms *cooperation* and *collective action* interchangeably. Cooperation, or collective action, occurs when a group of actors seeks to provide a good (public or private) through agreed-upon joint means.

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gimes can promote technical consensus on shared problems. The hypothesis is that if national actors arrive at a common definition of the problem and a common understanding of the causal relations it embodies, they are more likely to cooperate on solutions. Thus, through a process of learning, international institutions can reshape actors' perceptions of the problems they face.[12]

Robert Keohane explores another approach to analyzing the role of international institutions, suggesting that regimes provide information and channel behaviors into predictable courses. They do this by creating stable expectations about how other actors will behave. Such a setting facilitates the striking of further bargains. In short, "regimes can also affect state interests, for the notion of self-interest is itself elastic and largely subjective. Perceptions of self-interest depend both on actors' expectations of the likely consequences of particular actions and on their fundamental values. Regimes can certainly affect expectations and may affect values as well."[13]

Finally, I will argue that under certain circumstances international organizations can exercise international leadership by proposing cooperative solutions to shared problems and mobilizing coalitions in support of them. Peter Haas has focused on "epistemic communities" as a way of accounting for an active, leadership role for international institutions.[14] My approach begins elsewhere, with the problem of organizing collective action.

The first step in this argument is to show that leadership is a prerequisite for collective action. Mancur Olson has shown that public goods can be supplied when one powerful actor values the good sufficiently to provide it for herself (and thus for everybody) or to make side payments in order to line up contributions.[15] But as Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer, and Oran Young argue:

> Except in the unusual case of the single individual who supplies a collective good, it is generally agreed that some sort of organization is required to collect resources and to supply the good in question. Yet discussions of collective goods seldom pay much attention to the process through which such an organization can or will come into existence in a social structure.[16]

[12] Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); idem, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980).

[13] Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 63.

[14] Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization* 43 (Summer 1989).

[15] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[16] Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young, *Political Leadership and Collective Goods* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 6.

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They argue that political leadership is necessary to organize cooperation. Organizing to supply collective goods entails costs beyond those of providing the good itself. A political leader (or entrepreneur) is one who agrees to bear the cost of providing a collective organization in return for some benefit or net gain.

The dominant mode of thinking in international relations scholarship has been that hegemons play the leadership role because leadership is identified with power.[17] Hegemons, the argument goes, are able to mobilize collective action through coercion or side payments. But there are multiple kinds of leadership, with power/leadership only one variety; other kinds of leadership do not rely on the ability to bribe or compel. As Oran Young has recently argued, effective international leadership can also derive from bargaining skill ("entrepreneurial leadership") and the ability to generate ideas that reshape the perspectives of the bargainers ("intellectual leadership"). Young also notes that the "heavy-handed arguments of the hegemonists" run into problems of reification and "do not stand up well to empirical testing."[18]

A number of leadership functions do not depend on the wielding of power. Such functions include some or all of the following:

1. *proposing*, which points out to potential collaborators the areas in which collective action would be mutually beneficial
2. *mobilizing*, which draws potential collaborators into discussions over the proposed collaboration
3. *shaping the agenda*, which outlines a framework for negotiations, including goals and means of cooperation
4. *building consensus*, which promotes common understandings of the problem and of cause-effects relations
5. *brokering compromises*, which defines potential regions of agreement among divergent interests[19]

If one views the functions of international leadership in this way, then clearly the exercise of leadership is not limited to officials of national governments. Officials of international organizations are able to provide international entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership as defined by Young. The officials and staff of an IO might expect a variety of gains

[17] See Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976).

[18] Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization* 45 (Summer 1991).

[19] See Wayne Sandholtz, *High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), chap. 2.

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from taking a leadership role: enhanced prestige, new domains of activity, larger budgets, and more personnel.

The point is that neorealism implicitly assumes that for IOs to exercise leadership, they would have to act like major states by displaying power/leadership.[20] A more nuanced notion of leadership allows that IOs can lead in other ways. By linking political leadership to the costs of organizing cooperation, I have reframed the notion so that it can include leadership by IOs. In principle, IOs are capable of assuming at least some of the costs of organizing cooperation.

I enumerate four conditions under which the potential for IO leadership is greatest. Even the presence of all four in a specific situation, however, does not ensure that IO leadership *will* be effective.

First, the greater the initial grant of authority to the international organization, the greater its ability to lead in new areas. Some IOs are forums in which member governments can express their positions and debate the differences—like the United Nations General Assembly. Others provide a mechanism for coordinating rules and standards; the IO then promulgates the agreed-upon rules. The International Civil Aviation Organization is an example of this type. Other IOs have secretariats with authority to administer funds and programs agreed upon by their member states; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are examples. A few IOs have independent powers to make and enforce rules among member states and their populations. The Commission of the European Communities is the best example of this type. It possesses the power, for example, to rule on whether or not to permit certain company mergers. Hence, the capacity of an IO to lead depends in large part on the nature of its constitution and the independent authority granted to its officers and staff. The World Bank and the Commission of the European Communities therefore enjoy greater scope for independent initiative than does the International Postal Union.

Second, when leaders and staff of the international organization are substantively knowledgeable and well prepared, they can help shape technical discussions and agreements. One of the most dramatic examples of this effect is the economic analysis generated by Raul Prebisch and his fellow economists at the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America. ECLA thinking was incorporated into the philosophical foundations of both Latin American regional organizations and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

[20] International organizations do not act or lead; their officials do. Thus when I write that IOs do something, or exercise leadership, it is a shorthand for describing the actions of IO officials.

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Third, the capacity of international organizations to exercise initiative depends in part on the personal characteristics of their leaders. Personal attributes that enhance the influence of an IO official include charisma, expertise, negotiating ability, personal achievement outside the IO, and administrative competence. Thus, as Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson suggest, "High international officials may command information and recognition, which allows them the initiative in proposing action or resolving conflict."[21]

Fourth and most important, I submit that international organizations register the greatest impact on interstate cooperation during periods of policy adaptation. When national leaders confront policy failures that compel them to rethink their objectives and/or the means chosen to pursue them, they adapt by searching for alternative approaches. Under such circumstances international organizations can seize the initiative to supply new models and strategies and to promote bargains. Policy crises provide opportunities for activist, entrepreneurial IO leaders to marshal states behind a cooperative solution.

At this point, the earlier discussion of domestic influences can be integrated with notions of international leadership. Essentially, for collective action to be possible, governments must come to value it over unilateralism. Domestic groups are important in this context: they can provoke governments to rethink and adapt their policies, although domestic politics is not the only way to induce policy adaptation. Cognitive change is also possible, as governments adopt new ideas, models, and information that can alter the way they view problems and define the national interest. Governments can also learn from experience, when policy failure forces them to search for alternative approaches.[22]

Thus, the analysis of collective action has two important dimensions. Half of the question deals with the demand for cooperation, how and why leaders of states decide that cooperation is an acceptable option. Explaining the demand for cooperation forces us to look at domestic politics, learning, and policy adaptation. The other half of the analysis focuses on organizing collective action. Even when states reassess their interests, cooperation is by no means automatic. Leadership is necessary to organize collective action. International organizations can be sources of leadership and promote international collective action.

[21] Cox and Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 20.

[22] See John S. Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 367–71.

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The New Telecommunications in Europe

Given the technological revolutions in telecoms, liberalization was in some ways inevitable. It was not inevitable, however, that telecoms reform assume a strong European Community orientation. It can be a purely national affair, as it has been in the United States, Japan, Australia, and other countries. Furthermore, it is axiomatic of international politics that the mere potential for gains from collective action does not ensure that cooperation will occur.

In Europe the potential gain from collective action was substantial. First, a major obstacle to fulfilling the hopes for 1992 was the unavailability of advanced telecoms services across national borders. Second, national markets for some telecoms subsectors (like public exchanges) were too small to support competition. Creating a regional market required action at the EC level. Third, a true regional market would require common standards to ensure that equipment and services could be used throughout the Community. Fourth, given the dramatic technological changes under way and on the horizon, unified standards required joint research and planning for future networks. These were the opportunities for collective action. The following sections consider the two necessary conditions for initiating collective action: adaptation at the national level and international leadership.

Policy Adaptation

By the mid-1980s national governments across the EC were reassessing telecoms policies. One sees the evidence that governments were adapting in the measures to reassess policies, to search for alternatives, and, ultimately, to institute reforms. Britain was the first in Europe to liberalize telecoms. The Thatcher government in 1981 created the state-owned company British Telecom (BT). In 1984 a majority of BT shares were sold to private investors. Following the recommendations of the Beesley Report, the Thatcher government also began to open to competition the markets for networks, terminals, and services.

Following a period of extensive national studies, there were major steps in the liberalization of telecoms in France in the years 1986–89, under both the Chirac government and the second Mitterrand government. During that period, competition in networks and services was opened up; the renamed France Telecom retained its monopoly only on basic voice telephony. Large private networks and value-added services

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still required prior authorization, but the authorizing body was now an independent council and no longer the PTT.[23]

In Germany the Bundespost possessed by legislative fiat the "exclusive right to build and maintain telecommunications facilities." Until recently the Bundespost interpreted that mandate strictly, retaining monopoly control over the network, terminal equipment, and services.[24] Liberalization started with the Witte Report, which emerged with much fanfare in September 1987. It made several recommendations: to remove the telecommunications administration (to be renamed Telekom) from the postal service; to open value-added services to competition, with Telekom to retain only its monopoly of basic voice telephony; and to create a free market in terminals.[25] Despite opposition from the powerful postal workers' union (DPG) and its court challenges, the cabinet approved the proposals in May 1988, and they went into effect in July 1989.

The three large states were not the only ones undergoing national telecoms reform. Similar processes were under way in Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium. In short, by the late 1980s national governments everywhere in the EC were rethinking telecoms policies. State leaders created commissions and panels to study liberalization. The national reforms did not necessitate collective action at the Community level. The domestic reform processes did, however, undercut the highly nationalist, PTT-dominated telecoms arrangements. Equally important, events in member states established one of the conditions I earlier identified as propitious for leadership by an IO: policy adaptation and openness in national governments. EC initiatives, begun years earlier, could land in fertile soil.

The Commission and International Leadership

Altering European telecommunications regimes is not an automatic, market-driven process; rather, it requires collective political action. The engine pulling the EC toward a common, liberal, modernized telecommunications regime has been the Commission of the European Com-

[23] After January 1989 the powers to authorize rested with the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA), which replaced the Commission Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés (CNCL) created by the Chirac government. A decree of May 1989 created a Direction de la Réglementation, which functions as an independent regulator. This paragraph relies on Benjamin Coriat, "Regime reglementaire, structure de marché et competitivité d'entreprise," in OECD-BRIE (fn. 4).

[24] See Hart (fn. 8); and Patrick Cogez, "Telecommunications in West Germany," in Michael Borrus et al., *Telecommunications Development in Comparative Perspective: Appendix* (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1985).

[25] "From Bundespost to Telekom," *Telecommunications Policy* 11 (December 1987), 407–8; "RFA: Les recommandations (en substance) de la commission Witte," *Telecoms Magazine* 8 (October 1987), 91.

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munities. I outlined four conditions under which IO officials are most likely to exercise effective international leadership. We have seen that one of them was present in Europe during the early 1980s (when national governments were in the midst of policy adaptation and thus open to new approaches). The other three conditions were also present in the Commission at that time. First, the Commission has substantial autonomous powers, granted in the Treaties of Rome and subsequent additions to the treaties. For instance, the Commission has sole power to propose EC legislation (though the Council of Ministers may request proposals from the Commission).[26] Once the Council has approved Community laws and programs, the Commission is broadly responsible for administering them and can issue rules and directives for their implementation. Finally, the Commission has independent authority to act in a few areas. The most important of these is probably competition policy and enforcement (antitrust). The Commission has the power to prohibit business practices that it deems incompatible with treaty provisions establishing a common market. It can veto mergers and acquisitions that would be anticompetitive, and it can require firms to repay government subsidies that it judges to have been granted in violation of EC rules. In fact, the Commission may be the international institution with the most significant autonomous powers.

Second, command of relevant technical information can be a basis for entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership. On this count the Commission was also well prepared. In 1979 the new commissioner for industry, Etienne Davignon, created an independent working group, the Information Technologies Task Force (IT Task Force), which was independent of the existing directorates general and reported directly to the commissioners. The brief of the task force was to assess the long-term needs of the telematics industries and to draft a Community-level strategy. The task force carried out its own studies of the telecoms sector and also

[26] A brief note on some of the institutions of the European Community might be in order. The Commission is the executive arm of the Community; its members are appointed by the member state governments but do not take instructions from them. The Council (its full name is the Council of Ministers) is the body in which national governments are represented and vote. For general EC business, the foreign ministers meet and vote. But ministers with other portfolios can also constitute a Council when the subject under discussion indicates it would be appropriate. For instance, the ministers of agriculture meet and vote on agricultural questions, ministers of research handle technology questions, and so on. Most EC laws and policies must be approved by the Council of Ministers; votes of the Council carry equal authority regardless of which set of ministers is involved. The European Council is composed of the heads of state or government. It meets three times per year and deals with broad issues. Major new policies and institutions are always agreed on at this level. Meetings of the European Council are also referred to as European summits, the terminology I will use in this paper so as to avoid confusion with the Council of Ministers.

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commissioned a number of technical and economic studies from prominent consulting firms, including Arthur D. Little International, Mackintosh International, McKinsey and Company, and the Yankee Group. Armed with the studies, the Commission could exercise leadership as a knowledgeable, credible participant in highly technical discussions with industry and telecoms administrations.[27] The Commission's competitiveness rationale and its case for significant joint gains from EC-level cooperation became the basis for the cooperative endeavors.

Third, Etienne Davignon was the entrepreneurial leader par excellence. The IT Task Force was largely his creation, and his skills were also apparent in his organization of an industrial coalition in favor of EC-led telecoms cooperation. In fact, industry executives frequently mentioned in interviews that Davignon's personal prestige, vision, and drive were responsible for bringing together the twelve largest EC electronics firms in the "Roundtable." Davignon was also indefatigable in selling the high-tech programs to national governments.

In short, in the early 1980s the Commission displayed all four of the characteristics that increase the scope for effective IO leadership.

The Commission's Strategy

Davignon entered his job convinced that the Community needed an industrial strategy for telematics (the broad sector comprising semiconductors, computers, and telecommunications). Without one, European economies would suffer, in terms of growth, employment, and the ability to compete with the U.S. and Japan. A Commission report presented to the heads of state in Dublin in November 1979 was titled "La société européenne face aux technologies de l'information: pour une réponse communautaire." It presented the case for an open European telecommunications market. The Commission noted that telematics was "strategically important," having a "direct effect on the competitive position of numerous other branches of activity."[28]

More specific proposals followed in July 1980. A paper on telecoms proposed several market-opening measures, arguing that with demand growing for the new services, a harmonized, Europe-wide network would be required. Approval did not come until November 1984 and then only in the form of a nonenforceable "recommendation." The PTTs would allow open markets for new terminals and beginning in 1986

[27] Interviews conducted by the author in 1987. Officials interviewed were promised anonymity. Interview notes are in the author's possession.

[28] *Agence Europe*, November 7, 1979, p. 8; *Agence Europe*, November 26, 1979, p. 9; *Agence Europe*, November 28, 1979, p. 5.

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would set aside 10 percent of their annual purchases of network equipment and conventional terminals (handsets, modems, telex) to open bidding.[29]

The Commission in the meantime was laying the foundation for a more comprehensive Community telecoms program, which it presented to the European Council in Stuttgart in June 1983. The Commission argued that the Ten needed to cooperate in order to ensure compatibility of new products and services during the period of rapid change in digitization, satellites, fiber optics, and microelectronics. Finally, the Commission requested that member governments appoint representatives to a senior officials group to discuss the formation of an EC telecoms body.[30] In November 1983 the council of ministers of industry unanimously agreed with the Stuttgart paper and asked the Commission to organize the meetings of senior officials. Davignon and the IT Task Force immediately created the Senior Officials Group for Telecommunications (SOGT), composed of representatives from diverse national bodies, including ministries of industry and economics and the PTTs.[31]

The SOGT, which met six times between November 1983 and March 1984, reached a consensus based on six "lines of action" proposed by the Commission in September 1983.[32] The SOGT agreement then became the core of Commission proposals for EC telecoms strategy in May 1984.[33] The main points in the program proposed by the Commission were:

1. to create a Community telecoms market, via common standards, mutual recognition of type approvals, and the opening of public procurement in telecoms
2. to plan jointly the introduction of new networks and services, focusing on ISDN, mobile telephones, and broadband
3. to undertake collaboration in research and development in order to develop the technologies for next-generation systems
4. to provide aid for telecoms development in the "least-favored" regions (economically depressed or remote areas)

Without major disagreements, the ministers of industry approved these objectives in December 1984. By the end of 1984, therefore, the member states had accepted the Commission's vision of a common strategy for

[29] CEC, *Communication from the Commission to the Council on the Status of the Community Telecommunications Policy*, COM (85) 276 final (Brussels: CEC, 1985), 5.

[30] *Agence Europe*, June 17, 1983, p. 10.

[31] Interviews (see fn. 27); CEC, *Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications*, COM (84) 277 final (Brussels: CEC, 1984), 2; *Agence Europe*, November 7, 1983, p. 7.

[32] CEC, *Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications: Lines of Action*, COM (83) 573 final (Brussels: CEC, 1983).

[33] CEC (fn. 31), 3–7, 10.

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the liberalization and modernization of telecoms. In proposing common actions, mobilizing support, and providing a rationale, the Commission was thus exercising the functions of international leadership.

The Strategy in Action

Under the leadership of the Commission, translating the EC telecoms strategy into specific actions has been an ongoing, incremental process. I will examine three specific areas in which Commission efforts have been productive: collaborative research and development, standards, and market liberalization.

Collaboration on R and D

The vehicle for EC collaboration in telecoms R and D has been the RACE program. Since I have analyzed RACE in detail elsewhere, I will only summarize the points that are significant for this analysis.[34] RACE rode the wave of collaborative enthusiasm generated by the Commission's ESPRIT program for the information technologies. The perceived success of ESPRIT had produced a broad consensus that EC-level cooperation in R and D was valuable and that the Commission was capable of administering effective new programs. The Commission began the drive for an R and D program in telecoms immediately after the member governments authorized the creation of the SOGT.

The Commission proposed a program of R and D in telecommunications to the Roundtable companies, the same group of twelve firms that had been instrumental in preparing and winning approval for ESPRIT.[35] The Roundtable firms expressed strong interest in cooperating on telecoms R and D and accepted the Commission's invitation to help prepare such a program. During the summer of 1984 eighty experts from industry met twice a week to identify those R and D activities for future telecoms systems that could benefit from Community-level cooperation. The nitty-gritty work was done by four technical panels, in which the Italian and Dutch PTT research labs participated.

The result was a detailed plan for "Community-wide introduction of Integrated Broadband Communications (IBC) by 1995 taking into account the evolving Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDN)."[36] The

[34] For a detailed account of the origins and operation of the RACE program, see Sandholtz (fn. 19), chap. 8.

[35] GEC, ICL, and Plessey from Britain; Bull, CGE, and Thomson from France; AEG, Nixdorf, and Siemens from Germany; Olivetti and STET from Italy; and Philips from the Netherlands.

[36] ISDN is the next step in telecoms evolution. It will constitute a digital network capable of simultaneously carrying voice, text, high-speed data, and low-quality images.

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proposed RACE program, slated to last five years, would set the requirements for the European IBC network and provide the technological base for it. The plan specified separate research tasks, each with its objectives, technical approach, progress indicators ("milestones"), resource requirements, and timetable. By March 1985 the Commission had put together a proposal for a limited "Definition Phase," to precede the full ten-year RACE program. The total EC contribution to the RACE Definition Phase would be 22.1 MECU over eighteen months, to be matched by project participants (as in ESPRIT).[37] The council of research ministers approved the RACE Definition Phase in July 1985.[38]

With the Definition Phase already considered a success by industry and governments, the Commission sent a proposal for the Main Phase to the Council in October 1986. It outlined a five-year program with a Community financial contribution of 800 MECU (to be matched by participating organizations). A detailed draft work plan was finished in spring 1987. RACE received Council approval in July 1987 with EC funding of 550 MECU, and an equal amount was to be contributed by participating firms. RACE projects involve companies, universities, or laboratories from at least two EC countries. Each project addresses a specific task outlined in the RACE work plan. RACE has involved 294 organizations in 92 projects.

In May 1990 the Commission proposed a second phase of RACE. In addition to continuing the R and D on broadband technologies, the new program will focus on eight priority areas, including mobile communications, image and data communications, and information security technologies. The Council approved RACE II in mid-1991, with an EC budget appropriation of 484 MECU for five years.[39] The initial call for proposals for RACE II drew over two hundred submissions.

To summarize, RACE has been the result of Commission leadership. The proposal for collaboration on telecoms R and D came from the Commission, which then mobilized industrial support and organized the planning. Governments, in the midst of overhauling their telecommunications policies, endorsed what the Commission and industry together had prepared.

[37] CEC, *Proposal for a Council Decision on a Preparatory Action for a Community Research and Development Programme in the Field of Telecommunications Technologies: R&D in Advanced Communications-Technologies for Europe (RACE), Definition Phase*, COM (85) 113 final (Brussels: CEC, 1985).

[38] *La Tribune*, July 2, 1985; *Le Monde*, June 6, 1985.

[39] CEC, *Information and Communications Technologies in Europe*, EUR 13413 EN (Brussels: CEC, 1991), 44; *Agence Europe*, March 7, 1991; CEC, *Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe: RACE 1992* (Brussels: CEC, 1992), 1.

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Standards

Standards are technical specifications of how electronic information is to be "packaged" on the network and of how various pieces of equipment (switches, customer equipment) talk to each other. Traditionally, the PTTs have controlled the standards-setting process in each country, as well as the procedures for verifying that specific pieces of hardware comply with the national standards. Distinct national standards maintained the autonomy of the PTTs, with the result that West European telecommunications remained a patchwork of frequently incompatible national systems. The Commission took the lead in pressing for EC-wide standards.

Through the initiative of the Commission, the Community has seen a complete restructuring of its institutional arrangements for standardization in telecoms. Common standards were part of the Commission strategy for telecommunications as early as its 1979 report to the Dublin summit; the Commission reasserted the importance of common standards in its 1980 telecommunications document and in the program it presented at the Stuttgart summit in 1983. All of these actions came before member states (Britain excepted) had devised their own plans for telecoms reform; the Commission was therefore well ahead of the national governments on standards (the British were content to liberalize at home and were not urging standardization in an EC telecoms market). Furthermore, Commission initiatives gradually built on each other.

As a result of a Commission proposal, the Community signed a memorandum of understanding with the CEPT in July 1984. Under the terms of this memorandum, CEPT would produce recommendations for common standards and specifications for equipment approval ("type approval" in EC jargon) according to priorities established by the Community. The standards defined by CEPT are called normes européennes de télécommunications (NETs) and are mandatory technical standards covering connection and access to the public networks. In addition, the Commission earned itself the central coordinating role in defining priorities for two other European standards bodies, CEN and CENELEC.

In its comprehensive document, *Towards a Dynamic European Economy* (known as the telecommunications *Green Paper* [1987[1]),[40] the Commission had proposed the creation of a permanent and independent European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The ETSI proposal was a political move to sidestep the CEPT, which was seen as too closed and dominated by the PTTs. Conflict emerged over the overlap

[40] CEC, *Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment*, COM (87) 290 final (Brussels: CEC, 1987).

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between the ETSI mission and that of CEPT. Reformers pointed to CEPT deficiencies, namely, a lack of permanent specialized technical expertise and a lack of representation for telecommunications industries. After approval by the national telecoms ministers, ETSI came into being in March 1988. The institute has a permanent directorate. Network operators (primarily the PTTs), equipment manufacturers, and telecoms users meet to establish technical specifications. ETSI is assuming the standardization functions of the CEPT.[41]

With new standards-setting institutions in place, the final area of reform was in procedures for testing compliance with common standards. A major success came in July 1986, when the Council approved a directive proposed by the Commission (Directive 86/361/EEC). The directive provided for mutual recognition of type approval, beginning initially on a limited basis. Type approval is certification by an authorized body that a piece of equipment meets the relevant technical standards; mutual recognition means that type approval in one country will be accepted in other member countries, so that devices will not have to go through the type approval process in each state. Full-fledged mutual recognition of type approvals came with a new directive approved by the Council in April 1991 (91/263/EEC). The effect of the latest directive, which replaced the earlier one, is to establish a network of laboratories throughout the Community designated to test equipment for conformity to EC standards. Manufacturers of equipment can submit devices to any of the laboratories; once a device is approved, the certification of conformity is valid throughout the EC.[42]

Standardization at the EC level and mutual recognition of type approval were key elements of the Commission's strategy from 1980 on. Even though liberalization was beginning in most EC states by the mid-1980s, common standards and mutual recognition were by no means by-products of liberalization. Indeed, telecoms reform can proceed on a national basis well in advance of international cooperation on standards—witness the early liberalization in the United Kingdom. Though common standards offered potential collective gains, it was leadership from the commission that made those benefits accessible to the member states.

Market Liberalization

The intersection of the telecommunications reform effort with the 1992 project resulted in June 1987 in the telecommunications *Green Paper*, which was the Commission's blueprint for comprehensive telecoms re-

[41] CEC, *Information and Communications Technologies* (fn. 39), 64.

[42] Council Directive of April 29, 1991 (91/263/EEC), in *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. L 128/1 (1991).

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forms under EC auspices. On the basis of extensive technical documentation, the Commission in the end advanced ten positions as guides for Community telecoms development. The thrust of the proposals was to challenge the PTT monopolies and open up EC-wide competition in the markets for network equipment, terminals, and telecoms services. The PTTs would be left with a monopoly only on basic voice telephony.

The Commission's plan received strong support from the major EC business associations, including INTUG (the International Telecommunications Users Group, representing European national users groups), the industry association UNICE, and the Roundtable of European Industrialists (which counted many of Europe's largest corporations as members). The only reservations expressed by these private groups concerned areas where they thought the Commission had not gone far enough.[43] The Commission carried on intensive discussions of the *Green Paper* with the SOGT and with the national telecoms administrations. As a result of all the feedback, the Commission prepared a second document, "Implementing the Green Paper,"[44] in which it reviewed the responses to the *Green Paper* and concluded that there was a consensus in support of its major goals. On that basis the Commission set forth a series of specific goals and deadlines, all to be achieved for the completion of the internal market in 1992. The Council supported all of these objectives in a nonbinding resolution passed in June 1988.

The Commission's efforts to carry out this ambitious agenda of market opening have been surprisingly successful, sometimes pushing EC-level liberalization farther and faster than major states desired. In both terminals and services, the Commission has sought to liberalize markets by issuing directives under Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome, which allows it to prohibit state enterprises or authorized monopolies from engaging in practices that reduce competition. It gives the Commission power to issue binding directives without seeking approval from the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers. The Commission has used Article 90 against the PTTs, arguing that PTT monopolies constitute "abuse of dominant position" (Article 86), which restrains competition.

Commissioner for Competition Peter Sutherland announced in February 1988 that the Commission would issue a directive under Article 90 to end PTT monopolies on the provision of terminal equipment. The

[43] See, e.g., George G. McKendrick, "The INTUG View on the EEC Green Paper," *Telecommunications Policy* 11 (December 1987), 325–29.

[44] CEC, *Towards a Competitive Community-wide Telecommunications Market in 1992: Implementing the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, State of Discussions and Proposals by the Commission*, COM (88) 48 (Brussels: CEC, 1988).

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Commission decided to use the Article 90 lever because it feared that if left to the Council of Ministers and the usual procedure of agreement, the liberalization of the terminals market would be delayed by at least two years.[45] The supply of modems, telex terminals, PABXs, fax machines, mobile telephones, satellite dishes and so on would be open to competition. As a sop to the PTTs, supplying the first telephone set was to remain a public monopoly until the end of 1990. At French insistence, the Commission also included one escape clause: telecoms administrations may deny the right to connect to the network any piece of equipment that does not meet network technical standards.

Every member state agreed with the objective of opening the terminals market. But many, including Britain, France, and Germany, objected to the use of Article 90, which they thought would set an undesirable precedent for Commission activism. Nevertheless, the Commission proceeded, and the directive became law in April 1988. France immediately filed an appeal at the European Court of Justice, seeking to have the Commission's use of Article 90 overturned. The French emphasized that they favored opening the terminals market but disapproved of the unilateral manner in which the Commission was trying to achieve it. In November, West Germany, Italy, and Belgium (all three in favor of market liberalization) sent statements to the Court of Justice in support of the French petition. Interestingly, Britain, which had so often declaimed against Commission assaults on national sovereignty, did not join the suit. Since Britain had the longest experience with telecoms liberalization, many Britons thought that British telecoms industries, accustomed to the rigors of competition, would fare well in a unified EC market.

The European Court of Justice ruled in favor of the Commission on March 19, 1991.[46] Though the court voided certain portions of the terminals directive, it affirmed that the Commission had the authority to issue the directive and sustained its central thrust, namely, that PTT monopolies violated EC treaties by restricting competition. The court annulled one article and parts of two others because the "special rights" they aimed to abolish were nowhere defined. However, the main significance of the ruling was that it upheld the Commission's use of Article 90 against state monopolies.[47] As one knowledgeable observer has written, "The inference is that the Court's judgement in the terminals dispute effectively signals the end of legal action to halt the EC programme." The same author also notes that some telecoms people think

[45] *Sunday Times* (London), April 24, 1988, p. D6.
[46] *Target 92* (May 1991), p. 2.
[47] *Agence Europe*, March 20, 1991; March 21, 1991.

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that EC liberalization of basic voice telephony—the last monopoly—is now inevitable.[48] In addition, within a month of its ruling the European Court of Justice received queries from national courts in France and Belgium concerning the compatibility of national regulations with the terminals directive.[49]

A second sally by the Commission armed with Article 90, this time in services, was even more controversial because a number of states disagreed with the ends as well as the means. The battle lines were drawn at the July 1988 meeting of the ministers in charge of telecommunications, when a majority of member states (led by France) signed a resolution declaring that PTT monopoly rights be retained "for a limited number of basic services." Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark (the three states most committed to services liberalization at home) supported the full liberalization envisioned by the Commission. However, there was general agreement that value-added services (VANS) should be opened to competition.[50]

In December 1988 the Commission decided to proceed as planned with the services directive, though it would delay enactment until March 1989 in order to consult with member governments first. The measure, to be phased in by January 1991, would leave PTT monopolies only in basic voice service and telex. But the conflict generated was such that the March deadline passed. Two new commissioners for competition and telecommunications, Leon Brittan and Filipo Maria Pandolfi, consented to a one-year delay, making the deadline January 1992.[51]

Distinct camps began to emerge among the member states. France, Spain, Italy, and Greece wanted the PTTs to keep their profitable monopolies on basic data communications (unenhanced, without any value added). Britain and Germany favored complete liberalization of services but also had reservations about the Commission's use of Article 90. However, both British and German officials reportedly wanted the Commis-

[48] John Williamson, "Intervention Is the Slogan," *Financial Times*, October 7, 1991, World Telecommunications Survey, p. 6.

[49] *Agence Europe*, April 11, 1991.

[50] William Dawkins, "Ministers Baulk at EC Telecom Reform Plans," *Financial Times*, July 1, 1988, p. 6. The definition of which services are "basic" and which are "value-added" is not that simple. In general, however, the consensus is that value-added services are those that involve something beyond simple transmission. Thus the transmission of a computer file in unchanged form is a basic service. Any sort of operation to alter the format or the content of the file would imply a value-added service. Clear examples of VANS include electronic mail, voice messaging, data banks, and videotex. The Commission argues that the only truly basic service is voice telephony; the French argue that packet switching should be considered basic.

[51] William Dawkins, "EC May Delay Telecoms Move," *Financial Times*, April 25, 1989, p. 24.

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sion to retain the right to compel reforms if the states could not reach a compromise.[52]

The ministers agreed in May 1989 to liberalization for VANS but not for basic data. Spain proposed a compromise: that the Commission not enforce liberalization of services until the member states had agreed on Open Network Provision (ONP). Originally proposed in the Commission's *Green Paper*, ONP would guarantee access to the public network for private suppliers of telecoms services. France supported the Spanish proposal.[53] In September the telecoms ministers agreed that VANS should be open to competition, but there were three different positions on basic data: Britain and West Germany wanted complete liberalization by 1993; the Netherlands and Denmark said liberalization should begin in 1993; and the rest wanted basic data communications to remain a public monopoly indefinitely.

A compromise emerged unexpectedly from a special meeting of telecoms ministers in December 1989.[54] Ministers agreed to liberalize the services market beginning April 1, 1990. All VANS would be open to competition immediately. Basic data communications would be open to competition starting in January 1993. States can impose conditions in granting licenses for basic data services, but the Commission must approve national licensing schemes in order to guarantee that they are not used to protect state monopolies. The Commission's directive (90/388/EEC) was accordingly issued on June 28, 1990, declaring that member states "shall withdraw all special or exclusive rights for the supply of telecommunications services other than voice telephony and shall take the measures necessary to ensure that any operator is entitled to supply such services."[55] However, as Peter Cowhey points out, events have opened the door for private operators to chip away even at the PTT monopoly on voice telephony. In addition, EC competition commissioner Leon Brittan declared in early 1992 that the Commission might decide during the course of the year to abolish national monopolies on voice transmission.[56]

At the December meeting the ministers also approved the Commis-

[52] Hugo Dixon, "Paris and Bonn Seek Accord on Telecom Market," *Financial Times*, June 23, 1989, p. 2.

[53] William Dawkins, "Brussels and EC Countries Stake Out Telecoms Battle Lines," *Financial Times*, May 5, 1989, p. 2.

[54] Tim Dickson, "EC Move to Open Telecoms Market," *Financial Times*, December 8, 1989, p. 24; *Times* (London), December 9, 1989, p. 21.

[55] Commission directive of June 28, 1990 (90/388/EEC), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. L 192/15 (1990).

[56] Cowhey (fn. 8), 200; "Phone Service Monopoly under Review," *Eurecom* 4 (February 1992), 3.

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sion's proposed directive on Open Network Provision.[57] The goal of ONP is to guarantee that telecoms services can be offered and utilized anywhere in the Community. The Council translated its agreement of December 1989 on ONP into a binding directive (90/387/EEC), issued simultaneously with the Commission's services directive on June 28, 1990. The directive declares that its intent is to harmonize the "conditions for open and efficient access to and use of public telecommunications networks." In particular, its goal is to "facilitate the provision of services" in member states other than the home country of the service provider.[58]

The Commission has since begun to propose concrete measures for implementing ONP. The first draft directive concerns the liberalization of leased lines. In Europe companies have been prohibited from offering telecoms services to third parties over lines rented from the PTT. In the United States the market for value-added services has boomed because service providers are allowed to offer services over leased lines or to resell capacity on them. In February 1991 the Commission forwarded to the Council a draft directive to liberalize the use and resale of leased lines, by ensuring open and harmonized access to rented lines in all EC networks. Not only will the directive spur growth in the VANS market, but it will also enhance the ability of major users to develop and customize private networks (those dedicated to intracompany uses).[59] After amendments by the European Parliament, the Council reached a common position on the directive in November 1991.[60]

The final area in which the Commission has pushed for liberalization is that of public procurement. Until recently four "excluded sectors" have been exempted from application of EC rules requiring openness in bidding on public sector contracts: water, energy, transport, and telecommunications. The Commission proposed in July 1990 that the four excluded sectors be opened, so that firms from all EC countries would have an equal chance in bidding for public procurement contracts.[61] A directive of September 1990 accomplished this goal for "works and supplies" (material and equipment); as of late 1991 its provisions had been approved by the Council, with the exception of the appeals procedure. The Commission submitted a draft directive in September 1991 that would

[57] "EC Ministers Reach Agreement on ONP and Service Provision," *Telecommunications* 11 (January 1990), 11; Tim Dickson, "EC Move to Open Telecoms Market," *Financial Times*, December 8, 1989, p. 24; *Times* (London), December 9, 1989, p. 21.

[58] Council directive of June 28, 1990 (90/387/EEC), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. L 192/2 (1990).

[59] *Agence Europe*, February 23, 1991.

[60] *Agence Europe*, October 26, 1991, and November 5, 1991.

[61] *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. C216/8 (1990).

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open public contracting for services in the excluded sectors to EC-wide bidding.[62] Whatever happens with the latter proposal, public procurement of telecommunications goods and equipment opened to competitive bidding in 1992.[63]

In short, the core of the Commission's plan for liberalizing telecoms markets survived the battles intact. The Commission initiated the proposals for market opening, set the agenda for Community deliberations, and pushed for approval of specific directives. In every instance, the Commission was ahead of the member states in its objectives for EC-level reforms; in many instances Commission proposals had to overcome the resistance of major member states. The result is that the Commission now has a more solid grasp than it began with on independent powers to open telecoms markets to competition. In fact, the Commission published guidelines in September 1991 concerning the application of EC competition rules—an area where the Commission can act directly, without Council approval—to the telecoms sector. The guidelines reflect the Commission's stronger position in the wake of the court ruling upholding its use of Article 90.[64]

Conclusions

In less than a decade the former patchwork of national telecommunications fiefdoms has changed into a regime in which R and D planning, standards, and market opening are subject to extensive collective action. This paper has made the case that the cooperative dimension in EC telecommunications reform is largely the result of Commission leadership.

The evidence presented here raises serious questions about neorealist hypotheses concerning international institutions and cooperation generally and about the EC specifically. For instance, Joseph Grieco has argued that because of state concerns for relative capabilities, international institutions are "unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on inter-state cooperation."[65] That generalization must now be viewed skeptically on empirical grounds. Writing on the Single European Act, An-

[62] CEC, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament: Council Common Position on Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors*, SEC (91) 1609 final (Brussels: CEC, 1991); *Agence Europe*, September 26, 1991, and September 28, 1991.

[63] Lucy Kellaway, "A Definite Article of Dissent," *Financial Times*, April 19, 1990, International Telecommunications Survey, p. 3.

[64] CEC, "Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, no. C 233 (September 6, 1991).

[65] Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), 485.

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drew Moravscik employs a "modified structural realist" approach and argues that "the primary source of integration lies in the interests of states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels."[66] But in telecoms Britain—the state that might have been expected to take the lead in EC telecoms policy—did not. Britain was deregulating faster than the other states and should have had a powerful incentive to see parallel reforms in the other EC states. Yet, although the British government supported most of the Commission's telecoms plans, it neither produced a single initiative nor took a strong public role in pressing other governments to deregulate faster. The telecommunications case suggests that the strongly intergovernmental approach to EC politics underestimates the role of EC institutions in promoting collective action within the Community.

With regard to telecommunications, Stephen Krasner argues that the United States has used its power to induce telecoms reform in other states.[67] Unfortunately, Krasner does not specify how U.S. power was deployed in Europe or how it produced the results he claims for it. In fact, a striking aspect of U.S. telecoms reforms is that the government failed completely to use the opening of U.S. telecoms markets as a lever to induce other states to do likewise. This failure stems in part from the central role played by the judicial branch in U.S. telecoms deregulation—a role that hardly squares with the neorealist conception of unitary actor governments employing power to achieve international objectives. As this study clearly shows, technological changes provoked telecoms reforms in Europe, and the direction and character of those reforms were driven by factors internal to the Community—not by American pressure.

To the contrary, the empirical record fits the analytical framework presented in this essay. The two conditions posited to be necessary for collective action to arise—adaptation in national governments and international leadership—were both present in the case of EC telecoms reform. Furthermore, my proposition that international organizations can exercise international leadership on behalf of collective action is supported by the role played by the Commission of the European Communities. Technological innovations had produced pressures on traditional state telecoms monopolies, and by the mid-1980s national governments were in a process of policy adaptation. But however well the technological and market changes account for national reform efforts, they in no

[66] Moravscik, "Negotiating the Single Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45 (Winter 1991), 47.
[67] Krasner (fn. 1).

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way explain the extensive collective action that emerged at the EC level. Indeed, European cooperation was not the ineluctable result of national reforms. Liberalization in one country is, after all, commonplace—witness the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. The Commission provided the leadership to organize collective action in telecoms in the European Community.

Finally, one can ask whether the Commission exerted independent influence or simply shaped its proposals to fit what the major states already desired. The evidence clearly supports an independent role for the Commission; its proposals were consistently ahead of what the major states were contemplating on their own at the time. Indeed, already in 1979 Davignon had outlined the intellectual rationale and basic goals for a Community telecommunications strategy. The member governments responded to Commission proposals, not vice versa. In some cases far-reaching Commission initiatives had to overcome the objections of major states.

Davignon and the Commission clearly displayed entrepreneurial leadership on behalf of R and D: they proposed collective action, mobilized support, and promoted compromises. In 1979 and 1980, Davignon and the IT Task Force were already formulating an EC R and D strategy for the telecommunications sector. The Senior Officials Group for Telecommunications (SOGT) was created at Commission request, used Commission proposals as the basis for its discussions, and approved the "lines of action" laid out by the Commission in September 1983. Davignon initiated meetings in 1983 with executives of the same twelve Roundtable companies that had helped to launch ESPRIT. By summer 1984 the Commission and industry had a detailed work plan for RACE. This plan was the basis for the program that won approval from the governments in 1987.

In standards, the Commission led in establishing an entirely new set of institutional arrangements for the creation of EC-level telecoms standards. It succeeded in establishing the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, which is taking over the standards functions of the CEPT. Furthermore, the Commission won for itself a central role in setting the agenda for ETSI (as well as for CEN and CENELEC)—an arena in which the Commission had previously not had a role at all.

On the liberalization of telecoms markets, Britain was the only state that might seem to have been a step ahead of the Commission. Yet Davignon and the Commission announced clear ideas about liberalizing EC telecoms before the new Thatcher government had time to develop its own program. Commission documents in 1979 and 1980 argued for open

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European markets in telecommunications. It was not until 1981 that the Thatcher government created British Telecom (BT) and licensed its first competitor, Mercury; and it was not until 1984 that BT was partially privatized. As for other states, the Commission could not have been following their national telecoms liberalization plans, because these had not yet been defined. Dutch and Italian reports on domestic liberalization came out only in 1985. France began to liberalize in 1986 and 1987. German and Belgian reports urging deregulation date from 1987. In short, the Commission had proposed EC-wide liberalization measures years before the national governments defined their domestic reforms.

Even more impressive is the Commission's drive to open the EC markets for telecoms equipment and services by means of Article 90 directives that did not require approval by the member governments. Several states—including France, Germany, and Italy—challenged the terminals directive in the European Court of Justice, which ruled in favor of the Commission. Implementation of the directives has proceeded.

To conclude, European telecommunications is in the midst of a radical transformation. The former regime, centered on CEPT, enshrined national autonomy as the guiding principle. PTTs held monopolies over virtually every aspect of telecoms (networks, equipment, services). The new regime espouses the norm of Community-wide compatibility of equipment and services and eventually of an integrated European broadband network. The new regime is creating rules about mutual recognition, EC-level standards, and competition in terminals and services. New decision-making procedures are emerging, with the Commission at the center of them.

Adaptation at the national level, as a response to the technological revolution in telecommunications, created an environment in which proposals for change could find a receptive audience. But the adaptive process within states in no way necessitated collective action at the European level. International leadership was necessary to organize the cooperative dimension of reform. As the Commission role in EC telecommunications reforms confirms, international institutions can be a source of effective leadership on behalf of collective action.

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IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE GORBACHEV FOREIGN POLICY REVOLUTION

By JEFF CHECKEL*

Introduction

IT has become almost a commonplace in both academic and popular analyses that the Gorbachev revolution in foreign and security affairs represented a triumph of knowledge and reason over dogmatic Leninist ideology.[1] Underlying this simple statement of fact (for it is indeed true) is the even more basic realization that "ideas" and new knowledge played a key role in bringing about the monumental changes in Soviet international behavior during the Gorbachev era.

To trace the intellectual antecedents of Gorbachev's new thinking on foreign policy, one need only peruse back issues (in some cases dating to the 1960s) of any one of several Soviet academic journals dealing with international affairs.[2] Indeed, Soviet academic writing on international relations during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras gives one a sense of being "present at the creation" of the ideological underpinnings of the new thinking.[3]

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[1] See, e.g., Elizabeth Valkenier, "New Soviet Thinking about the Third World," *World Policy Journal* 4 (Fall 1987), 653–54; and Thane Gustafson, "Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?" in Timothy Colton and Gustafson, eds., *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 343. In the popular press, see "Think-Tanks: The Carousels of Power," *Economist*, May 25, 1991, p. 26; and "This Year's Economist," *New York Times*, June 23, 1991, p. 14.

[2] Allen Lynch provides a good overview of the intellectual origins of the new thinking; Lynch, *Gorbachev's International Outlook: Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences*, Occasional Paper no. 9 (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1989).

[3] See, especially, William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–67* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind* (New York: Praegar, 1983); Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986); Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Stephen Shenfield, *The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).

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So ideas—the concepts and intellectual frameworks of Soviet academic specialists—mattered tremendously in the development of the Gorbachev revolution. Put another way, the relationship of expert knowledge to political power and state behavior appears to have changed fundamentally under Gorbachev. How can we explain this new relationship? Was it an inevitable consequence of the modernization and socioeconomic change that any mature postindustrial polity experiences?[4] Was it the result of factors unique to the former USSR—in particular, the coming to power of a new and more enlightened generation of leaders?[5] Was it a consequence of the actions of transnational, knowledge-based communities of experts—so-called epistemic communities?[6] Was the new relationship (and, more generally, the Gorbachev revolution) the result of a process of adaptation to a fundamentally changed international system?[7]

Most of the above explanations force an either-or approach to understanding state behavior—either domestic-level variables *or* the international system.[8] I argue, however, that a full understanding of the new relationship between knowledge and Soviet state behavior requires an explanatory framework that integrates *both* domestic and international levels of analysis.[9] Although this argument may seem rather obvious, it is one that only very recently has come to receive serious attention in the

[4] Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987–88), 93–131. Snyder essentially makes this argument. See also Philip Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 36.

[5] Stephen Meyer stresses the importance of leadership variables; Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* 13 (Fall 1988).

[6] For a comprehensive overview of the epistemic-communities approach, see Peter M. Haas, ed., "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992). This is a special issue of *IO* dedicated to the epistemic approach.

[7] Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security* 16 (Winter 1991–92). The authors list no fewer than eight international sources for the changes in Soviet foreign behavior under Gorbachev.

[8] The epistemic-communities literature is an exception to this generalization; see Haas (fn. 6).

[9] This essay thus contributes to a growing body of international relations literature that combines levels of analysis to arrive at more comprehensive explanations of state behavior. This literature has developed partly in response to Kenneth Waltz's theory of structural realism, with its heavy emphasis on one level—international system structure—for understanding state behavior. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For important critiques of Waltzian and other structural arguments, see Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Timothy McKeown, "The Limitations of 'Structural' Theories of Commercial Policy," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, 2d ed. (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1989), afterword; and John S. Odell, "Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis," *World Politics* 43 (October 1990).

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literature on change in Soviet (and now post-Soviet) international behavior.[10]

The argument in brief is as follows. The appearance of a new ideology of international affairs in Soviet policy under Gorbachev was in no way preordained by a changing international system or domestic modernization processes. Rather, a changing external environment and the advent of a reformist general secretary created a series of policy windows through which aspiring policy entrepreneurs jumped. These purveyors of new concepts and ideologies—individual academic specialists and heads of research institutes—did not, however, operate in a vacuum. They acted within institutional and political settings that at different times either constrained or enhanced their ability to influence policy.

After more fully explicating the explanatory framework, I assess its utility by conducting a case study of one particularly important set of specialists in the former USSR: those at the Academy of Sciences Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). As IMEMO has long been considered one of the most important foreign policy think tanks in the Soviet Union/Russia, a study of its role in shaping the Gorbachev foreign policy revolution should help to improve our understanding of the relationship among ideas, institutions, and state behavior. I conclude with an assessment of the implications of the analysis for several ongoing debates in the international relations literature.

Windows, Entrepreneurs, and Institutions

Scholars in the field of international relations have spent much of the past thirty years engaged in an often not very fruitful debate over the level-of-analysis issue in the study of state behavior.[11] One problem in this debate is confusion over what precisely the subject is. Is it broad patterns of state interaction over time (for example, the seemingly recurrent formation of balances of power), or is it the foreign policy behavior of particular states? Even the most adamant systems-level theorist would admit that while international levels of analysis may be sufficient for the former, they need to be supplemented by domestic levels if the latter

[10] See, e.g., Robert Legvold, "Soviet Learning in the 1980s," in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 4), 684–87, 720–26. Also addressing this issue is Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace through Strength' End the Cold War? Lessons from INF," *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991).

[11] The seminal work on the level-of-analysis problem remains J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14 (October 1961). This debate continues to the present. See, e.g., the divergent predictions of a number of international relations specialists on the future of European security in the new, post–cold war world, in Sean Lynn-Jones, ed., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).

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topic is being examined.[12] Lack of precision in specifying the topic of explanation has led more than one analyst astray.[13]

A second, more troubling aspect of the debate is that until recently the accepted wisdom has held that it was appropriate to maintain different levels of analysis, especially in terms of theory development.[14] In recent years, however, a growing number of scholars—first, in the subfield of international political economy (IPE) and, more recently, in the foreign policy/security area—have argued the need for integrating domestic and international levels of analysis to explain topics as diverse as regime formation, international trade policy, foreign policy decision making, alliance behavior, and security policy.[15]

This is not to deny the importance of international/structural sources of state behavior. Rather, it is to argue that systems-level explanations are inherently limited: they define the universe of possible outcomes but do not explain why particular ones occur.[16] The challenge for theorists is to develop analytic frameworks that explore the dynamic between international and domestic variables, a dynamic that ultimately determines the character and content of particular policy outcomes.[17] Put another way, theories that analyze domestic "decision processes as well as [sys-

[12] A point clearly recognized by Kenneth Waltz (fn. 9), 122–23. See also Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990), 137–38.

[13] See, e.g., Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Mandelbaum utilizes—unsuccessfully—international-level structural theories to explain the security policies of particular states.

[14] McKeown (fn. 9), 56.

[15] In the IPE literature, see, among others, McKeown (fn. 9); Paul Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policymaking," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987); Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987), 513–17; Keohane and Nye (fn. 9), 257–67; Odell (fn. 9); and Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," in Haas (fn. 6), 367–69. In the foreign policy/security studies subfield, see Timothy McKeown, "The Foreign Policy of a Declining Power," *International Organization* 45 (Spring 1991), 278–79; Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73," *International Organization* 45 (Summer 1991), 370–74, 393–95; Risse-Kappen (fn. 10); and Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (March 1991), 13. Robert Putnam provides an important theoretical treatment and argument for integrating domestic and international levels. See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988).

[16] For a recent and perceptive review of the debate over structural/systemic theories, see Stephan Haggard, "Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

[17] In the IPE subfield, this dynamic has recently been theoretically argued and empirically demonstrated by G. John Ikenberry. See Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement," in Haas (fn. 6).

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tematically/structurally influenced] decision outcomes are stronger theories than those which purport merely to explain outcomes."[18]

Another problem left unexplained by an approach that focuses on international sources is the timing of the changes. Why did the moderation in Soviet international behavior begin under Gorbachev and not before? As has recently been persuasively argued, a number of international factors contributed to this moderation,[19] yet many of them were in no sense new. Some—such as nuclear weapons and the liberal capitalist system of states—had already been present in the international system for decades.[20] To answer the question of why they only became influential determinants of Soviet policy under Gorbachev, then, one needs to explore the *interaction* between international and domestic-level variables.[21] This mandates a certain tolerance for theoretical pluralism, as well as the development of explanatory frameworks with multiple levels of analysis.[22]

Acceptance of the need to link domestic and international levels of analysis to understand more fully changes in Soviet/post-Soviet external behavior then raises additional questions. What factors should be examined at the domestic level? What is the nature of the interaction between domestic and international levels? On the first question, both the IPE and comparative politics literatures have made an important contribution by reminding us that ideas—in particular, specific sets of ideas or ideologies, intellectual frameworks, and concepts—can be important determinants of state behavior.[23]

[18] McKeown (fn. 9), 56. Advancing a similar argument are Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, "Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (December 1991), 374–75. In an interesting parallel to the move away from structural/systemic theories within the international relations field, several scholars in the comparative politics literature have recently argued that domestic-level structural arguments must likewise be supplemented, in this case, to make better sense of the political phenomena of concern to comparativists. See especially Peter Hall, "Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas," in Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), chap. 14; Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19; Timur Kuran, "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991), 13–25; and Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991), 122, 126–36.

[19] Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7). The authors are to be commended for their systematic treatment of this neglected issue.

[20] Deudney and Ikenberry themselves admit that their explanation is overdetermined: "Given the number of variables that suggest shifts to accommodation [in Soviet policy], the question may not be why it happened, but why did it not happen earlier?" Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7), 116.

[21] A point clearly recognized even by Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7), 116.

[22] On this, see, especially, Matthew Evangelista, "Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy," in Philip Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[23] These literatures, which sit at the intersection of comparative politics and international

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The notion that ideas matter, however, begs a more important question: how and under what conditions are they influential determinants of policy? As John Kingdon has argued in the public policy field, the issue is not so much the origins of ideas (although this is certainly of interest) as it is the factors that help particular ideas take hold and grow.[24]

Earlier writing on the role of ideas in politics examined their influence primarily from an individual level of analysis, emphasizing the importance of ideas held by particular individuals.[25] More recently, however, several analysts have argued that to understand what makes certain ideas take hold and grow, one must look beyond the individual to the role of institutions as well.[26]

This latter writing provides the theoretical basis for my research on change in Soviet international behavior. I explore the influence of ideas on Soviet/Russian state behavior by examining the institutional and political contexts that have shaped and filtered these ideas. I assign a key role to the ideas of particular individuals and examine how institutional and political variables constrain or enhance their ability to influence policy. Furthermore, I argue that changing systems-level variables can and often does provide these "peddlers" of new ideas with opportunities to advance them.

More specifically, my dependent variable is the dramatic change that began in late 1985 in the Soviet political leadership's understanding of the issues, actors, and fundamental dynamics of the international environment within which the USSR operated. The independent variables are the set of beliefs and attitudes on international politics developed and held by Soviet academic specialists, the role of institutions, political factors, and changes in the international system. Some theorists might prefer a shorter list of causal variables, but, as has been argued in other

relations, include John Odell, *U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Emanuel Adler, "Ideological 'Guerrillas' and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Computer Industry," *International Organization* 40 (Summer 1986), 673–705; idem, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 276–280; Hall (fn. 18); and Sikkink (fn. 18). For especially useful definitional and theoretical overviews of the role of ideas in politics, see Odell, chap. 6; and Sikkink (fn. 18), chap. 1.

[24] Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 75–77.

[25] See, e.g., Odell (fn. 23), chap. 2.

[26] See, especially, Judith Goldstein, "Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy," *International Organization* 42 (Winter 1988); idem, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies," *International Organization* 43 (Winter 1989); and Sikkink (fn. 18), chap. 7.

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contexts, such parsimony would be gained at the expense of capturing the full array of factors affecting a complex process.[27]

My approach departs in two ways from the explanatory frameworks advanced in recent writings on ideas and politics. First, I explore more systematically the interaction between the individual and institutional levels of analysis. Second, I suggest a route by which systemic, external-level stimuli enter the domestic policy process and create "windows" for the promotion of particular ideas or views.[28]

In the case of the former USSR, academic specialists and research institutions under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences have been an important source of new ideas in Soviet politics over the past twenty-five years. In contrast to previous writing on these specialists, however, I do not see them as completely "free agents" who independently form their ideas and conceptual frameworks.[29] Rather, I see them as operating within an institutional context that often influences their behavior in important ways.[30] Thus, I am sympathetic to what has come to be called the "new institutionalism."[31] If nothing else, this perspective reminds us that institutions—their standard operating procedures and structures—matter. There is indeed abundant empirical evidence in the West that "processes internal to political institutions, although possibly triggered by external events, affect the flow of history."[32]

Applied to the Soviet/post-Soviet case, the argument holds that the ideas and intellectual outlooks of specialists are filtered through the in-

[27] Hall (fn. 23), 259–60. See also Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 25. Using slightly different language to make the same point, Gilpin argues that "eclecticism may not be the route to theoretical precision, but sometimes it is the only route available." As I will suggest in the last section of the article, the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR—by providing a large set of real-world cases where states are undertaking major reorientations in their foreign policies—offer an important opportunity to control more carefully for the influence of each of the four causal variables in the framework.

[28] Recently, a number of scholars have suggested another mechanism—transnational epistemic communities—by which external-level variables can enter the domestic policy process. See, e.g., the contributions in Haas (fn. 6). I will address this literature in the article's concluding section.

[29] Previous analyses of these specialists do see constraints on their behavior, but they are of a general nature and apply equally to most other participants in the process as well. See, e.g., Hough (fn. 3), 16–18.

[30] For the theoretical and empirical justification of this viewpoint, see Jeff Checkel, "Organizational Behavior, Social Scientists and Soviet Foreign Policymaking" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991).

[31] See, especially, James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984), 734–49; and idem, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989). Odell (fn. 9), 152–55, provides a useful review of the most recent international political economy literature utilizing this institutionalist perspective.

[32] March and Olsen (fn. 31, 1984), 739.

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stitutional settings in which they operate. Depending upon the details of a particular organization's history and sense of mission, these settings can either hinder or promote particular ideas or outlooks.[33] In others words, these specialists would be expected to respond to the "constraints and opportunities presented by [their] institutions."[34]

A challenge for the institutionalist perspective is to explain *nonincremental* change.[35] After all, despite the institutional organization of most of our social, economic, and political lives, there *are* cases of dramatic and rapid change in policy. Soviet foreign policy since 1985 is an obvious case in point. To understand such nonincremental change, one needs to turn to the individual level of analysis and explore how particular combinations of circumstances (policy windows) can be exploited to overturn existing organizational norms and constraints.

Clearly, the ability of any one individual to modify basic organizational missions is highly constrained. First, a process of selective recruitment usually ensures that individuals with a mind-set different from the dominant institutional ideology rarely join the organization.[36] Moreover, once an individual has joined, an array of bureaucratic obstacles and power relationships minimize his ability to affect the organization's behavior.[37]

Nonetheless, it must be recognized that most institutions do contain one or more individuals who rock the boat or run against the grain of the dominant mind-set. John Kingdon has called such individuals "policy entrepreneurs."[38] They seek to promote particular ideas that may or may not fit comfortably within the institution's self-defined sense of mission. Whether such a person succeeds in gaining acceptance for new

[33] On this, see also Goldstein (fn. 26, 1988, 1989). A useful review and critique of cognitive approaches such as Goldstein's is Haggard and Simmons (fn. 15), 509–13.

[34] Odell (fn. 9), 153. On the importance of institutional structures in shaping outcomes, also see Sven Steinmo, "Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain," *World Politics* 41 (July 1989).

[35] This was a central theme of the panel "Reflections on the New Institutionalism," held at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991.

[36] See Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 228–33. For evidence that selective recruitment occurs in an academic think tank such as IMEMO, see Checkel (fn. 30), chap. 7.

[37] Downs (fn. 36), chaps. 6, 12; James Thompson, *Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 105–8; and Pasquale Gagliardi, "The Creation and Change of Organizational Cultures: A Conceptual Framework," *Organization Studies* 7 (1986), 119–21, 130–33.

[38] Kingdon (fn. 24). See also Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities and Agenda Setting," in John Tropman, Robert Lind, and Milan Dluhy, eds., *New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy* (New York: Pergamon, 1981). The arguments about the role of policy entrepreneurs in explicitly institutional settings are taken from Checkel (fn. 30), chap. 1.

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ideas depends to some extent on his or her expertise, position within the organization, negotiating skills, personality (traits such as persistence), and connections to higher-ups in the organization or outside it.

Whether or not his entrepreneurial skills have the desired effect also depends on the external environment in which his institution operates. Two particular environmental factors are important: (1) whether there are problems in that external setting that could be solved in whole or in part by the implementation of the entrepreneur's ideas; and (2) whether there are leaders in power who recognize that such problems do indeed exist.[39]

These last two variables, taken together, create an opportunity, or policy window, through which an aspiring entrepreneur can "jump" in an attempt to sell a particular idea, intellectual outlook, or policy.[40] In the foreign policy issue-area, the concept of policy window is a way of linking domestic levels of analysis to the international setting. In particular, for Soviet/Russian foreign policy specialists and their institutions, external threats or other changes in their international environment help form such a window. How wide this window opens, however, is a function of the other variable mentioned above: a political leadership willing to consider the new knowledge being purveyed by these specialists.[41]

Hence, my framework emphasizes the role of chance in the policy process. (Are entrepreneurs available? Are policy windows open?) Along with a growing number of scholars, I therefore argue for moving beyond the "stages" model of the process first developed during the 1970s and 1980s.[42]

To sum up, to understand the role and influence of ideas on Soviet/Russian foreign policy, one has to integrate factors operating at several levels of analysis. My clear bias is toward the importance of domestic variables: individual policy entrepreneurs and their ideas, institutional settings, and enlightened political leadership.

As I have suggested, however, by creating policy windows, a changing

[39] On the former point, a number of analysts agree that the influence of new ideas is partly a function of their ability to solve key problems faced by political decision makers. See, e.g., Hall (fn. 18), 386–89; Sikkink (fn. 18), 247; Ikenberry (fn. 17), 318–21; and Adler and Haas (fn. 15), 380.

[40] On this, see Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17 (March 1972), 1–25; and Kingdon (fn. 24), 89–94.

[41] Taking a slightly different approach, Evangelista (fn. 22), 275–77, 335–36, has also suggested the importance of policy entrepreneurs and windows for understanding changes in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev.

[42] I will return to this point in the article's concluding section. The stages heuristic typically divides the process into a logical sequence, for example, agenda setting, option formulation, decision selection, and implementation.

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external environment also matters. It is simply impossible to understand the shift to moderation in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev (and the influence of new ideas and concepts) without an appreciation of the changing international environment and the deteriorating external situation facing the USSR in the early 1980s.

The Reagan military buildup, the recovery in many Western capitalist countries from the economic stagflation of the 1970s, the technological challenge of SDI, the crisis in Poland, and the failure of the Afghan intervention did indeed matter. These events created windows and opportunities and thus helped begin a process that eventually led to a revolutionary redefinition of Soviet state interests in the international arena.[43] This occurred through an interaction among individual/cognitive, institutional, and leadership variables.

This framework, with its multivariate emphasis, obviously sacrifices parsimony and generalizability for a deeper understanding of a particular instance of change in state behavior (albeit one without precedent in seventy years of Soviet history). The potential payoff, however, is at least twofold. First, within the field of Soviet/post-Soviet studies this kind of analysis can contribute to the ongoing and painfully slow process of bringing the study of the former USSR back into the mainstream of contemporary social science.[44] The events of August 1991 and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union have, if anything, reinforced the need for such a reintegration.

Second, within the broader international relations field, this study can contribute to several of the more promising research programs, because of its explicit focus on the relationship of knowledge to power and the links between domestic and international variables.

Academic Expertise and the Gorbachev Revolution

As far back as late 1986 several Western analysts had recognized that Gorbachev's foreign policy reforms were quite different from those of Brezhnev and Khrushchev. In particular, Gorbachev did more than sim-

[43] As an anonymous reviewer has correctly noted, I am essentially arguing that ideas as influence are partially "demand-driven," that is, turned to when structural or other changes in the international system trigger a search. Although such sources may prompt this search, the degree of influence new ideas ultimately have on policy depends on the array of *domestic* variables discussed above.

[44] On this, see, especially, Frederic Fleron, ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," *International Security* 9 (Winter 1984–85); idem, "Science and Sovietology: Bridging in the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies," *World Politics* 40 (January 1988); and Evangelista (fn. 22), 259–60.

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ply bring in new people (for example, Shevardnadze as foreign minister in July 1985) and articulate new policies (such as the unilateral nuclear test moratorium announced in August 1985); he also brought in new ideas and concepts.[45] By early 1986 Gorbachev was articulating a dramatically different worldview (*mirovozzreniye*)—to borrow some Soviet-speak. The ideas and conceptual frameworks underlying it would eventually be used both to legitimize radical changes in Soviet international behavior and undercut the arguments of domestic opponents of these changes.

As many analysts have noted, this new worldview—captured in phrases such as "values common to all mankind," "global problems," "interdependence," "mutual security," and "reasonable sufficiency in defense"—was in fact not new at all. Such concepts had been articulated by various academic specialists and institutions in the USSR since at least the mid-1960s.[46] Yet it was only beginning in 1985–86 that such notions came to influence both the basic assumptions informing Soviet foreign policy and the strategic prescriptions for the USSR's national security.[47]

Gorbachev's revised basic assumptions include the following:

—an official view of the international system that stressed its interdependent nature and the advent of global problems

—a goal structure for Soviet policy that emphasized the dominance of nonclass over class values and interests

—an image of capitalism that openly questioned the Leninist orthodoxy concerning its inherent aggressiveness and militarism

And the revised strategic prescriptions are as follows:

—a new conceptualization of national security that gave first priority to mutual efforts at ensuring it

—a new criterion guiding the development of the Soviet military force posture (the principle of reasonable sufficiency of military potentials)

The specialists at IMEMO were instrumental in putting several of these issues on the Soviet public agenda. To understand why these researchers and their ideas were sometimes influential (and sometimes not), one must appreciate the institute's own history and sense of mission, how personal and institutional factors interacted and sometimes clashed within it, the role played by policy entrepreneurs and windows, and—

[45] See, e.g., Charles Glickham, "New Directions for Soviet Foreign Policy," Radio Liberty *Research Bulletin* Supplement 2/86 (September 6, 1986); and Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach to Security," *World Policy Journal* 3 (Fall 1986).

[46] Lynch (fn. 3); and Zimmerman (fn. 3).

[47] The distinction between basic assumptions and strategic prescriptions draws on George W. Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 430–31.

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most importantly—the ties it was able to establish to a reformist political leadership.

By the early 1980s IMEMO was a well-established institution that had a clearly defined sense of mission, a rather stable structure, and a well-articulated and distinctive set of beliefs about the international system.[48] The institute's sense of mission focused on the study of the political economy of contemporary capitalism, international economics, and conceptual-theoretical studies of the international system. This type of "fundamental" research was given priority over such applied topics as the study of U.S. foreign behavior or questions of international security.[49]

In the early 1980s, the institute quite aggressively promoted a distinctive ideology of international relations, including a complex empirical and essentially nonclass vision of world politics. In particular, it advocated the study of global problems such as environmental degradation and resource depletion that cut across national and—as institute scholars often pointed out—ideological boundaries.

All this ideological advocacy mattered not at all in terms of official Soviet views. Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and other elites were content to repeat the tried-and-true verities of the Marxist-Leninist dogma. Hence, leadership statements and other official documents stressed the class-based nature of the international system, downplayed or simply ignored the topic of global problems, and emphasized the importance of the international class struggle.

This result is understandable given the paucity of "access channels" through which IMEMO (and other academic institutes) could enter the policy process. In fact IMEMO's prime route for influencing policy—personal ties between institute leaders and the top political leadership—was completely disrupted in 1982 with the death of *both* longtime IMEMO head Nikolay Inozemtsev and CPSU general secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

The importance of this political context for understanding the relationship of the specialists' knowledge to Soviet policies and state behavior is highlighted even more dramatically by another event that occurred in

[48] For a recent and authoritative overview of the ideology of international relations developed at IMEMO during the 1970s and early 1980s, see Yevgeniy Primakov, "Uchenyy, rukovoditel', chelovek (k 70-letiyu akademika N.N. Inozemtseva)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (hereafter *Memo*) 4 (April 1991), 104–10. Primakov had served as a deputy director of IMEMO for seven years in the 1970s and returned as its director for several years in the mid-1980s.

[49] This assessment of IMEMO's sense of mission is derived from (1) a review of institute literature and programmatic statements by IMEMO's top leadership concerning its research agenda, both over a sixteen-year period (1964–71, 1980–87); (2) an examination of the training and background of key institute leaders; (3) a quantitative analysis of the subject matter of articles published in IMEMO's journal, *Memo*; (4) interviews with institute researchers and leaders; and (5) a review of the various graduate degree programs offered at IMEMO.

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1982, when IMEMO was the target of a pressure campaign that had backing at high levels within the CPSU. This campaign, which included the arrest of a deputy director and the formation of a CPSU/KGB investigatory commission, had a tremendous influence on the institute's behavior.

IMEMO's remaining access channel to the political process—aside from personal connections to top political leaders and their staffs and occasional reports sent to the Central Committee (many of which were never read)—was its publications, especially its monthly journal *Memo*. Yet because of this political interference, *Memo*, for the first and only time in a sixteen-year period from the 1960s into the 1980s, virtually lost its "voice" during 1982. For example, the institute's strident advocacy of the need to study global problems, which had been so evident in the early 1980s, nearly disappeared from the pages of *Memo* during 1982 and early 1983.

IMEMO's fortunes, and ultimately its ability to use its expert knowledge to influence Soviet policy, took a dramatic turn for the better in the last half of 1983, with the appointment of Aleksandr Yakovlev as institute head. This change, it turns out, was largely a product of chance. Gorbachev had met Yakovlev during the summer of 1983 while touring Canada, where Yakovlev was ambassador.[50] The two men hit it off, and Gorbachev decided he wanted Yakovlev back in Moscow. Needing a "safe" place for Yakovlev (that is, not a high party or government post), Gorbachev "parachuted" him into a convenient and relatively safe position that happened to be open: the directorship of IMEMO.[51]

After his appointment in September 1983, Yakovlev quickly began to exploit his new position and mobilized the institute in a dramatic way to advance several radical positions—positions that within eighteen months began to find their way into Gorbachev's own speeches. Put another way, Yakovlev, the policy entrepreneur, was exploiting an emerging policy window to influence the views of a political leader, Gorbachev, to whom he had direct access.

How did Yakovlev mobilize the institute? As institute researchers re-

[50] Yakovlev was essentially in "exile" at this time. He had been posted to Canada in 1973, after losing a battle with conservative Russian nationalist elements within the Communist Party. Prior to 1973 he had spent most of his adult life working in the central apparatus of the CPSU, mainly in its propaganda, science, and culture sections. In notable contrast to most apparatchiks, Yakovlev was well educated. He held a doctorate (in historical sciences) along with the academic rank of professor and had spent a year as an exchange student at Columbia University in the late 1950s.

[51] On this, see also Arkadiy Vaksberg, "Priglasheniye k sporu: Zametki na polyakh knigi A.N. Yakovleva 'Kakim my khotim videt' Sovetskiy Soyuz'," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 15, 1991, p. 3. The directorship of IMEMO was open because Vladlen Martynov, who had taken over as the institute's leader in the wake of Inozemtsev's death, was officially only its acting director.

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count it, he brought a more open atmosphere to IMEMO and encouraged serious, scholarly research, while downplaying Marxist-Leninist dogma.[52] Moreover, under his leadership, several new rubrics specifically intended as a forum for unorthodox, controversial views were introduced in the institute's journal, *Memo*. In other words, Yakovlev, the acknowledged mastermind behind Gorbachev's later policy of glasnost, was already implementing within IMEMO reforms much in the spirit of this policy.

The policy window Yakovlev exploited was a function of two factors, both of which were apparent by the first half of 1984: (1) Soviet foreign policy had reached a low point not seen in decades (perhaps in the whole postwar era); and (2) Gorbachev was now the clear heir apparent to Chernenko and had made known his openness to new ideas on foreign and security policy.[53] While these two factors created the policy window for Yakovlev, what made it work—that is, what made the ideas of Yakovlev/IMEMO so influential—was Yakovlev's personal tie to Gorbachev from early in the fall of 1983.

In one sense, however, Yakovlev does not fit the description of a policy entrepreneur. He did not have a ready-made solution looking for a problem but instead was open to a range of new ideas and approaches on foreign policy, as long as such approaches proceeded from the realities of the contemporary world. This latter point is one he made over and over again in the past half dozen years.[54]

Yakovlev's own lack of a clear vision for resolving the foreign policy problems facing the USSR reinforced the importance of the institutional context within which he was operating. As will be seen below, he did

[52] Those familiar with Yakovlev's publications during the years 1983–85 may well question this observation. Many of these writings were vitriolic, propagandistic, and extremely anti-American. Institute researchers assert, however, that Yakovlev's tone and approach within the institute were completely different. Moreover, a careful review of his writing during this period reveals several instances where he adopted a very unorthodox approach on matters of foreign (and domestic) policy. See, e.g., Yakovlev, "Dinamizm i konservatizm—ikh adepty" (Dynamism and conservatism—their adherents), in Yakovlev, *Realizm—zemlya perestroyki: Izbrannye vystupleniya i stat'i* (Realism—land of perestroika: Selected appearances and articles) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990). This essay, first published in 1990, was in fact written by Yakovlev at the time he assumed the leadership of IMEMO in 1983. For further evidence of his unorthodox views during these years, see Yakovlev, "Demokratiya, toropyas', ne proizvodit nravstvennoy selektsiy," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 25, 1991, p. 3. Yakovlev reveals in that article that as far back as late 1985 he had proposed splitting the CPSU into two parties, thus fostering the development of multiparty politics in the Soviet Union.

[53] On this last point, also see "Vystupleniye M.S. Gorbacheva v Britanskom parlamente," *Pravda*, December 19, 1984, pp. 4–5; and Georgiy Arbatov, "Memuary. Arkhivy. Svidetel'stva: Iz nedavnego proshlogo," *Znamya*, no. 10 (October 1990), 221.

[54] See, e.g., Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Obshchestvennye nauki na novom etape," *Pravda*, November 28, 1987, p. 3. The one exception to this pragmatic approach is Yakovlev's image of American capitalism. See fn. 69.

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indeed mobilize the institute and make it an influential player in the advent of the new thinking, but IMEMO was most "mobilizable" and influential only on those issues that best fit with its own long-standing ideology and beliefs about international relations.

Structure of the International System

Beginning in late 1983 IMEMO dramatically increased its earlier advocacy in favor of revising the official Soviet dogma concerning the structure of the international system. Two issues in particular received significant attention: the correlation between class and nonclass values in the world arena and the specific nature of the international system. On both issues, IMEMO engaged in extraordinary advocacy throughout the years 1983–85. In many instances, this advocacy came in the work of senior institute scholars writing in the lead article of a given issue of *Memo*.

The very clear message that emerged from institute advocacy on the relationship of class to nonclass (*obshchechelovecheskiy*) values was that the former should be subordinated to the latter.[55] Although this distinction might seem to have little practical significance for Soviet foreign policy, in fact, this was not the case. As of 1986 Soviet scholars and, eventually, Gorbachev and other leaders would use the notion of the primacy of nonclass values to delegitimize one key class-based element of the foreign policy strategy inherited from the Brezhnev leadership—support for national-liberation movements—while simultaneously legitimizing the importance of such nonclass notions as "global problems" and "interdependence."

The boldness of the institute's advocacy here can only be appreciated when one recalls the extremely poor state of Soviet-American relations in late 1983 and early 1984. These ties were virtually frozen by the time of Andropov's death in February 1984.

On the second issue, of the specific nature of the international system, the institute was almost equally outspoken throughout the years 1983–85.[56] The two buzzwords for institute researchers were "interdependence" and the notion of a single "world [*vsemirnyy*] economy" that operated according to economic laws common to *both* socialism and capi-

[55] See, e.g., V. Lukov and Dmitriy Tomashevskiy, "Radi zhizni na zemle (Uroki velikoy pobedy i mirovaya politika nashikh dney)," *Memo* 2 (February 1983), 3–13; idem, "Interesy chelovechestva i mirovaya politika," *Memo* 4 (April 1985), 17–32; and Oleg Bykov, "Leninskaya politika mira i ee voploshcheniye v deyatel'nosti KPSS," *Memo* 3 (March 1984), 23–29.

[56] See, e.g., "Vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya konferentsiya: Delo Marksa zhivet i pobezhdayet," *Memo* 7 (July 1983), 72–95; and Yuriy Shishkov, "Tribuna ekonomista i mezhdunarodnika: K voprosu o edinstve sovremennogo vsemirnogo khozyaystva," *Memo* 8 (August 1984), 72–83.

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talism.[57] The point here is not that such words (and the nonclass framework of analysis they implied) were new to the Soviet scene. Scholars at IMEMO (and elsewhere) had been promoting them for years. The difference now was that the language was much more forceful ("objective realities" and the like). In addition, much of this analysis came at a time when East-West relations were so bad that the political climate within the USSR did not provide an objective basis (to borrow some Sovietspeak) for thinking in such nonclass terms.

During these years (1983–85) there is a clear contrast in the institute's advocacy of a complex, nonclass, and empirical vision of the international system, on the one hand, and of a revised view of the nature of security, on the other. In the former case the advocacy, often by leading IMEMO scholars, was very pronounced and many times appeared in the lead article of a given issue of *Memo*. On the nature of security, the advocacy was *much* less pronounced and there was less of it. Yakovlev, it would seem, had only been fully able to mobilize the institute behind a certain subset of foreign policy issues.

Thus, to arrive at a full understanding of the institute's behavior one must look not only at Yakovlev's important "entrepreneurial" role and the "window" available to him but also at the institutional context within which he was operating. Simply put, theoretical and empirical analyses on the nature of the international system were bread-and-butter issues for IMEMO. Those were its areas of expertise, and as far back as the late 1960s the promotion of a complex vision of the world arena had been a central element of its own ideology of international relations. It was natural that the institute would most vigorously promote those issues that protected and extended this core sense of mission.

For all this advocacy and bold analysis by academic researchers, one must still ask whether it mattered. It turns out that, in this case, it really did. From October 1985 Gorbachev began to describe the international system in language virtually identical to that employed by any number of these institute scholars, often indeed repeating parts of their analyses verbatim. By October 1986 concepts such as interdependence, global problems, and nonclass values were an integral part of the new general secretary's vocabulary. Yakovlev, the entrepreneur with an open policy window, had mobilized the institutional resource at his disposal (IMEMO), along with its ideology of international affairs, to influence the evolving worldview of a Gorbachev to whom he had direct access.

These concepts, and the worldview they implied, were utilized by

[57] Valkenier (fn. 3), chap. 2, provides a good overview of Soviet specialist writing during the 1970s on these concepts.

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Gorbachev and his political allies to promote several major policy changes in 1985–86. These changes included a new, more favorable attitude toward arms control (premised on the need for "mutual" security) and a dramatically revised international-economic/foreign-economic policy (premised on the need for greater Soviet integration into an interdependent world economy).

Thus, by late 1986 the largely deductive, Marxist-Leninist view of the international system that for so long had been a staple of Soviet leadership statements had been replaced by an empirical, nonclass vision—one based on an ideology of world politics championed by IMEMO for nearly twenty years.[58] New ideas and specialist expertise—with a mighty assist from a very able entrepreneur and an open window—had triumphed over the kind of Leninist dogma upheld by *the* most powerful political institution: the Soviet Communist Party.

Image of the Adversary

As of late 1986, however, Leninist dogma still prevailed in one key area: leadership views of capitalism. Gorbachev and other leaders continued to speak of capitalism in much the same way as the leadership had in the bad old days of *zastoy* (stagnation) under Brezhnev. Gorbachev, in particular, seemed curiously dogmatic on this subject. Through October 1987 he continued to talk of imperialism's inherently aggressive nature and the growth of militarism in capitalist societies.

Beginning in the fall of 1987, however, Gorbachev completely changed his tune. At a major party gathering, he turned the Leninist theory of imperialism on its head by suggesting that, yes, contemporary capitalism *could* free itself of militarism and its neocolonial tendency to exploit the developing world.[59]

These were truly revolutionary words in the Soviet context. But why the dramatic shift in the general secretary's oratory? Several likely explanations come quickly to mind. One is that the new, dramatically more moderate image of capitalism (and, by implication, of America) was needed to legitimate the more cooperative approach to ensuring Soviet national security that had been announced at the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress in February 1986. It would be difficult to justify a more cooperative approach if the chief adversary (the United States) were *inherently* prone to aggression and reliance on military force. Related to this line of

[58] The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (ISKAN), the other main international affairs think tank, had virtually nothing to say on the issues IMEMO was most aggressively promoting during these years.

[59] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Oktyabr' i perestroyka: Revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya," *Kommunist* 17 (November 1987), 31–36.

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reasoning is the argument that Gorbachev needed the new image of capitalism to undercut the domestic opposition to the new thinking that was already beginning to appear by mid-1987.

A third quite logical reason for the new image was that Gorbachev, who by 1987 had finally begun to lose his former naïveté concerning the state of the Soviet economy, was looking for additional ways to pare the Soviet defense burden. A benign image of the capitalist adversary would certainly make it easier to implement such reductions.

Any or all of these explanations may have played a part in the introduction of the new image of the capitalist adversary, but all suffer from the same drawback. They are a bit too logical and rational, particularly in light of the increasingly tumultuous sociopolitical atmosphere in the USSR. By late 1987 this kind of atmosphere—with ideas, policies, and attacks coming from all over the political spectrum—surrounded the evolution of Soviet foreign policy as well.[60]

It was a setting ripe for policy entrepreneurs. It turns out that one of these entrepreneurs was the new head of IMEMO, Yevgeniy Primakov.[61] Primakov, exploiting an open policy window and his close personal ties to Gorbachev's circle of advisers, revitalized and mobilized IMEMO (in ways even more far-reaching than those of Yakovlev) and swayed the general secretary's thinking on a fundamentally important issue: the image of the USSR's capitalist adversaries. In contrast to Yakovlev, Primakov was no outsider to the institute. He had spent seven years in the mid-1970s as one of its deputy directors.[62] Like Yakovlev, however, Primakov had solid intellectual and academic credentials, having been elected a full member of the Academy of Sciences in 1979. His scholarly work—mainly on the Middle East and the developing world—was well respected and had often stretched the limits of official Soviet dogma.

Perhaps because of his prior association with IMEMO, Primakov's effect within the institute was even greater than Yakovlev's. Senior institute scholars praise him for the "democratic" atmosphere he established and for bringing some fresh air into IMEMO. Moreover, in a powerful symbolic move, Primakov appointed German Diligenskiy editor in chief of

[60] See Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (America and the World 1988–89), 82–98.

[61] Primakov had been appointed head of the institute in December 1985, succeeding Yakovlev, who moved on to a much more important position in the Central Committee apparatus. This "promotion" may seem odd given Yakovlev's apparent success at IMEMO. Gorbachev, however, clearly wanted his close ally in a stronger bureaucratic position so that Yakovlev could help him overcome opposition to his policies in the Central Committee (which at that point was still a key actor in the political process).

[62] From 1977 to 1985 Primakov served as director of the Academy's Institute of Oriental Studies.

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the institute's journal, *Memo*. Within IMEMO, Diligenskiy had a reputation as a radical, respected for his research creativity and fierce independent streak. Of even greater symbolic importance was that Diligenskiy had lost his position at IMEMO during the 1982 CPSU/KGB "investigation." Thus, an outcast, one labeled a "dissident" in the early 1980s, was now overseeing IMEMO's most important publication.

As for Primakov the policy entrepreneur, one particular idea he was peddling in 1985–87 was the need for a dramatic revision of the Soviet image of capitalism—both its internal (economic) and external (foreign policy) components. In mid-1986 Primakov began to suggest publicly, at first cautiously but then with increasing boldness, that capitalism could endure and sustain significant economic growth, indeed, could even outgrow its militarism and aggressive foreign policy.[63] The eventual success of Primakov's entrepreneurship in using IMEMO's knowledge and expertise to modify the official Soviet image of capitalism hinged, however, on his personal ties with Gorbachev's circle of advisers.[64]

Several factors account for the policy window open to Primakov. Most important was the presence of political leaders willing to listen to new ideas (as had been the case for Yakovlev several years earlier). In addition, the CPSU's two most recent authoritative statements on the nature of capitalism—Gorbachev's Political Report (which was so innovative on a host of other foreign policy issues) to the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in February 1986 and the new edition of the Third Party Program adopted at that same congress—were *completely* at odds with a variety of signals coming from the USSR's external environment. These included, inter alia, the capitalist West's continuing success at adapting to and participating in the scientific-technical revolution and the apparent success of the "Reagan revolution" in America (in particular, its emphasis on deregulation) at stimulating sustained economic growth—contrary to Soviet expectations. These facts, however, were clearly appreciated by Primakov.[65]

As it turned out, IMEMO needed little prodding by Primakov to reconsider the image of capitalism. Revisionist views on the subject had been an important part of its ideology of international affairs since at least the

[63] See, e.g., Yevgeniy Primakov, "Leninskiy analiz imperializma i sovremennost'," *Kommunist* 9 (June 1986), 102–13; and idem, "Kapitalizm vo vzaimosvyazannom mire," *Kommunist* 13 (September 1987), 101–10.

[64] These ties first became evident in November 1985, when Primakov accompanied Gorbachev to the Geneva summit meeting. Two deputy directors of IMEMO confirm in separate interviews that by late 1986 Primakov had become a key Gorbachev adviser.

[65] See Yevgeniy Primakov, "XXVII s'ezd KPSS i issledovaniye problem mirovoy ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy," *Memo* 5 (May 1986), 6–8.

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mid-1960s.[66] In mid-1986, however, institute advocacy on this question took a qualitative jump when it began publication of a series of essays on the Soviet "theory" of state-monopoly capitalism and organized a conference to examine the Soviet framework for explaining capitalist foreign policy behavior.[67] The bottom line of this advocacy was as simple as it was revolutionary in the Soviet context: capitalism had an internal vitality that would allow it to maintain more than adequate levels of economic growth for the foreseeable future, and its external behavior posed no threat to the USSR; that is, it was *not* inherently militaristic.[68]

There is a striking correlation between this IMEMO-Primakov analysis and the commentary about the nature of capitalism Gorbachev would first use in November 1987. Primakov had mobilized the institute to consider a topic (the political economy of contemporary capitalism) quite consistent with its own sense of mission and ideology and then presented these arguments—via his personal access channel—to a skeptical Gorbachev.[69] This combination of institutional expertise and personal access prevented conservative organizations such as the Soviet military from dominating the debate.

Thus, not only on official views about the structure of the international system but also on an even more fundamental question—the image of the adversary—the new ideas and expertise of specialists had triumphed over Leninist dogma and politically powerful conservative institutional actors. In neither case, however, was this "victory" in any sense inevitable. It was the result of the efforts of skillful policy entrepreneurs who had a "mobilizable" institutional resource at their disposal, as well as access to reformist political leaders.

Did this revised image of capitalism matter? Aside from consigning another piece of Leninist dogma to the "dustbin of history," did it have any more practical effect? In one very important way, it did. In early 1988 reformist commentators began arguing on the basis of the new, less aggressive image of capitalism that the USSR did not face a serious ex-

[66] On this, see also Primakov (fn. 48), 106–7.

[67] For an excellent overview of the essays on state-monopoly capitalism (and their radical content), see Brian Taylor, "Perestroika and Soviet Foreign Policy Research: Rethinking the Theory of State-Monopoly Capitalism," *Millennium* 19 (Spring 1990). On the conference, see "Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya: Sovremennye osobennosti obshchego krizisa kapitalizma," *Memo* 6–8 (June–July–August 1987).

[68] ISKAN contributed virtually nothing to the capitalism/militarism debate in 1986–87.

[69] Aleksandr Yakovlev was an obvious source for Gorbachev's skepticism about capitalism. Yakovlev, who at this point was already one of Gorbachev's most trusted advisers, had consistently promoted an image of capitalism that was virtually identical to the one articulated by Gorbachev through early 1987. Even *after* Gorbachev's commentary on capitalism changed, Yakovlev continued to speak on the topic in a distinctly more pessimistic manner.

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ternal threat and thus could countenance a radical restructuring of its armed forces.[70]

Security Issues

On questions of international security (the balance of conventional forces, evaluations of strategic stability, nuclear doctrine and strategy, and so forth), a new relationship between specialist knowledge and the political process would, at least for IMEMO, be much more difficult to establish than in other issue-areas. This difficulty certainly did not arise from a lack of political leaders interested in civilian analyses of security. In mid-1986 Gorbachev and his allies in the leadership had explicitly and publicly stated for the first time that they indeed wanted studies of this type. Moreover, there were several security issues that could be defined as major problems for the USSR at this point (most prominently, the NATO Euro-missile deployments). In other words, a policy window was open in this issue-area as well.

Instead, IMEMO's difficulty in establishing a new relationship to the process arose from several other variables at the political and, especially, institutional levels. On the former, it is clear that through 1986 the social scientists at IMEMO (under the leadership first of Yakovlev and then of Primakov) had been unable to establish access channels to important political leaders on security issues; this contrasted notably with their success in doing so in other issue-areas. The political leadership at this point was turning to another set of Soviet specialists for advice and information on security topics.[71]

Even if the necessary access had been in place, however, the researchers at IMEMO were poorly equipped to exploit it. As noted above, "applied" issues such as international security did not fall within the institute's sense of mission, and as a result occupied only a minor place in its ideology of international affairs. This being so, the recent literature on political institutions[72] would hold that any attempt to expand IMEMO's conceptual/research repertoire to include security matters could well be a difficult exercise.

An analysis of IMEMO's behavior in the 1980s indicates this was indeed the case. The evidence is twofold. First, one needs to recall the institute's

[70] See, especially, Sergey Karaganov et al., "Vyzovy bezopasnosti—starye i novye," *Kommunist* 1 (January 1988).

[71] These were the *natural* scientists who worked for the Academy of Sciences technical divisions and, in particular, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, against the Nuclear Threat.

[72] March and Olsen (fn. 31, 1989), 16–19 and chap. 2; and Goldstein (fn. 26, 1988), 181–86 and passim.

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actions during the years 1983–85, when Yakovlev was its head. This was a period of mobilization that saw IMEMO aggressively promote several topics. Equally important, however, is what it did not promote. Specific questions of international security (for example, military strategy or arms-control verification) received *very* little attention.

This behavior is especially puzzling in light of two additional facts. For one, the announcement of the U.S. SDI program and the commencement of the Euro-missile deployments, both in 1983, should have created one or more exploitable policy windows. In addition, Yakovlev, the entrepreneur with no fixed personal agenda, had by late 1983 taken the specific step of creating a new disarmament unit within the institute to mobilize IMEMO on security issues as well. The head of this new section, Aleksey Arbatov, was a very capable (in the Soviet context) analyst of strategic issues, but he was hindered by a lack of institutional interest, resources, and expertise devoted to security issues.[73]

Second and more important is the record of the institute's behavior in the years 1985–88. Under Primakov's leadership at the time, IMEMO was influential in both promoting *and* revising Gorbachev's initial agenda for foreign policy reform. Political leaders were now openly calling for academic analyses on security topics, and by 1987 there were public debates on at least two such issues: the overall size of the Soviet force posture (the debate over "reasonable sufficiency") and whether the Soviet armed forces should be restructured along more defensive principles ("defensive defense"). To aid IMEMO's participation in this debate, Primakov, in 1986, created a full-fledged Department of Disarmament and International Security within the institute. The creation of this new unit, which was headed by Aleksey Arbatov, placed security studies on a par with other department-size research interests within IMEMO.

Despite these various changes and despite Arbatov's skills, IMEMO was a relatively uninfluential player in these security debates. Arbatov was in fact a "policy entrepreneur"—a person who like Yakovlev and Primakov had the necessary skills and connections to exploit open policy windows. Nevertheless, he failed to convert this entrepreneurship into influence, even though he had the clear backing of his boss, Primakov. A key element in this failure was that Arbatov, in bringing his expertise in strategic affairs to IMEMO, was attempting to modify fundamentally the institute's basic mission.

[73] This observation is based on an analysis of numerous IMEMO publications, as well as on interviews with three deputy directors of the institute. The institutional constraints facing Arbatov included a weakly developed scientific/technical culture within IMEMO and the institute's long-standing unwillingness to seek contacts with groups within and outside the USSR that studied issues of international security.

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This explains why Arbatov was unable to find a ready cadre of strategic analysts within IMEMO. Moreover, his entrepreneurship was openly and actively resisted by various institute scholars.[74] The basic charge these researchers leveled against Arbatov was that he was leading IMEMO away from what it did best. That this dispute received wide publicity in the institute's journal suggests the strong feelings it generated within IMEMO. In sum, Arbatov was in no sense a free agent but rather was operating within an institutional context and history, one that hindered his ability to bring new *strategic-affairs* ideas to IMEMO and the broader political process.[75]

Is this focus on institutional dynamics within IMEMO really necessary for explaining its inability to be a major actor in the area of security policy? Perhaps what really accounts for this behavior is that IMEMO, like *all* other civilian institutions, had suffered from the Soviet military's monopoly of national security expertise and information during the Brezhnev era.

While this factor has certainly played a role, by itself it is insufficient to account for IMEMO's behavior. If the military's monopoly on security expertise was the main factor at work here, one would expect other academy units—especially the other main international affairs think tank, the U.S.A. and Canada Institute (ISKAN)—to be similarly affected. This, however, was not the case. Throughout the latter half of the 1980s, ISKAN was consistently a more knowledgeable and influential participant in the Soviet security debates than IMEMO. Like IMEMO, the U.S.A. and Canada Institute had a very skillful policy entrepreneur on security matters. This individual, Andrey Kokoshin, however, was given a powerful assist by a much more facilitating institutional environment than Arbatov had at IMEMO.[76]

The comparison between Arbatov/IMEMO and Kokoshin/ISKAN and also the earlier review of Yakovlev-Primakov-IMEMO's starkly different behavior and influence in other issue-areas suggest that while individuals (entrepreneurs) and their ideas do indeed play critical roles in making

[74] See, especially, the debate between Arbatov and Elgiz Pozdnyakov, a senior scholar in IMEMO's Department of International Relations, over the proper way to study issues of international security. Arbatov, "Deystvitel'no, yest' li povod dlya spora?" *Memo* 10 (October 1988), 130–34; and Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "S kem, kak i po kakomu povodu sporit A. Arbatov?" *Memo* 10 (October 1988), 125–30.

[75] Arbatov had made quite clear on more than one occasion his desire to bring such expertise to IMEMO. See, e.g., Arbatov, "Glubokoye sokrashcheniye strategicheskikh vooruzheniy," *Memo* 4 (April 1988), 10–22.

[76] For details on the role of ISKAN and Kokoshin in these security debates, see Checkel (fn. 30), chaps. 8–10. In the spring of 1992 Kokoshin was named a deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation.

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revolutions, they often do so in institutional settings that can constrain or magnify their ability "to effect the flow of history."[77]

Alternative Explanations

The plausibility of the above account is strengthened by comparing it with several alternative theoretical frameworks for explaining the emergence of new ideas in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev. One alternative explanation—at the individual level of analysis—is the "Gorby the Great" interpretation. This argues that Gorbachev, a representative of a new and more politically sophisticated leadership generation, was himself the carrier of the new ideas that later became the central conceptual elements of the new thinking in foreign policy. Given the clear correlation between Gorbachev's accession to power and the promulgation of the new thinking, there is an obvious intuitive appeal to such an explanation.

There is very little evidence to support it, however. Prior to late 1985, while Gorbachev had clearly hinted in both public and private that he was open to new ideas on foreign policy, there is no indication that he had developed a comprehensive conceptual or policy framework for foreign policy reform.[78] In fact, the evidence is quite clear that in these early years (1984–85) of Gorbachev's ascent to power his thoughts were concentrated on a different domain of public policy: *domestic* socioeconomic reform.[79]

A second set of explanations for the advent of new ideas and knowledge in Soviet foreign policy focuses on psychological learning processes within individuals. By itself, however, a learning explanation is inadequate. First, there are the definitional problems inherent in the notion of learning and the question of who or what must learn for Soviet policy to change.[80] Second, even if one accepts that a process of learning—most importantly, at the level of Gorbachev himself—was the mechanism by which new ideas came to alter Soviet policies, learning explanation nonetheless overlook an important question. In particular, since proponents of this approach are most interested in ascertaining whether learning has

[77] March and Olsen (fn. 31, 1984), 739.

[78] See, e.g., Eduard Shevardnadze, *Moy vybor: v zashchitu demokratii i svobody* (My choice: In defense of democracy and freedom) (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), 62–63. The former foreign minister argues that during the early 1980s Gorbachev knew the kind of foreign policy he did not want—the one followed by the Brezhnev leadership—but seemed much less clear on what should replace it.

[79] Compare, for example, the discussion of domestic and foreign policy in Gorbachev, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda* (Vital creativity of the people) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), a speech of December 1984 before a conference on ideology.

[80] Tetlock (fn. 4) is an excellent overview of the definitional problems.

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occurred, they often fail to ask what accounts for particular instances of learning.[81] If Gorbachev did indeed modify his foreign policy beliefs as a result of new knowledge,[82] one must still ask who or what was the source of such knowledge. As I have argued throughout this essay, policy entrepreneurs with the requisite institutional resources and personal access were a key source of this new knowledge.

It is indeed possible that a learning model is applicable at the level of these entrepreneurs.[83] Nonetheless, to explain how cognitive processes within particular individuals (the entrepreneurs) came to influence the views of leaders like Gorbachev, the learning approach must be supplemented with an exploration of the *political context* (influence relationships, institutional access) within which the beliefs and images of Soviet leaders evolved.[84]

A third plausible explanation for the advent of new ideas in Soviet policies under Gorbachev is that their appearance was part of a logical and largely inevitable process of adaptation to various international stimuli.[85] Taken by itself, however, this explanation is also inadequate. Most importantly, by dismissing the importance of domestic-level variables, such explanations ignore the *process* by which Soviet state interests are shaped. While the international environment may have helped induce a change in Soviet interests in the mid-1980s, a focus on external stimuli alone is completely inadequate for explaining the *content* of these new/redefined interests and the role of new ideas and knowledge in this process.[86]

Obviously, international factors play a role in shaping state interests. The challenge, however, is to understand *how* they matter—under what conditions. This is an issue that must be empirically explored and not simply assumed away.[87]

[81] Legvold's (fn. 10) important account of Soviet learning in the 1980s exhibits this analytic bias.

[82] That is, through "cognitive content" learning. For a discussion of this concept, see Tetlock (fn. 4), 27–31.

[83] Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this issue.

[84] On the importance of integrating political factors into psychological theories of decision making, see also Sarah Mendelson, "Explaining Change in Soviet Foreign Policy: Learning, Motivated Bias and Epistemic Communities" (Paper delivered at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1991), 1–10. For an excellent overview and critique of learning theories as applied to the Soviet case, see Evangelista (fn. 22), 266–79, 323–28.

[85] Deudney and Ikenberry (fn. 7).

[86] For a recent treatment of this issue, see McKeown (fn. 15, 1991), 259–61, 276–78.

[87] Realist theories (which focus on a particular subset of international stimuli to explain state behavior) insist—wrongly I think—that a state's interests can be taken as a given. Even recent and quite sophisticated realist theories exhibit this analytic bias. See G. John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," *Inter-*

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Conclusions

I will address several questions related to the analysis and explanatory framework and then discuss the relevance of this research for several ongoing debates in the public policy and international relations literatures.

Analysis and Framework

To start with, there is an important methodological question to be addressed: the measurement of influence. This is an important issue in *any* study of foreign policy decision making and all the more so in the Soviet case.[88] Ultimately, my measurements of influence are indirect. I am not privy, for example, to the personal conversation a Yakovlev or Primakov had with Gorbachev or members of his personal staff. As a result, I have measured a correlation between concepts, intellectual frameworks, and policies advocated by IMEMO-Yakovlev-Primakov and changes in official Soviet views or behavior (as announced in leadership statements or important CPSU documents). However, by controlling for several likely alternative explanations and wherever possible supplementing my analysis with direct participant insights (through interviewing), I feel confident in moving from a correlational relationship to a causal one and therefore arguing that the influence patterns were real.

A second point about the framework is its relationship to that well-known concept in the study of foreign policy: the black box. The perceptive reader will recognize that while the black box has definitely been "shrunk," it is still present.[89] In particular, one must ask of the policy entrepreneurs I have identified: where did *their* unorthodox views come from? For Primakov, it is clear that his ideas on the nature of capitalism emerged from the Soviet milieu, if for no other reason than because the institution he took over in 1985 had been advancing such views for the better part of twenty years.[90]

While I have not discussed Aleksey Arbatov in detail here, it is worth noting that the source of his ideas is a more interesting case. Given that many of his security views were qualitatively new in the Soviet context when first elaborated in the mid-1980s and given that he has spent considerable time abroad (in both the U.S. and Western Europe), it is quite

national Studies Quarterly 33 (December 1989). The authors attempt to develop a realist theory that incorporates both domestic and international variables.

[88] Timothy Colton, "Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union," in Colton and Gustafson (fn. 1), 34–37.

[89] Thanks to Dave Cameron of Yale University for alerting me to this issue.

[90] See, especially, Primakov (fn. 48). Recall that Primakov had a prior association with IMEMO, as a deputy head of the institute for seven years beginning in 1970.

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likely that individuals and institutions *external* to the USSR were the source of his innovative ideas.[91] This suggests the importance of transnational linkages, an issue addressed by the literature on epistemic communities.

A third point concerns the causal logic of the framework. By arguing that foreign policy change is the result of a complex interplay of stimuli from the external environment and domestic-level cognitive, institutional and political variables, I have highlighted what I believe to be the diverse sources of major change in state behavior. This argument, however, leaves important issues unresolved. What, for example, was the *independent* causal impact of new ideas? How important was the cognitive-institutional synergy in bringing about the revolutionary redefinition of Soviet state interests? Answers to these (as well as other questions) are needed to advance an ideas-based argument more confidently.

The preceding comments point to the need for more research. The revolutions in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR, however, present a golden opportunity—a theorist's dream—to control better for the independent effect of the different variables.[92] These events provide a large set of real-world cases where existing and recently created nation-states are undertaking major reorientations in their foreign policies—and doing so at a time when both the international and domestic-level variables identified here are in great flux.

Within the former USSR, for example, the breakup of Union structures has created a dramatically different external setting for many of the former republics. At the same time these new states are establishing their own foreign policy and national security institutions, and new leaderships are assuming power in several of them. Moreover, there is early evidence that in some cases the ideas of specialists are playing a key role in shaping the worldviews and foreign policy orientations of states formerly a part of the USSR.[93] In other words, new policy windows have opened and new entrepreneurs may be coming to the fore. Comparative

[91] Two books written by Arbatov in the early 1980s clearly demonstrate his knowledge of Western strategic concepts and thinking. See Arbatov, *Bezopasnost' v yadernyy vek* (Security in the nuclear age) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980); and idem, *Voyenno-strategicheskiy paritet i politika SShA* (Military-strategic parity and the policy of the U.S.A.) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984). On Arbatov, also see Tyrus Cobb, "National Security Perspectives of Soviet 'Think Tanks,' " *Problems of Communism* 30 (November–December 1981), 54–55, 57.

[92] In the comparative politics literature, David Laitin has made a similar point with respect to the revolutions in Eastern Europe. See Laitin, "The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991), 141–42.

[93] There is interesting if preliminary evidence that this is the case in Ukraine. See Kathleen Mihalisko, "Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR* 3 (December 6, 1991), 15–19.

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research on these cases will help to rectify the problem of overdetermination in my analysis and further sharpen the ideas-based argument.

Debates in the Literature

The analysis presented here can make a contribution to three current debates in the public policy and international relations literatures. First, in the policy studies field there is a growing recognition of a need to move beyond the "stages" heuristic of the policy process developed and refined in the 1970s and 1980s.[94] As Paul Sabatier has correctly noted, this heuristic divides the process into stages but contains no clear assumptions about what forces move it from one stage to another.[95]

The present study, with its emphasis on the role of chance in the policy process, has much in common with Kingdon's alternative to the stages heuristic: the "policy streams" approach.[96] It also provides fairly strong empirical support for Kingdon's work. My main amendment to it, at least in the case of the former USSR, would be greater attention to the *institutional* context in which policy entrepreneurs—the purveyors of new ideas—operated.

Second, there is an ongoing debate in the international relations literature over the influence of domestic context on state behavior, with many arguing that this is still a neglected area of research in the field of international politics.[97] This study, I hope, has shown the tremendous importance (and complexity) of the changing domestic context for understanding the revolutionary changes in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev. We need more research in the spirit of the integrative explanatory framework advanced here (and elsewhere).[98]

Third and again within the international relations field, there is an emerging debate on how epistemic communities can influence state behavior.[99] This is an important research program that shares many insights with the analysis presented here, for example, a commitment to exploring the dynamic interaction between domestic and international

[94] See the recent symposium "Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (June 1991), 144–56.

[95] Sabatier, "Political Science and Public Policy," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (June 1991), 145.

[96] Kingdon (fn. 24).

[97] Risse-Kappen (fn. 10), 187–88; and idem, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43 (July 1991). See also Haggard (fn. 16), 432–33.

[98] As noted earlier, Evangelista (fn. 22) argues in favor of a similar approach.

[99] See, especially, Haas (fn. 6). See also idem, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization* 43 (Summer 1989); Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), chaps. 1–2; and Mendelson (fn. 84).

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sources of state behavior and a recognition that under the proper conditions new knowledge can play a decisive role in shaping state behavior.[100]

My framework differs from the epistemic framework in an important way, however: the level of analysis. The epistemic approach emphasizes the role of transnational networks of knowledge-based experts in bringing new ideas to the political process.[101] I have stressed the importance of ideas imbedded in particular domestic institutions and the role of policy entrepreneurs as essential to the dynamic whereby new knowledge enters the process. Hence, my primary levels are individual and institutional, not transnational.

This difference, however, is more apparent than real and can best be reconciled by a synthesis of the two approaches. Take, for example, the case of Aleksey Arbatov. As I suggested above, transnational contacts almost certainly played a role in the evolution of his views on security.[102] That is, Arbatov may very well have been a member of a transnational epistemic arms control community during the 1970s and early 1980s.

Yet, as this study showed, the faced significant obstacles in diffusing this knowledge within the former Soviet Union. Indeed, it was not until 1986 that he even gained an institutional platform (his own department at IMEMO) from which to promote such knowledge. Even after gaining this platform, however, his ability to diffuse new arms control concepts was hindered by institutional impediments, namely, the presence of a dominant ideology within IMEMO.

The epistemic approach does in fact recognize the importance of institutional dynamics.[103] Indeed, the third element in the causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is "institutionalization," that is, the extent to which an epistemic community consolidates bureaucratic power within domestic or international institutions. The community's influence over domestic and/or international policy-making will correlate with the degree of this bureaucratic consolidation.[104]

Despite this appreciation of institutional factors, some proponents of the epistemic approach nevertheless seem to underrate them. Emanuel

[100] These are central themes of virtually all the essays in the recent special issue of *International Organization* dedicated to epistemic policy coordination. See Haas (fn. 6).

[101] For an excellent overview of the causal logic behind the epistemic-communities approach, see Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," in Haas (fn. 6).

[102] Matthew Evangelista and Stephan Kux have suggested, in a more general sense, the importance of such contacts for the evolution of Soviet views on security. See Risse-Kappen (fn. 10), 183.

[103] Haas (fn. 101), 3–4, 33–34.

[104] Ibid., 4. The first two elements in the causal logic are *uncertainties* faced by political decision makers and *interpretation* of these uncertainties by experts. That is, uncertainties give rise to demands for information and advice that is provided by the epistemic community.

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Adler, for example, has recently argued that during the 1960s an epistemic community that began in the United States and then spread to the USSR played an important role in shaping Soviet policy on offensive and defensive strategic nuclear arms control (the SALT I and ABM treaties).[105] There are, however, several problems with this argument. For one, the Soviet leadership's overall record on arms control in the decade after these initial accords leads one to wonder whether there was a process whereby the epistemic community's influence in Soviet politics had in fact been "institutionalized." Moreover, IMEMO—one of the key institutions that could have served as a resource for members of the Soviet arms control epistemic community—was quite resistant to developing arms control expertise during this period, in part because such research fell outside its dominant institutional mind-set and ideology.[106]

In sum, while the epistemic approach and the one outlined in this article are largely complementary, the former will benefit by a more systematic consideration of institutional factors. They can play a key role in either promoting or hindering the diffusion of new ideas and knowledge, regardless of whether the deep roots of such knowledge lie in transnational networks or in domestic institutions.

[105] Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," in Haas (fn. 6), 101–45.
[106] See Checkel (fn. 30), chaps. 5–6.

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DIVERGENT LEARNING AND THE FAILED POLITICS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM

By JAMES CLAY MOLTZ*

Introduction

DECISION-MAKING theory and organizational theory both argue that state leaders increase their search for new information in conditions of crisis.[1] As Ikenberry and Kupchan explain: "Crisis creates an environment in which elites seek alternatives to existing norms that have been discredited by events."[2] This is true regardless of the nature of the crisis, whether military, sociopolitical, or economic. But what this literature does not tell us is where actors look for new information, what factors shape the *lessons* they draw from it, or whether consensus or conflict will be the ultimate result. This article examines the views of top Soviet leaders regarding economic reform, from the rise of Gorbachev in 1985 to his political demise in December 1991. It traces in particular the effects of organizational factors on Soviet borrowing from foreign capitalist models.

Its findings argue that the so-called learning theory frequently used to explain the Gorbachev reforms is correct in showing that cognitive change *did* occur in the common acceptance of a number of new princi-

* The author wishes to thank particularly Philip Roeder, as well as Thomas Graham and Susan Shirk, for their useful comments and suggestions. The University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) provided support for this study's research and writing.

[1] See, e.g., Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1968).

[2] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990), 284. This phenomenon is also described by Peter Gourevitch, who writes, "The moments of greatest freedom are crisis points." See Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 240. For a Soviet perspective on the effects of the Gorbachev-era crisis in expanding economic options, see K. Kagalovskiy, "Ekonomicheskiy krizis: Gde iskat' vykhod?" *Kommunist* 4 (March 1990). On crisis policy-making and the effects of domestic and international institutions, see Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Politics and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

World Politics 45 (January 1993), 301–25

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ples in foreign policy, politics, and political economy.[3] But the argument also challenges existing studies by showing that the particular economic programs leaders adopted and when they adopted them were determined more by their underlying *organizational* interests than any shared understandings about new cause-and-effect relationships regarding economic mechanisms. Thus, in contrast to the cooperative outcomes seen in foreign policy and in certain areas of political perestroika (restructuring), the result of this divergent economic learning was the ultimate *failure* of efforts at economic reform and the political undoing of Gorbachev himself, as other leaders successfully blamed him for the government's inaction in the face of the worsening crisis.

Up to 1988 explanations based on collective learning[4] in the economy are generally convincing due to the centralized nature of the Communist Party, in-group norms of consensus decision making, and collective responsibility for decision outcomes within the Politburo. After 1988, however, changes in electoral laws brought about by the Nineteenth Communist Party Conference shifted the flow of power increasingly in a bottom-up direction. As power swung from the Communist Party to new state bodies—including the Congress of People's Deputies and a reformed Supreme Soviet—previously collegial leaders of various organizations and bureaucracies were impelled not just to differentiate their views from one other but also to *defend* their constituencies. In these new conditions, collective learning became far less likely than it had been in the consensual environment of the old Politburo. Thus, the argument presented here seeks a more complete analysis of late Soviet economic reform, one that—unlike collective learning—can help explain the conflictual scenarios that brought about the August 1991 coup, the bitter post-coup battle for political power between Gorbachev and Russian president Boris Yeltsin, and, finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's unceremonious ouster from power. This is accomplished by combining the notion of political self-interest with a limited learning model and by focusing on the instrumental uses of this new information, rather than on Gorbachev's ultimately unsuccessful efforts at consensus building.

This study begins with the literature on international learning and examines the conditions under which the unique dynamics of such cognitive changes are most likely to occur (as well as those where learning

[3] For an example of this literature, see Robert Legvold, "Soviet Learning in the 1980s," in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

[4] See, e.g., George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Economic Reforms since Stalin: Ideology, Politics, and Learning," *Soviet Economy* 6 (July–September 1990).

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will be difficult to achieve). It then focuses on recent applications of learning theory to the Soviet economic reform debate and suggests an approach that emphasizes *divergent* learning (or "the adoption of *different* new policy understandings by members of a group") as a response to simultaneous economic and political crises. To explain the use of foreign economic information by Soviet leaders in these conditions, the article introduces a more specific subset of divergent learning that I call "borrowing."

The Roots of Learning Theory

Contemporary learning theory has its roots in the psychological, organizational, and decision-making literatures of the late 1950s through the early 1970s. Such authors as James March, Herbert Simon, and Karl Deutsch articulated the concepts of *simple* learning (changes in means), *complex* learning (changes in underlying goals), and *pathological* learning (changes that impede future cognitive growth).[5] These authors examined information flows and decision-making structures within business, academia, and government organizations, where hierarchies and decision-making rules were relatively well established and where there were relatively stable decision environments (even if in certain cases dramatic changes were required of particular institutions). They focused mainly on how different decision-making procedures shaped information searching, decision outcomes, and future strategies. As Newell and Simon concluded: "Learning is a second-order effect. That is, it transforms a system capable of certain performances into a system capable of additional ones."[6]

In the late 1970s theorists of international relations began to examine learning concepts to explain changes in international relations that could not be accounted for by the dominant structural theories in the discipline. U.S.-Soviet arms control and the rise of a number of important multilateral economic regimes challenged widely held assumptions about the all-pervasiveness of conditions of anarchy in international relations. If the system had not changed, analysts asked, how could existing theories account for the presence of new, more cooperative international behavior?

From the beginning, the learning literature in international relations

[5] See Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). He wrote, "Simple learning is goal-seeking feedback, as in a homing torpedo" (p. 92). "A more complex type of learning is the self-modifying or *goal-changing* feedback" (p. 92).

[6] Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, *Human Problem Solving* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 7.

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has focused primarily on the transnational effects of shared knowledge, usually scientific and technical information. This work has involved cases from a variety of issue-areas: strategic arms control (Nye, Weber),[7] international organizations (E. Haas),[8] nuclear proliferation (Lavoy),[9] space cooperation (Moltz),[10] regional conflict (Breslauer),[11] and international environmental regulation (P. Haas).[12] Under particular circumstances, new "consensual knowledge" caused states to alter or abandon competitive policies they had once embraced in order to pursue more highly valued collective benefits. The learning literature has primarily sought to move beyond the limited predictions of static rational-choice models by highlighting areas where states seemed to be moving "forward" intellectually toward the common solution of international problems. These conditions highlight the possibility of developing *cumulative* knowledge and thereby extending the reaches of international relations beyond the limits of abstract, noncommunicative games.

Learning in Foreign versus Domestic Policy

One of the general findings of this literature is that political factors tend to shape the learning process in inverse proportion to the level of strategic or technological factors involved. That is, one would expect fewer political intrusions into the learning process when there are objective threats to state security or when technical considerations limit the set of possible solutions, especially in conditions of international interdependence. For this reason, the prerequisites for consensual learning may arise more often in foreign policy than in domestic policy (see Figure 1). The two most persuasive examples of U.S. and Soviet learning, accordingly, developed in arms control policy and in international environmental/technological controls. In both cases high threats relative to potential

[7] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987); Steve Weber, "Interactive Learning in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control," in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 3).

[8] Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[9] Peter R. Lavoy, "Learning and the Evolution of Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Non-Proliferation Activities," in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 3).

[10] James Clay Moltz, "Managing International Rivalry on High Technology Frontiers: U.S.-Soviet Competition and Cooperation in Space" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989).

[11] George W. Breslauer, "Soviet Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 3).

[12] Peter M. Haas, "Saving the Mediterranean," *International Organization* 43 (Summer 1989).

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Policy Area	Presence of Factors Promoting Collective Learning: High Security Threats	Complex Technical Factors	Limited Popular Input	Reliable Communications	Stable political institutions
Foreign Policy	+	+	+	−	+/−
Domestic Policy	−	−	−	+	+

FIGURE 1
LINKS BETWEEN POLICY AREA AND IMPETUS FOR COLLECTIVE LEARNING

gains limited the attractiveness of existing, unilateral policies and raised the incentives for cooperation, even with an erstwhile adversary.

By contrast, such consensus-building pressures are frequently absent from domestic policy-making, particularly in times of economic crisis. Solutions under such circumstances are often highly debatable because of conflicting interpretations about the underlying causes of economic distress. These conflicts in areas of "soft" policy give politicians leeway to use information from abroad instrumentally to defend their interests, rather than causing them to band together and negotiate common fronts. As David Brian Robertson argues: "The use of lessons [drawn from abroad] as leverage in political conflict pervades policy areas where facts are contested, values are complex, and partisan differences are sharp."[13] Among the top Soviet leaders of the Gorbachev period, accordingly, virtually all agreed on such dramatic changes in "hard" policy as the INF Treaty and the withdrawals from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, while there was almost no agreement on the proper direction for domestic political and economic reforms.

We might contrast the factors promoting collective learning in foreign policy with a pattern of divergent (or cross-sectional) learning[14] that occurs more frequently during domestic policy crises. In such cases individuals often learn *different* lessons (or fail to learn) even in the presence of shared information and good communication. As regards the former Soviet Union, most studies using the learning approach have examined

[13] Robertson, "Political Conflict and Lesson-Drawing," *Journal of Public Policy* 2 (January–March 1991).

[14] The terminology used in this section was drawn from discussions with Philip Roeder, who provided valuable suggestions.

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how Politburo leaders achieved consensual policies through a process of repeated interaction with foreign governments over time, especially over matters of a technical or strategic nature. But this focus on "longitudinal" learning (collective learning over time) in foreign policy has fostered a tendency to neglect cases of divergent learning, particularly in times of domestic policy crisis. One exception to this trend is a study by Richard D. Anderson, Jr., which perceptively characterizes the *instrumental* nature of late Soviet leadership views regarding the international environment in these terms:

> They are likely to form perceptions of the international situation by the criterion of persuasiveness to their various constituencies and usefulness in justifying policy compromises and to use images chosen on these grounds to represent the international situation, instead of forming their perceptions of the international situation by monitoring the situation itself.[15]

In Soviet domestic politics after 1988, self-interest and the tendency to use information instrumentally became more pronounced because of the seriousness of the simultaneous political struggles going on between Party and state and between the center and the republics. These crisis conditions led politicians to seek strengthened ties with their own support groups, rather than risk losing their political backing by attempting to reach across established organizational lines. Thus, when faced with conflicting information about foreign capitalist economic models, these political blinders caused them to ignore messages that might otherwise have encouraged them to act upon established traditions of more consensual decision making.[16]

Learning Theory Applied to the Soviet Economic Debate

In a 1990 article George Breslauer made the first serious effort to apply a "collective learning" framework to the Soviet economic debate. He argued that such concepts are useful for explaining the gradual Soviet acceptance since the late Khrushchev period of the need for economic reform. As he concluded, "Collective learning . . . goes far toward explaining the *increasingly radical* nature of economic reforms over time."[17]

[15] Anderson, "Why Competitive Politics Inhibits Learning in Soviet Foreign Policy," in Breslauer and Tetlock (fn. 3), 117. As other studies have shown, this tendency is weakened by the presence of high strategic threats and technical factors. Thus, the author does not share Anderson's pessimism about learning in all areas of foreign policy.

[16] Herbert Simon has called this "selective attention," that is, political leaders exhibit a "deliberate ignoring of the remainder [of a package of information] as irrelevant to the subject's goals and motives." See Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1976), 309.

[17] Breslauer (fn. 4), 255.

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Breslauer argued further that Gorbachev's more radical reform proposals after 1989 were accepted by the top leadership because the deterioration of economic conditions made them "credible."[18]

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that beneath the veneer of consensus in the events of 1990 and indeed earlier, a conflict of serious proportions had already broken out between powerful organizational factions in the top Soviet leadership. Thus, while Breslauer's account is valuable for explaining the distance the leadership had traveled together intellectually from Stalin's time to the early Gorbachev years and the presence of a significant degree of simple learning (changes in means), other explanations are needed to account for the differences that broke out during the late Gorbachev years, which in the end proved more decisive in the ensuing crisis.[19]

From 1988 onward the Soviet economic debate saw a gradual *differentiation* of positions that ultimately resulted not in consensus but in cutthroat political conflicts played out from the fall of 1990 to December 1991. Thus, the evidence of the subsequent year and a half suggests that other approaches need to be utilized in order to explain (1) the failure of the Soviet Union to reform itself economically and (2) the political roots of its abrupt and—to many—unexpected end. The rest of this study addresses these aspects of the story.

To lay the groundwork, the failure of old-style consensus building can be linked to the new requirements of the increasingly pluralist Soviet political realm after 1988, which brought in factors previously *absent* from domestic policy-making. The creation of a meaningful state government, dissident voting in the Supreme Soviet, and an elected Congress of People's Deputies meant that decisions could no longer simply be made by the higher-ups, without accountability. All major state and party organizations had a great deal at stake in the changes being wrought by perestroika; under these new conditions, therefore, their leaders had to defend their constituencies or face criticism. Gourevitch's observation about Western political responses to crises could now be seen at work in the Soviet context as well. As his research emphasizes: "Economic crisis leads to policy debate and political controversy; out of conflict, policies emerge. Policies, whether innovative or traditional, require

[18] Ibid., 273. Breslauer explained that evidence of differentiation among leaders could be traced to the necessity of "authority building" within the Politburo.

[19] Ibid. As Breslauer correctly cautioned on the limits of the learning model as he looked beyond 1990: "To be an effective contributor to problem solving, learning processes require a stable frame of reference. When the situation changes fundamentally . . . lessons derived from earlier experience may no longer be applicable. That is precisely what has happened to Gorbachev's economic reform program" (p. 276).

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politics: that is, the responses to economic crisis require political support."[20]

Leaders' Search for Information under Conditions of Uncertainty

In order to identify new, more successful directions for policy in times of economic crisis, politicians—as nonexperts—look to government advisers, academic analysts, and other specialists. They also reflect on the experiences of other states that have faced similar problems in the past, filtering in the different economic mechanisms and biases at work in their own domestic institutions. Finally, they use elements of foreign models *selectively* to fit their practical needs in political struggles against rivals engaged in much the same maneuvering.[21]

As we have observed, the area of international *economic* learning contains few objective imperatives for directing domestic policy outcomes. Where there are no "right" choices or indicators of what specific policies "should" be followed, politicians tend to act in ways that will promote their self-interests, instead of seeking new knowledge primarily to achieve the "best" outcome.

Rather than using the term *collective learning*, therefore, we need to develop a concept more appropriate to what actually took place in the Soviet economic debate from 1988 to 1991: one that describes the selective use of new knowledge for both policy efficacy *and* instrumental political purposes. As a subset of divergent learning, I propose the concept of *borrowing*, which can be defined as *the process by which political leaders derive new knowledge from the international arena—and adopt new policy positions based on that information—in order to increase their political efficacy*.[22]

Unlike collective learning in international relations theory, which involves consensual knowledge developed from new technologies, situations of strategic interdependence, or iterated governmental negotiations,[23] borrowing is an explicitly secondhand, derivative form of international knowledge acquisition. It is creative only in the sense that new domestic political rationales must be developed to generate support

[20] Gourevitch (fn. 2), 19.

[21] For an excellent analysis of these processes from a public policy perspective, see Richard Rose, "What Is Lesson-Drawing?" and Colin J. Bennett, "How States Utilize Foreign Evidence," both in *Journal of Public Policy* 2 (January–March 1991).

[22] For a previous use of this term, see James Clay Moltz, "Commonwealth Economics in Perspective: Lessons from the East Asian Model," *Soviet Economy* 7 (October–December 1991).

[23] For more on learning of this variety, see Haas (fn. 8).

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for these policies. Finally, where true (or so-called complex) learning involves changes in the underlying *goal* structures of policymakers (usually toward increased cooperation), borrowing may be consistent with old competitive strategies and existing domestic coalitions.

Overall, borrowing predicts that in situations where political leaders face choices between new information coming from *competing* epistemic communities,[24] ulterior political and institutional stakes will provide a reliable indicator for determining which alternatives they will choose.

Tracing the Learning Process: The Early Gorbachev Years (1985–87)

Gorbachev's initial theme for economic reform—*uskorenie* (acceleration)—fell squarely within the tradition of his former patron, Yuri Andropov. Although his speeches acknowledged the need for change, there was as yet no hint of any need to look toward foreign capitalism as the way out. In an interview for a Western audience in the fall of 1985, Gorbachev outlined a thoroughly old-style plan for reversing the negative trend in Soviet economic performance, saying:

> To improve the functioning of the national economy it will be necessary to further strengthen centralization in strategic areas of the economy through making individual branches, regions, and elements of the economy more responsive to the needs of economic development.[25]

If Gorbachev believed that radical reform was necessary, there was little evidence of it. He continued to focus on trying to make the *existing* system work better. As he said of Soviet aims in his first year in office: "In short, we are seeking the most rational method of managing the economy."[26] Meanwhile, the debate on economic reform remained clumped into a narrow band of largely technical improvements and cosmetic meddling.[27] (See Figure 2.) For there to be truly new thinking about the

[24] An epistemic community is a group of individuals united by shared beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships in a particular domestic or international policy environment; the group is united across institutional, professional, and sometimes national boundaries. For our purposes, it may include Soviet academics, industrial officials, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, and advisers in various Central Committee departments who promoted a particular set of economic reforms. For a detailed discussion of this concept, see the special issue of *International Organization* ("Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination," ed. Peter M. Haas) 46 (Winter 1992).

[25] See "An Interview with Gorbachev," *Time*, September 9, 1985, p. 24.

[26] Ibid. He admitted only one area of Soviet weakness: "We have not yet learned proper managerial skills as is required by a modern economy."

[27] For an analysis of the nuances of the debate at this time, see Anders Aslund, *Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 25–68.

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

FIGURE 2
THE SOVIET DEBATE ON ECONOMIC REFORM (1985–87)

economy, the Soviet Union would have to break out of the notion that the only fruitful ideas for reform were homegrown.

Gorbachev's ambiguous signals (such as his focus on the anti-alcohol campaign) and the continuing strength of old-style Brezhnevites in the Politburo kept the lid on debate over reform possibilities—much less over active consideration of foreign models—until the latter part of 1986 and early 1987. After Gorbachev's initiation of glasnost in the Soviet press, academics began to engage in debate on the merits of foreign models—but with caution. After all, not so long ago, praise for capitalist methods could ruin a promising academic career. Thus, academia tended to follow rather than lead the process of perestroika, as did potential reformers within the central ministries and the party bureaucracy. These dynamics are consistent with the findings of organizational theorist Kare Rommetveit, who argues:

> Classical administrative and democratic theory suggest that changes in standard operating procedures may be instantaneous. A central planning unit or a renegotiated coalition may simply replace an established routine. Experience with organizational inertia, however, makes us believe that this type of change will be the exception rather than the rule.[28]

[28] Rommetveit, "Decision Making under Changing Norms," in James G. March and Jo-

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Although Gorbachev had ousted some of his leading conservative rivals (including Romanov and Grishin) in 1985 and appeared to have consolidated control by 1987,[29] it is clear that he was not using this power to pursue radical economic reform based on the Western model. The Twenty-seventh Party Congress in 1986 came and went without serious economic restructuring. Only in January 1987 were joint ventures with minority foreign participation legalized, and not until the June 1987 Central Committee plenum did Gorbachev launch a serious attack on the old structure of central planning and ministerial control over enterprises. Most significant was the new Law on State Enterprises, which legalized direct contacts between Soviet factories and foreign firms, weakening (at least in intent) the stranglehold on trade enjoyed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. At the same time, new legislation required that as of January 1, 1988, all enterprises (with the exception of those in the defense industry) were to be governed by the principle of *khozraschet* (self-accounting), which meant that they would be held responsible for losses and debt and, if warranted, be forced into bankruptcy. Opposition to these measures proved limited, as the reforms fell well within the technocratic solutions preferred by conservatives.

Gorbachev's adherence to long-standing Politburo norms of decision making by consensus and a united policy front allowed little room for genuine debate, however, much less pluralism within the Party. In late 1987 Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin aroused Gorbachev's ire at the October Central Committee plenum by blasting conservative Yegor Ligachev for blocking perestroika before the assembled members. Although Yeltsin was only calling for enforcement of Gorbachev's own decrees—a far cry from the radical capitalist notions he would later espouse—he was abruptly fired from both the Politburo and his leadership of the Moscow party apparatus.[30]

Judging from Soviet writings on the question of reform, most Western observers of perestroika concluded that the Western market economies—and particularly the American economy—would provide the model for Soviet reforms. It seemed that a new epistemic community based in academia had convinced government leaders to look specifically

han P. Olsen, eds, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), 141.

[29] For an argument on the strength of Gorbachev's political power at this time, see Jerry F. Hough, *Opening Up the Soviet Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988).

[30] Meanwhile, Yeltsin continued his heckling of Ligachev at the Nineteenth Party Conference the following year, although he no longer had the power to influence his or Gorbachev's positions. On the Yeltsin-Ligachev dispute, see Philip G. Roeder, "Red Sunset: Origins of the Soviet Constitutional Revolution" (Manuscript, November 1991), 315.

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at the U.S. economy as a potential model for Soviet reforms. The initial Soviet focus on American techniques, however, had more to do with structural factors within Soviet academia and government research institutions than with some purported exclusive interest. During the cold war thousands of Soviet analysts had been trained to study the United States. Many had developed at least a grudging respect for it, and they also could see which way the political wind was blowing. With their already considerable expertise, it was relatively easy to produce new articles that had a positive slant on certain aspects of the American economy.[31] Ironically, the logical implication of applying the American model would be the destruction of existing central control over economic decision making, something not lost on Gorbachev and his leadership cohort.

Recognizing this contradiction, Gorbachev and his top advisers (including particularly Aleksandr Yakovlev) began explicitly distancing themselves from the American model by mid-1987 in hopes of forging a "socialist market" based on the limited application of capitalist techniques from above. In pursuit of these goals, they began to take note of the work of then-director of the Institute of Economics Leonid Abalkin, who suggested that the Soviet Union might do well to examine the Japanese economic model. In an interview in West Germany in 1987, Abalkin went so far as to say: "Among the capitalist countries, I would assess the Japanese highest of all." For the Soviet Union he proposed that "flexible, modern planning and market economy elements" might "very well complement each other."[32] It was no coincidence when Gorbachev soon picked Abalkin to serve as the chairman of the government's new State Economic Reform Commission.

However, it is doubtful that Gorbachev was as yet fully convinced of the usefulness of borrowing from the Japanese model. As leader of the Communist Party, Gorbachev still had very different political stakes from those of his economists. As he assured the members of the Central Committee in a speech in September 1988: "If we do not strengthen but instead weaken the Party, nothing will be accomplished from perestroika." Reform was necessary, he argued, "However, there must be order."[33] Thus, the Japanese model might be useful, but only within certain, clearly defined political parameters.

[31] See, e.g., T. Krasnopol'skaya, "Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie i chastnoe predprinimatel'stvo v kapitalist-icheskikh stranakh: evolyutsiya vzaimootnosheniy" (State regulation and private enterprise in capitalist countries: The evolution of interrelations), *MEMO* 11 (1986); N. Pusenkova, "Gosudarstvennaya politika SShA v oblasti 'vysokoy tekhnologii' " (State policy in the U.S.A. in the sphere of high technology), *MEMO* 3 (1987); and M. I. Lapitskiy, "Pochemu oni rabotaet luchshe nas" (Why they work harder than we do), *SShA* 2 (1989).

[32] Abalkin interview in *Der Spiegel*, July 6, 1987, p. 98.

[33] Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Na novom etape perestroyki," in *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* (Selected speeches and articles) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 6:573.

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It is clear from this evidence that two processes were at work. First, there was a process of complex learning by Soviet economists, free for the first time to express their true views on how the Soviet Union should organize its economy. Second, there was a process of much more limited, instrumental borrowing of these ideas by Soviet politicians. This process can only be termed simple learning, because in the translation from ideas to reality much was lost because of the ulterior political motives of various leaders to promote their own constituencies (for Gorbachev, the Supreme Soviet and the power of the all-Union presidency).

Even by the end of 1989 only a tiny portion of the economic reform legislation had been effectively applied. The state planning agency (Gosplan), the state supply network (Gossnab), and the central economic ministries continued to work virtually as before. As for the new cooperative (or private) sector—for all the storm it had raised in Moscow—it constituted less than 5 percent of the economy.[34] The reason was that implementation of these reforms threatened the power bases of a number of key organizations and their leaders, especially in the central ministerial structure. Accordingly, the well-intended Law on State Enterprises went completely ignored, and ministers continued to seize enterprise profits from earned export income for reallocation to losing enterprises or favored projects.[35]

But by 1988 the combination of Gorbachev's lack of progress in reforming the old economic structure and the dynamic effects of new popular elections changed the tone of economic debate from one of collaboration to one of confrontation.

The Soviet Economic Debate (1988–90)

After the adoption of radical political reforms at the party conference in the summer of 1988, the debate on foreign economic models became much more outspoken. Gorbachev's acceptance of a multiparty system in February 1990 and his victory over the conservatives at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress in July 1990 removed the final constraints on economic debate. Finally, a new period of open discussion and experimentation had begun.

As a 1989 report from the influential Institute of Economics in Moscow concluded:

[34] Figures provided by Russian economist Aleksey Isyumov, IREX Younger Scholars U.S.-Soviet Exchange in International Economic Security, Rockefeller Center, Dartmouth College, October 11–14, 1991.

[35] Despite its illegality, this practice continued throughout the final days of the Soviet Union.

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> Economic success today cannot be established by a collection of statistical characteristics or proofs. It is not a situation, but instead a process of movement, which can be described [only] by a collection of dynamic means and qualitative characteristics. Economic success is the capability of an economy to develop dynamically and flexibly in accordance with the demands of the time.[36]

But there was still a strong desire, even on the part of academics, to seek this new "success" within the limits of the existing system and to avoid the economic disruption that would inevitably be associated with full-scale structural reforms. As economists Artemev and Stankovskiy noted, the goal of the reform movement was not capitalism but a new form of *socialism* that combined market mechanisms with state planning.[37] Gosplan chairman Yuri Maslyukov promoted a similar mix of socialist and capitalist methods, explaining: "This principled approach of using the method of central planning in conditions of a regulated market defines the possibility of the full realization of our socialist direction."[38] Along these lines, President Gorbachev asserted at the party congress in July 1990 that the state would continue to act as a mediating force to protect individuals and "create buffers for the process of transition to market relations."[39]

During this same time government officials, influenced in part by chief reform economist Abalkin, began to make strategic policy decisions to promote study and use of the Japanese model in Soviet industry and state planning organizations.[40]

New Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Far East and the extensive new press coverage devoted to the Pacific Rim economies raised public awareness of East Asian methods of quality control and technological prowess. This knowledge began to be impressed upon the public consciousness by articles in the official and private press highlighting the speed with which these countries made the transition from underdevelopment to prosperity through disciplined work and sacrifice.[41] The mes-

[36] D. V. Kuzin et al., *Ekonomicheskiy uspekh: novye faktory v sovremennykh usloviyakh* (Economic success: New factors in contemporary conditions), A Report of the Sector on Foreign Experience and Criticism of Bourgeois Theories (Moscow: Institute of Economics, USSR Academy of Sciences, December 21, 1989), 11.

[37] I. Artemov and S. Stankovskiy, "GATT i interesy SSSR" (GATT and the interests of the USSR), *MEMO* 19, no. 8 (1989).

[38] See Maslyukov's speech at the Twenty-eighth Party Congress, *Pravda*, July 5, 1990, p. 3.

[39] For the text of Gorbachev's speech, see *Pravda*, July 11, 1990, p. 2.

[40] For more details on these changes, see Moltz (fn. 22).

[41] See, e.g., V. Gubarev, "Mozhno li zhit', kak v Yaponii?" (Can we live like they do in Japan?) *Pravda*, March 20, 1990, p. 5. A large picture above the article shows a group of smiling Japanese teenage girls in front of a well-stocked electronics and appliances store. See also the interview with economist B. Z. Mil'ner, "Uzhnokoreyskiy fenomen" (The South

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sage seemed to be: If they can do it, so can we. Ironically, however, there was little effort to stimulate entrepreneurial initiative from below, and the substance of the new approach bore a disturbing similarity to an old-style, economic "campaign," rather than indicating a real revolution in thinking.

Notably, this borrowing by members of the Gorbachev leadership was not occurring in a vacuum. On the *other* side of the Soviet debate, Boris Yeltsin and newly elected reformist mayors Gavriil Popov of Moscow and Anatoliy Sobchak of Leningrad—with power bases below the all-Union level—began to promote a more Western-oriented capitalist model. This debate reached a showdown in the fall of 1990 over the highly publicized "500 days" Shatalin plan.

By this time, the major emerging forces in the political realm were the independent-minded republics, led earlier by the weak Baltic states but now joined by Yeltsin, the newly appointed president of the Russian Federation. After his humiliating demotion in 1987 from Politburo member to first deputy chairman of the State Committee on Construction, Yeltsin returned to politics in the spring of 1989 by gaining election to the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies. Although he called for more extensive reforms throughout 1989, it was only with his election to the presidency of the Russian Federation Parliament in 1990 that he attracted the attention of radical, pro-Western economists and began to develop a plan for overturning the existing economic order *and* its political structure.

Until 1988 the Soviet economic debate had largely revolved around the kind of reformed socialist political economy that was desirable for the Soviet Union. But with the worsening of the Soviet economic crisis over the course of 1990, the debate evolved into a pitched battle between two capitalist-oriented alternatives: one in which the central government would lead the move toward the market and one in which the state would be dismantled and private entrepreneurs would lead the economy. The fact that the two leading politicians now backed radical reform shows that some learning had occurred, although of a cross-sectional nature and not widely, as these approaches had many opponents. Even among these individual learners, moreover, the evidence points to adaptation rather than to complex learning. That is, since the outcome of the debate would affect domestic political actors and institutions in fundamental ways, "scientific" criteria were not the only ones considered by those who staked out positions. Ultimately, Yeltsin promoted an Amer-

Korean phenomenon), *Ogonek* 37 (September 1990). The article has a picture of a container ship loading South Korean cars for export.

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ican-inspired economic model largely for its expected political effects in dismantling the central political and economic apparatus, which blocked his attempts to exercise power at the republican level. Meanwhile Gorbachev's leadership team continued to elaborate a Japanese-style approach to reform, which would attempt to implement additional market mechanisms from above, thus maintaining central political control. The goal of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin was not just to reform the Soviet economy but to reform it and also to maintain (if not further) their own power.[42]

Political Interests and the Debate over the Shatalin Plan (1990)

When forced in October 1990 to choose between the radical, Western-oriented "500 days" Shatalin plan and the gradual, state-led Ryzhkov program, the leading Soviet politicians fell into place much as their institutional interests would have predicted (see Figure 3). Russian Federation president Yeltsin, who had expressed virtually no interest in Western economic concepts as late as 1989, now embraced the American capitalist philosophy embodied in the Shatalin plan, despite its direct opposition to his earlier communist beliefs. The 500 days plan foresaw the rapid selling off of state industries, the elimination of the central economic apparatus (Gosplan, Gossnab, and the ministries), and the initiation of a privately led development process—all of which would strengthen Yeltsin vis-à-vis Gorbachev.[43] He realized that adoption of the plan would bring the system of central economic decision making to its knees and with it the power of both the Communist Party and the central government. By contrast, after first voicing his support for it, Gorbachev backed away from the plan when negotiations with his supporters in the Supreme Soviet convinced him that it would have threatened his key political base in the state economic bureaucracy and the Party. In all, the failure of consensus building showed how widely opinions had diverged since the 1985–87 period, ranging from that of old-style communists like Ligachev to that of radical reformers like Popov. (See Figure 3.)

The ultimate defeat of the Shatalin plan in October by deputies in the

[42] Unfortunately, these goals often worked at cross-purposes, something Gorbachev did not realize until late 1991.

[43] For more on the Shatalin plan, see Marie Lavigne, "Financing the Transition in the USSR: The Shatalin Plan and the Soviet Economy," Public Policy Paper 2 (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990); on the various revisions of the plan, see Jonathan R. Schiffer, "Soviet Territorial Pricing and Emerging Republican Politics," *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* 1 (Fall 1990), 67–68.

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

FIGURE 3
THE SOVIET DEBATE ON ECONOMIC REFORM (1990)

Supreme Soviet led to charges of "politicking" on both sides. Yeltsin accused Gorbachev of caving in to conservative pressures, while government leaders charged that Yeltsin's championing of the Shatalin program had been a blatantly political move. As deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Leonid Abalkin critiqued Yeltsin's motives to deputies in the Supreme Soviet: "The '500 days' program ruled out the existence of the USSR government as an executive authority and presupposed an entirely different structure of organs and administration."[44] None of this should have come as a surprise to anyone aware of the political stakes in the debate.

[44] Interview in *Soyuz* 43 (October 1990), 2 (FBIS-SOV-90-224, pp. 45–47). Abalkin further stated that the accelerated time frame of the Shatalin plan and unpredictable effects made it "unrealistic" (p. 46).

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At the same time critics correctly argued that the economy had seen few changes—much less improvements—since 1985. In November 1990 the chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee, S. Alekseyev, characterized the enduring scale of central control even after five years of reform:

> Over 90 percent of exports and imports remain in the hands of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic [Relations] through the state order system. Territories' freedom is actually illusory, although it seems as if the gates at the border have been flung wide open.[45]

With the economic situation in the country arousing increasing popular protests, the government felt impelled to act. Delegates in the Supreme Soviet had granted Gorbachev emergency powers over the economy in November, hoping to spur him to take a strong hand. But he lacked even a basic consensus within the Federation Council because of the wide disparity of views between his remaining communist supporters and radical reformers.

The government's inability to enact a mutually acceptable package was a product of the by now open conflicts among major economic institutions, various levels of state bureaucracy, and the local, republican, and all-Union governments. These different views created a highly fragmented policy-making environment. Indeed, by early 1991 there were six distinct schools of thought regarding the proper direction for economic reform. (See Figure 4.) As one might expect, each school's position on the old system and the role of borrowing was intended to maximize its political power in the eventual postreform system.

Soviet Economic Borrowing in Political Context

In considering the range of opinion in the political spectrum by this time, a common theme is the close link between the direction of borrowing (among those schools advocating it) and the locus of their political base, whether in the all-Union government, in the republics, or at the local level. The evidence shows very little indication of any residual collective learning by 1991. Moreover, it also casts doubt on the nature of divergent learning because of its clearly instrumental character.

Within the matrix of conflicting views, Gorbachev's Integrationalist school stood for the all-Union government and the Supreme Soviet and therefore backed an East Asian-type capitalist model that called for a strong central state presence in the economy. Before the dissolution of

[45] Alekseyev in *Izvestiya*, November 10, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-224, p. 51).

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View of Old System	Negative	Mixed	Positive
Favorable	Conservatives (neo-Stalinism) (Comm. Party) (Pugo, Yanayev)	Nationalists (authoritarian) (Central mins.) (Pavlov)	Integrationalists (state-led reform) (Pres., Sup. Sov.) (Gorbachev)
Unfavorable	Old Russians (local control) (mir, church) (V. Rasputin)	Regionalists (divided econ.) (reg. govts.) (V. Fyodorov)	Republicans (full market) (repub. govts.) (Yeltsin, Popov)

View of Borrowing

FIGURE 4
COMPETING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT/ORGANIZATIONS ON BORROWING (1991)

Gorbachev's old team over the course of late 1990 and early 1991, this school included such powerful figures as chief reform economist Abalkin, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and ideologist and confidant Yakovlev. But what appeared to be complex learning by Gorbachev in his initial backing of the Shatalin plan had yielded to instrumental borrowing in his decision to revert to the conservative position and attempt to use old methods based on existing central structures. This led many more reformist supporters to abandon his cause beginning in late 1990.

The chief rival to the Integrationalists within the government continued to be the Conservatives. These primarily old communists in the state apparatus and the military-industrial complex sought to preserve their power against the challenges of both private entrepreneurs and, especially, the growing power of the republican governments. As they witnessed the weakening of their political control and the decline in economic conditions, they tended to identify the solution in a reversion to neo-Stalinist techniques: discipline, coercion, heavy industrial investment, and belt-tightening.[46] By early 1991 this group represented a powerful coalition of top leaders including Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, and Interior Minister Victor Pugo

[46] For one example of this school of economic thinking, see V. Vorobyev, "Bread Roll for One in Ten?" *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 16, 1989, p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-89-244, p. 85). The article is a scathing critique of Moscow mayor Gavriil Popov's promarket reform proposals.

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(who would lead the crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991). Conservatives found their voice in the Soviet press in the neo-Stalinist writings of Nina Andreyeva.[47] During the fall of 1990 they had played a major behind-the-scenes role in defeating the Shatalin plan. As newly appointed vice president Yanayev told representatives in the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1990: "We have no right to pursue an unpredictable, convulsive policy in a country with 300 million people."[48] This group had never engaged in learning; indeed, it had begun a reaction even against the limited reforms of the 1985–87 period, believing them to have failed.[49]

The Nationalists offered a similar, but noncommunist perspective that was slightly more receptive to the application of foreign capitalist methods. As a group, they constituted a potent force in the Congress of People's Deputies, grouped around the Soyuz organization headed by Colonel Victor Alksnis. They supported economic reform, but only within the framework of a strong, centralized, and (if need be) repressive state apparatus. Soviet prime minister Valentin Pavlov would later seek support in the Nationalist camp after he opposed Gorbachev in a dispute over presidential versus prime ministerial power in the summer of 1991, a move that would presage his participation in the August coup attempt. Here, there had been some (simple) economic learning but largely as a means of strengthening the political power of the old state apparatus.

Among those schools calling not only for economic reform but also for a rejection of the old political system, the most powerful was the Republican school. Led ideologically by the economists Stanislav Shatalin and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, this school opposed state planning as fundamentally flawed and promoted the immediate selling off of a whole range of government assets (including apartments, party buildings, and dachas), the end of state subsidies for enterprises, and a rapid shift to free-market pricing. Its political supporters—including Yeltsin and leading city mayors Popov and Sobchak—favored dismantling the central decision-making structure and redistributing power to the republics and private industry. Notably, by mid-1990 this group had begun to employ a number of American advisers. But was this learning or borrowing? The fact that Yeltsin's dramatic switch in policy advocacy from reform communism to radical Westernization had come only after his elevation

[47] She is particularly well known for her letter in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* of March 13, 1988; the letter criticized the Gorbachev reforms and stirred up rumors of a conservative coup attempt by Ligachev.

[48] Remarks by Yanayev quoted by TASS, December 26, 1990 (FBIS-SOV-90-248, p. 10).

[49] The only form of learning this does approximate is Deutsch's rare "pathological" learning (fn. 5).

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to the Russian presidency suggests that this was tactical borrowing aimed foremost at weakening Gorbachev.

Finally, there were the Regionalists and the Old Russians, who were located on the fringe of the central power struggle but who were nevertheless viewed by many Soviet citizens as offering options for reform. The first school was not a formal group but constituted an eclectic ideological kinship of individuals supporting—according to their political interests—liberal market reforms in the context of subrepublican, regional control of economic decision making. The school included such radical economists as Sakhalin oblast chairman Valentin Fyodorov, who wanted economic autonomy from both the all-Union and republic-level governments in order to pursue innovative economic reforms at the regional level and establish direct links with foreign investors. Taking a different approach, the Old Russians, while also rejecting central economic decision making, vehemently opposed the idea of borrowing from foreign capitalist models. This school's political supporters (including Valentin Rasputin, a member of Gorbachev's Presidential Council) were motivated by anti-Western, anticommunist, and often anti-industrial sentiments.[50] They called for dismantling the central control structure and reestablishing *local* control based on old, collective decision-making models (like the peasant mir). One wing of this school was gathered loosely around the ideas of the influential exile Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who in 1990 presented a plan (published in the newspaper *Literaturnaya Gazeta*) for sloughing off most of the existing Soviet republics and consolidating a new Russian national state based on traditional Slavic values and participatory local democracy.[51] The school drew support from many believers in the Russian Orthodox church, as well as from certain Soviet environmentalists.[52]

The above evidence suggests that politicians were less concerned with the economic underpinnings of foreign methods than they were with their political ramifications. During the last twelve months of the Soviet system, it would be these fundamentally conflicting organizational interests—rather than shared notions of collective learning—that would

[50] One author summarizes these views by saying that Rasputin is "an ultra-nationalist who wants to strengthen the Soviet military and is contemptuous of Western-style democracy and free markets." See Aurel Braun and Richard B. Day, "Gorbachevian Contradictions," *Problems of Communism* 39 (May–June, 1990).

[51] See Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, "Kak nam obustroit' Rossiyu" (How we can reestablish [Old] Russia), *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 18, 1990, pp. 3–6.

[52] For more on the philosophy of this wing, see Robert G. Darst, Jr., "Environmentalism in the USSR: The Opposition to the River Diversion Projects," *Soviet Economy* 4 (July–September, 1988).

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dominate the political scene, eventually destroying the old system and many of its institutions.

The Political Struggle over Economic Reform (1991)

As he weighed his options for reform in 1991, Gorbachev's main political goal remained that of replacing the old system of Communist Party control with a new system of control by an *elected* government, with himself as president. Economically, the Japanese model continued to provide a justification and a rationale for maintaining *central* (versus republican) control in these turbulent times. Leading Soviet economists close to the government had argued increasingly in the previous year that the model of Japan in the 1960s and of the East Asian NICs in the 1970s and 1980s in gradually opening their economies to international competition—through the mediating role of a state-led industrial policy—might salvage central authority even as the state moved toward market mechanisms.[53] What was interesting about the developments of 1991 is that many communist bureaucrats began to endorse the Japanese model in hopes of creating a halfway house between the old system and an unfamiliar, privately run market economy. Indeed, late 1990 and early 1991 saw an increasing number of government leaders going to Japan in order to study ways of moving from "administrative command" planning to "indicative" state planning, and of industrial personnel going to examine Japanese management techniques.[54]

It is notable that the focus of this new interest was not on the dynamic entrepreneurial aspects of the Japanese model copied by Western corporations but was instead on its successes in state management of the economy. As such, the Japanese model provided a useful example for both reform and political stability. *Pravda* political analyst Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, writing in the spring of 1991, typified the new official interest, arguing: "Japan's economy is probably more efficiently and rationally controlled by the State than that of any other capitalist country."[55]

Yet what appeared to be a period of growing strength of the Conservatives and of Gorbachev's Integrationalists at the expense of the Republicans actually proved to be the period in which the all-Union government lost its control over events. Although not known in the West at this time, an important budget agreement signed in December 1990 between the heads of the republics and Gorbachev had begun to unravel

[53] Information from comments by Soviet economists attending the IREX Younger Scholars Exchange on International Economic Security (fn. 34).

[54] For further details regarding these trips, see Moltz (fn. 22).

[55] See Ovchinnikov, "Formula for Success," *Business in the USSR* 15 (March 1991), 58–59.

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by early 1991 due to outright sabotage by the republics, especially Russia. By refusing to pay their agreed shares into the all-Union budget, the republics began to "starve" the center, which was still responsible for paying a vast state bureaucracy as well as the four million plus soldiers in the Soviet armed forces.[56] Ultimately, this forced the Gorbachev government to print rubles to pay state salaries, which caused the economy to begin spinning out of control.

In March, Yeltsin's popular election as Russian president gave him increased leverage in the negotiations over a new Union treaty. This set the stage for the dramatic transfer of power that Gorbachev would agree to in July as a last-ditch effort to save some semblance of the Union.

Ironically, many of the ideas of the old Shatalin plan came to the forefront of Soviet political debate on the eve of Gorbachev's trip to London that summer during the Group of Seven meeting. The Yavlinskiy/Pavlov program of July 1991 represented a comprehensive *state*-led reform package inspired by some of its market-oriented concepts. But this spurt of new learning by Gorbachev came too late.

With Gorbachev's proposed signing of the Union treaty in mid-August, top-level Conservatives saw no alternative but to attempt to seize power in order to save the center. By turning tax collection over to the republics and drastically reducing the revenues paid to the center, the new Union treaty would have accomplished what the Shatalin plan had proposed a year earlier—the destruction of the old central apparatus and with it the removal of tens of thousands of central bureaucrats from power.

Ironically, the failed coup by Conservatives in August only accelerated the devolution of authority. It also began to highlight differences in the agendas of the various republican leaders, suggesting that collective learning regarding the economy would become no more prevalent in the postcoup environment. Indeed, the aftermath of the coup exposed the absence of any real plan for economic and political reform in Yeltsin's Democratic Russia Movement. Its sole uniting objective was to oust Gorbachev. As one of its leaders, Nikolay P. Travkin, lamented amid the republican infighting of November 1991: "The only goals it [Democratic Russia] had were to win in presidential elections in Russia and to destroy the regime. Both were successfully accomplished—there are no more goals left for the movement."[57] With the failure of the republics to produce any real plan for common rule over the remnants of the Union,

[56] Remarks by economist Vladimir Popov at the IREX U.S.-Soviet Younger Scholars Exchange on International Economic Security (fn. 34).

[57] Michael Parks, "Yeltsin Party Fragments over Russian Unity," *Los Angeles Times* (San Diego County Edition), November 11, 1991, p. A8.

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Yeltsin and the leaders of the two other Slavic republics cobbled together a Commonwealth of Slavic States in early December. The others (excepting Georgia and the Baltic states) joined in desperation later on, fearing economic and military isolation. Yeltsin's abrupt defrocking of Gorbachev later in the month and seizure of his Kremlin office left little doubt that whatever shared notions they might have had about economic reform now took a back seat to their more basic conflicts over the locus of political power. After his experience in 1987, Yeltsin would brook no compromises in forcing Gorbachev into a similarly humiliating exit from political life as part of the destruction of the all-Union government.

Conclusion

After years of denying the relevance of capitalism to the more "advanced," "socialist" Soviet Union, the late Soviet period saw top political leaders rushing to embrace new models of political economy in hopes of leading their country away from impending economic collapse. But what we in the West tended to interpret as Soviet "collective learning" based on increased "cognitive complexity" appears in retrospect as subtle (and sometimes less than subtle) efforts by Soviet leaders to protect their own political stakes in the changing late Soviet political order through the strategic promotion of foreign economic concepts. Thus, only with the worsening of the economic crisis did Gorbachev and other political leaders move away from socialist options to more market-oriented solutions. Even then, they moved only in those directions that would leave them in possession of political power. In the end, these alternatives diverged and resulted in conflict.

The question of why other development models—besides the American and Japanese—were not seriously considered or debated is important and sheds considerable light on the processes of international economic borrowing. While a strong case can be made that Soviet leaders would have learned more of direct relevance to their economy from studying France, Brazil, or Chile, they neglected this information because of the relatively low geostrategic significance of those countries.[58] As a general rule, this phenomenon could be expected particularly in a country like the former Soviet Union, where research institutes depended on the state for their funding. These models also suffered from

[58] This finding is supported by other work in the international relations literature. See, e.g., Ithiel de Sola Pool and Allen Kessler, "The Kaiser, the Tsar, and the Computer: Information Processing in a Crisis," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Relations and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

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the fact that political leaders could not point to powerful countries that had employed them in the past; and thus, despite their perhaps greater relevance, they were discredited.[59]

Moreover, due to the necessity of "selling" these models to conflicting constituencies, the common points of different capitalist-leaning reform programs could not provide a basis for compromise. Thus, constructive information incoming about foreign economies did not serve to link up compatible epistemic communities but rather provided further ammunition for domestic political battles. Politicians shaped new knowledge about foreign models to support their own political purposes, resulting in the creation of walls even between ostensible allies. Ultimately, these barriers to compromise contributed to the failure of late Soviet political consensus building and economic reform, speeding the way toward the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The dynamics of Soviet economic borrowing suggest a number of hypotheses for testing in other cases. Specifically, these findings further our understanding of the *process* of international "learning" in four key areas. First, they point out that actors do not learn "objectively" from information in the international system; rather, they borrow information highly selectively, according to their circumstances and needs. Second, they demonstrate how the absence of objective imperatives facing decision makers in domestic economic policy (as opposed to foreign and security policies) tends to result in more politically constrained learning. Third, this research shows that when respected information sources produce *competing* policy options, individual political leaders will tend to back the alternative that will best serve their own power base. Fourth, these findings highlight the interaction of increased cognitive complexity and instrumental organizational interests in determining *when* information becomes politically salient and *what* lessons actors will draw from it.

Thus, while the process of learning may be knowledge driven, it is not dictated by that new knowledge. At the level of policy, the specific lessons "learned" by actors are affected in important ways by their domestic political interests and the institutional context of the learning process.

[59] For a comparative historical case, we might consider Soviet borrowing from the American experience in the 1920s and 1930s. This interest grew out of Soviet respect for the mass production processes pioneered by Henry Ford and other leading American industrialists, as well as for rapid advancement of the United States as a world power after World War I.

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

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

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

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

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